Essays on corporate finance and political economy by Mendes, Diogo Gonçalo de Matos
Nova School of Business and Economics
Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Dissertation, presented as part of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in Economics | Finance
Essays on Corporate Finance and Political Economy
Diogo Gonc¸alo De Matos Mendes, Nr. 5
A Dissertation carried out on the PhD in Economics | Finance, under the supervision
of Professor Miguel A. Ferreira
September 2, 2019

Abstract
The first chapter of this dissertation investigates how financial frictions affect compan-
ies’ product market decisions. As different products have different production cycles,
I find that companies focus on products entailing short cash flow maturity as a way
of alleviating financial constraints. The second chapter focuses on a randomized con-
trolled trial where a financial education course was offered to managers of medium and
large companies in Mozambique. The results suggest that financial education improves
corporate practices and performance. The final chapter analyses the impact of inform-
ation on electoral behaviour. We expose 1800 participants to information about central
government performance and evaluate its impact on voting in local elections.
Keywords: financial constraints, product market decisions, financial education, voting
behavior
i

Acknowledgements
I thank all the support and friendship of my advisors Cla´udia Custo´dio and Miguel
Ferreira. They showed me research in finance is far more than studying random walks
in financial markets and provided me unconditional guidance when my walk throughout
this journey was following random paths.
I thank my host university, Nova School of Business and Economics, for giving me
all the opportunities to pursue my academic goals. I also acknowledge other schools
I visited, namely London School of Economics and Imperial College Business School,
where I met people who contributed a lot to this work.
To the extraordinary companionship of my friends who, in their own way, made this a
very pleasant adventure. My gratitude goes to those who shared with me the pearls of
being a Ph.D. student, namely Joa˜o, Marta, Matilde, Mattia and Pedro. It also goes to
others that know very little about this thesis but showed me how to enjoy life outside
the office. Thank you, Daniel, Jose´, Mariana, Marta and Miguel.
To my parents, grandparents and brother. Words cannot describe the importance you
had in the last half a decade.
Lastly, but foremost, to my girlfriend who has always been by my side in the bad and
goods moments of this long journey.
To all, Muito Obrigado.
This work received the support of Fundac¸a˜o para a Cieˆncia e Tecnologia (FCT) under
the grants PD/BD/105722/2014 and PTDC/IIM-FIN/4177/2014.
iii

Contents
Introduction 1
1 Financial Constraints and Product Market Decisions: the Role of Pro-
duction Cycles 5
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2 Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.2.1 Product Mix Measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.2.2 Wine production in Portugal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.3 Data and Empirical Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.3.1 Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.3.2 Empirical Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.3.3 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.4.1 Credit constraints and Product Mix Decisions . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.4.2 Production cycle mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.4.3 Production Decisions and Characteristics of Current Stock . . . 40
1.4.4 Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
1.5 Robustness tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
v
Appendix of Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2 The Impact of Financial Education of Managers on Medium and Large
Enterprises — A Randomized Controlled Trial in Mozambique 67
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.2 Financial Education and Financial Policies of Medium and Large Enter-
prises in Mozambique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.2.1 Mozambique and the Selection of Firms for the Experiment . . 78
2.2.2 Financial Practices of Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.3 Design and Implementation of the Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.3.1 Experimental Design and Sample Description . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.3.2 Design of the Course . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2.3.3 Delivery of the Course and Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
2.4 The Effect of Financial Education on Financial Policies and Efficiency . 95
2.4.1 Intention to Change Financial Policies (Exit Survey) . . . . . . 95
2.4.2 Changes of Financial Policies (15-months Survey) . . . . . . . . 97
2.4.3 Changes of Financial Policies (Financial Accounting Data) . . . 100
2.4.4 Efficiency of Implemented Changes of Financial Policies (Finan-
cial Accounting Data) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
2.4.5 Threats to the Internal Validity and Robustness Tests . . . . . . 112
2.5 Interpretation and Policy Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Appendix of Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
B1 Mozambique and other Sub-Saharan Economies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
B2 Participation in the Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
B3 Appendix Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
B4 Webpage, Brochure, and Course Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
vi
3 Central Government Performance and Local Election Outcomes: A
Randomized Experiment 141
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
3.2 Experimental Design and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
3.2.1 Institutional Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
3.2.2 Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
3.2.3 Sampling and Randomization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
3.2.4 Estimation Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
3.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
3.4 Perception on Central Government Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
3.4.1 Information and perception updating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
3.4.2 Undecided and Inexperienced Voters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
3.5 Central Government Performance and Local Election Outcomes . . . . 172
3.5.1 Turnout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
3.5.2 Voting Outcome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
3.5.3 Undecided and Inexperienced Voters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
Appendix of Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
Bibliography 191
vii

Introduction
The first chapter of this dissertation studies how financial frictions affect product market
decisions of companies. Different products have different production cycles and generate
cash flow at different maturities. Therefore, companies may adjust their production
cycles to alleviate financial constraints. I use the wine sector in Portugal as a laboratory
because product mix decisions can be easily identified and linked to cash flow maturity.
I exploit a banking regulatory shock which impacted negatively on credit availability,
and I find that credit constrained firms change their product mix in response to the
shock. Firms shift from long cash flow maturity products to shorter ones. My results
suggest that the adverse impact of financial constraints on product markets may be
exacerbated with longer, less-flexible, production cycles.
The second chapter studies the impact of a financial education program for top man-
agers of medium and large enterprises in Mozambique through a randomized controlled
trial (RCT). Using survey and financial reporting data, we find consistent evidence that
managers adjust financial policies in response to the education program. The largest
treatment effects are on short-term financial policies related to working capital, which
generate a positive impact on cash flows due to reduction in accounts receivables and
inventories. There is also a smaller but significant positive impact on long-term invest-
ment. These firm policy changes improved firm performance of treated firms. Overall,
the results suggest that relatively small and low-cost interventions such as a short exec-
1
utive education program in finance improves financial practices and can affect economic
development.
The third chapter analyzes the role of information on electoral outcomes. A substan-
tial part of the information spread out around elections relates to central government
performance, even when it is not directly related to the election taking place. We invest-
igate whether the perception about central government performance drives voting in
local elections. We conducted a randomized controlled trial around the Portuguese 2017
local elections: 1800 participants were exposed to information about central government
action. We find that negative information has a strong impact on performance percep-
tion (negativity bias), and that this impact depends on the ex-ante level of awareness.
Using the exogenously-induced change in perception, we investigate voting outcomes
at local level. We find no treatment effect on turnout or probability of voting for the
government incumbent party in full sample. Nevertheless, our evidence suggests that
central government performance perception plays a role among individuals with less
rigid voting preferences.
2
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Chapter 1
Financial Constraints and Product
Market Decisions: the Role of
Production Cycles
I thank Cla´udia Custo´dio, Miguel Ferreira, Raj Iyer, Marcin Kacperczyk, Daniel Ferreira,
Fernando Anjos, Irem Demirci, Diana Bonfim, Franklin Allen, Christopher Hansman, Daniel Carvalho,
Joa˜o Granja, Ernst-Ludwig von Thaden, Nadim Habib as well as conference and seminar participants
at Nova SBE Lisbon, Bank of Portugal, and QED Doctoral Workshop for very helpful comments.
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1.1 Introduction
Financial frictions may impact project maturity decisions of companies. Those decisions
may span several dimensions such as investment in fixed capital (Campello et al., 2010;
Cingano et al., 2016; Buca˘ and Vermeulen, 2017; Amiti and Weinstein, 2018), innovation
(Howell, 2017; Krieger et al., 2018) or product market outcomes (Matsa, 2011; Phillips
and Sertsios, 2013). In all these dimensions, inefficiencies may arise as companies favor
short-term projects which provide short-term cash-flow at the expense of the long run.
These inefficiencies are likely to have real implications for the economy.
Absent financial frictions, financing decisions should not affect investment decisions.
However, as different investments may impact on cash conversion cycle, the need for
internal funds might push for different - eventually sub-optimal - decisions (Maksimovic
and Titman, 1991; Chevalier and Scharfstein, 1996). In this paper, I study whether
financial constraints prevent companies from taking long investments.
Despite the importance of this question, the empirical evidence is limited. First, it
is difficult to observe project maturity. Second, investment decisions are endogenous
with respect to financial conditions as financial and investment decisions are jointly
simultaneously taken (Giroud et al., 2011). Last, the relation between the two might
exist because they co-move with another factor (e.g. market competition). These
challenges, together with limited data availability, undermine identification.
In this paper, I overcome these challenges using a unique setting. I focus on product mix
decisions in the wine industry. The Portuguese wine sector is a suitable laboratory to
test my research question. Granular data on product market outcomes, such as product
mix and product quality, is usually unavailable.1 In this setting, I can accurately
1To circumvent these obstacles, existing empirical work has focused on specific industries for which
granular data is available (Argente et al., 2019).
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observe product mix decisions. Second, there is a direct link between product mix
and companies’ project maturity. While the production process of different wines is
similar regarding inputs and technology, different products involve production cycles of
different lengths due to the wine ageing process. In this framework, I can identify how
product mix decisions translate into companies’ project maturity. Specifically, I exploit
industry regional regulations imposing minimum ageing periods on the production of
certain types of wine. The combination of these characteristics allows to isolate and
test my research question.
The focus on this sector overcomes a few other limitations. First, harvest and produc-
tion occur only once a year. Thus, it allows to identify the beginning of each production
cycle and match it with the frequency of financial reporting (Lovell, 1961). Moreover,
this is a market composed by non-listed, private, small and bank-dependent compan-
ies. Existing studies tend to look at large or publicly-traded corporations.2 I depart
from this approach by focusing mostly on small and medium enterprises. According to
Eurostat, around 99,8% of non-financial active enterprises within EU-27 were SMEs in
2008, that jointly accounted for 59% of value added.3.
In order to observe companies’ product mix decisions, I make use of the standardized
classification scheme for agricultural products and foodstuffs in place in the European
Union. The Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) and Protected Geographical In-
dication (PGI) certifications are attributed to several agricultural products such as
wine, cheese and fruit, with the goal of promoting and protecting the reputation of
regional products. Regarding wine product, PDO and PGI certified products are as-
sociated with higher quality standards due to more rigorous production methods and
certification processes. These two product categories contrast with a third-category -
2Kashyap et al. (1994) examine micro data on US listed firms’ inventory behavior but note that, if
available, they would prefer to look at non-traded firms as these are most dependent on bank financing.
3Pocketbooks (2011).
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non-classified wine, which is not subject to specific regulation or rigorous certification
processes. Based on these three product categories, consumers can form an expectation
about products’ characteristics. Average prices of each product category illustrates that
the market perceives them as different products in several European countries. This
approach departs from other papers on wine value which use subjective measures such
as experts’ ratings or auctions’ realized values (Gibbs et al., 2009; Dimson et al., 2015).
Besides the subjectivity, those metrics only allow to study wines of famous winemakers,
which poorly reflects the entire industry.
Evidence from the 2008-financial crisis suggests a link between financial leverage and
product mix decisions. Figure 1.1a shows a decline in the production of PDO wine
when the severe international crisis hit the Portuguese economy (2010). Performing
a separate analysis according to levels of leverage as of 2008, low- and high-leverage
companies follow different trajectories (figure 1.1b). I observe that the former group
reached the average pre-crisis benchmark two years later while a much persistent and
lasting impact affected highly-levered companies.4
I exploit a source of exogenous variation in financial constraints to address the concern
that financial constraints and product market decisions are simultaneously determined.
In October 2011, the European Banking Authority (EBA) announced a Capital Ex-
ercise which required a subset of European banks to reach a 9% core tier 1 (CT1)
capital ratio by June 2012.5 This regulation in the banking system aimed at creating
“an exceptional and temporary capital buffer to address current market concerns over
sovereign risk” (EBA, 2011). This regulatory measure is arguably suitable as a quasi-
4I do not exploit the financial crisis as a quasi-natural experiment because all agents were likely
affected and it poses challenges in identifying a suitable counterfactual. Moreover, the crisis might
have created distortions in consumer preferences or market competition, which does not allow to
clearly identify the impact of financial constraints.
5This represented a sizable increase relative to the previous 5% requirement established under
Basel III.
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Figure 1.1: Evolution of PDO certified wine production
This figure exhibits the evolution of PDO certified wine production. Subfigure 1.1a depicts the evolution of PDO certified
wine production in percentage of total production. Subfigure 1.1b shows the evolution relative to pre-crisis levels (2008)
for high- and low-leverage companies. A company is defined as high (low) leverage if total assets over total liabilities are
higher (lower) than the median.
(a) In percentage of total production
(b) Relative to pre-crisis levels (2008)
natural experiment for several reasons. First, it was largely unanticipated by economic
agents (Gropp et al., 2018; Blattner et al., 2018). Second, affected banks responded
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to higher capital requirements by cutting back on credit to the economy (Me´sonnier
and Monks, 2014). Finally, the exercise targeted banks in descending order of their
market shares in each Member State such that it affected only the largest banks in each
country. This generates a well-defined counterfactual.
I use the share of credit from affected banks as a measure of companies’ exposure
to the shock. In accordance with previous studies that have studied the impact of
the EBA Capital Exercise (Me´sonnier and Monks, 2014; Blattner et al., 2018), I find
that companies in our sample with high exposure to affected banks faced a credit
contraction following the shock. Unsurprisingly, I find that this impact is stronger for
companies that rely more on bank loans as a source of financing. I use a triple-difference
specification as the main empirical approach, where treatment is given by exposure to
affected banks and a high pre-shock level of bank dependency (Amiti and Weinstein,
2018). This approach allows to compare bank dependent companies with high exposure
to affected banks (treatment group) with companies that are not exposed to affected
banks or not dependent on bank credit (control group).
I find that companies adjust product mix as a response to the credit contraction induced
by the EBA Capital Exercise. Specifically, affected companies reduce the percentage
of PDO wine (the highest certification category) on total company’s production. The
impact is economically and statistically significant. An increase in the share of credit
from affected banks by one standard deviation decreases the percentage of PDO wine
by 5 to 7 percentage points on average. I test whether companies adjust also in other
margins as a response to the shock, namely total quantity produced and sale of grapes
right after harvest. In the face of financial constraints, companies might adjust pro-
duction levels as a way of cutting production costs, or generate immediate cash flow
by selling grapes right after harvest to other producers. I do not find any statistically
significant differences in those dimensions.
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Next, I study the role of production cycle. In other words, I analyze whether the
reduction in the production of PDO wine aims at shortening cash flow maturities. To do
so, I split companies according to regions where there is a minimum ageing regulation
on the production of PDO wine. These regulations establish a lower bound on the
production cycle length. In regions where a regulation is in place, companies need to
shift production of the constrained product to other products in order to produce faster.
I show that the reduction in PDO wine production found in the full sample is entirely
driven by companies operating in these regions. An increase in the share of credit from
affected banks by one standard deviation is associated with a reduction of 10 percentage
points in the production of PDO wine in these regions. The contrasting results among
the two types of regions suggest that the ageing restriction plays a role and constrains
companies in their product market decisions. Nevertheless, these findings rely on the
assumption that these regions do not differ in other dimensions beyond the existence
of an ageing regulation. To better understand whether the ageing restriction is indeed
the driving factor, I exploit the fact that these regulations apply mainly to PDO red
wines. By looking at within-company decisions of producing PDO red and white wine,
I show that companies only adjust production of PDO red wine. This finding supports
the role of production cycle mechanism.
A more direct way of alleviating financial constraints and generating cash-flow in the
short-term could be through an increase in sales by selling current inventory (fire sales).
Hence, I expect the adjustment in production to be stronger among companies with
lower inventories. I find evidence that this is the case by splitting companies with
high and low inventory levels. These results point towards a complementarity between
production and levels of current stock. As managers see lower inventory levels, they
seem to adjust production in order to produce faster and replace inventories at a faster
rate.
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Last, I discuss performance implications of such decisions. I analyze whether affected
companies that have adjusted their product mix perform better than affected compan-
ies whose production remained unaltered. Although this step is not clearly identified
because adjustment in production is an endogenous decision, it may give some indica-
tion about the direction of the effect. I find that companies that adjust the production
of PDO wine downwards present higher performance indicators following the shock.
Overall, this result seems to suggest that the adjustment in production was an optimal
response to the shock.
I perform several robustness tests. Alternatively to the minimum ageing restrictions,
I proxy the duration of the production cycle with a financial measure of inventory
duration. Consistent with the need to shorten production cycles, I find the adjustment
in product mix is stronger among companies with high days sales of inventory. I try
to investigate whether the response can be due to certification costs. If certification
costs are a driving mechanism of the effect, I expect companies to shift production from
PDO to non-classified wine (the product category that does not undergo certification
processes). I show that the reduction in PDO wine is accompanied by an increase in
the production of PGI wine. My results are also robust to alternative definitions of
treatment and different time periods.
The choice of focusing on a single industry comes at the expense of external valid-
ity, as results may not easily apply in other industries. However, the production cycle
mechanism may be a key driver of product market decisions in several settings. Straight-
forward cases include industries where different products require long production peri-
ods. Some examples include forestry activities, livestock production and certain types
of foodstuff, such as wine or cheese.6 Nevertheless, this effect may extend beyond
6Regarding investment in woodland, in March 2017 Financial Times wrote ’”There is a frightful
interval between the seed and the timber.” So said the 18th-century wit and writer Samuel Johnson,
but wait patiently for your forest to flourish and you could see a significant return on your investment.’
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inventory-dependent sectors. Activities in which production entails large upfront costs
and long development periods such as innovative industries or the construction industry
are suitable examples. Under financial constraints, companies may decline positive NPV
projects when the estimated time to develop it is long. It may extend to the academic
profession as well. Researchers may favor shorter research agendas, such as the ones
that do not involve collecting (or waiting for) data over long periods, something that
in many cases is out of their control. Finally, financial constraints may affect product
market decisions through the production cycle mechanism in industries such as mining
or oil extraction. Gilje et al. (2017) show that financial constrained companies anticip-
ate completion of oil wells at the expense of higher long-run returns. This behavior,
which aims at relaxing financial constraints, requires anticipating production and thus
it also fits in the definition of production cycle mechanism.
This study contributes to several strands of the literature. First, this paper contrib-
utes to the literature on the link between financial constraints and corporate decisions.
Based on the pecking-order theory of capital structure, Fazzari et al. (1988) find evid-
ence that corporate investment is not independent of financing decisions. Since then,
the literature has studied relations between financial constraints and specific investment
dimensions. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) show that high leverage constrains a firm
and leads to suboptimal investment. Maksimovic and Titman (1991) argue that high
levels of debt adversely affect investment in quality as managers favor short-term cash
flow to avoid financial distress. Their intuition finds support in the debt overhang prob-
lem developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977), i.e. managers have
incentives to compromise long-term returns as any future loss is shared with debthold-
ers. A different approach is discussed in Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996). Using a
model of countercyclical markups, they show companies may opt to generate earlier
https://www.ft.com/content/44153aae-0039-11e7-8d8e-a5e3738f9ae4
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cash-flows because they are not able to invest. Second, I investigate whether the length
of the production cycle impacts product market decisions. A glimpse of what may be
explained in the light of this mechanism is briefly addressed in Matsa (2011). He finds
that the adverse effect of leverage on product availability in supermarkets is higher for
vertically integrated supermarkets, i.e. the ones that control a substantial part of the
productive process. Although suggestive, one cannot claim this finding arises from the
mechanism I propose though.7 To my knowledge, this is the first study to investigate
the role of this mechanism in product market decisions. Finally, I assess if in the con-
text of industries with long inventories, production and sale decisions complement each
other. To some extent, my results add to the literature on inventory dynamics that has
studied relations between inventory behavior and several economic dimensions, such as
industry competition (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1989), financial prospects (Carpenter
et al., 1998), and reputation (Blazenko and Vandezande, 2003).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setting.
Section 3 describes the data, empirical methodology and presents descriptive statistics.
Section 4 presents the results. In section 5, I show additional robustness tests. Section
6 concludes.
1.2 Setting
Research on product market decisions, such as product mix or quality decisions, re-
quires granular information for which traditional financial disclosures offer poor guid-
ance. Existing studies on product quality for instance focus on specific sectors where
7For instance, an alternative explanation can be that some supermarkets are included in vertically-
integrated distribution chains because they have weak ability to negotiate with suppliers. If those
negotiation skills (or bargaining power) also affects the relation with creditors, this could drive the
observed effect.
14
Chapter 1
this information is available outside companies (Matsa, 2011; Phillips and Sertsios,
2013). This information is usually compiled by industry authorities or business watch-
ers. In this paper, I use the wine industry as a laboratory to test my research question.
Wine making is a very regulated activity in the majority of the European wine produ-
cing countries. Companies are required to disclose detailed information on production
and inventory levels to competent authorities, which use this information to create
exhaustive industry records that support policy and regulatory decisions.
Wine industry provides a suitable setting to explore the effect of financial constraints
on product mix decisions. First and most importantly, product mix decisions can
be accurately observed. Given the importance of this first requirement, I devote the
following subsection to describe it in detail. Also, there is a close link between product
choice and the length of the production cycle. On average, higher quality products
are associated with longer ageing periods (Jackson, 2008, page 441). Although there
may be some exceptions, a positive relation holds in the aggregate.8 In some wine
producing countries, there is even specific regulation imposing minimum ageing periods
for several wine categories and usually for higher quality tiers. Finally, the wine making
process requires wineries to hold inventories over long periods (usually longer than one
year), and production occurs once and at a specific time of the year. These features
are important as they allow the matching between each production cycle (starting with
harvest and grape processing) and the frequency of standard financial data.9
8To establish my argument, ageing does not necessarily need to be a driver of quality. Although
this is certainly true for some wines, a positive correlation between the two suffices. That being said,
one can think of alternative, unrelated to quality, explanations to why better wines may take longer
to be placed on the market. Some examples include longer certification processes or different demand
for wines in different tiers.
9Lovell (1961) mentions that “The task of investigating dynamic inventory phenomena is complic-
ated by the difficulties involved in obtaining appropriate data based on observations collected at more
frequent than yearly intervals. Since the planning horizon of the firm is surely shorter than a year (...),
annual data will not do.”
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1.2.1 Product Mix Measurement
I make use of the standardized classification scheme for agricultural products and food-
stuffs introduced by European Union in 2012.10 With the goal of promoting and pro-
tecting the reputation of regional products, the Protected Designation of Origin (PDO)
and Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) denominations soon started appearing in
the labels of several agricultural products such as wine, cheese, fruit, etc. Concerning
wine production, certification systems and information disclosures regarding production
characteristics have long been a practice in relevant wine-producing countries. There-
fore, this new classification system was similar to the traditional appellation systems in
place for decades in those countries, which legally defined and protected geographical
indications (Jackson, 2008). Due to this fact, the classification resulting from national
transpositions of the European regulation overlapped with the traditional classification
in countries such as France, Italy and Portugal.11
In Portugal, wines certified with any of these mentions are perceived by the market
as different products. Besides avoiding the misleading of consumers by non-genuine
products, PDO and PGI denominations are associated with higher quality standards
due to more rigorous production methods and certification processes. PDO is the
highest quality category of wines followed by PGI.12 The European Union certifies as
PDO those products that are ’produced, processed and prepared in a given geograph-
ical area, using recognized know-how (...), whose characteristics are linked to their geo-
10EU Regulation No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November
2012
11In France, for instance, the traditional Appellation D’Origine Controle´e works in parallel with
the new PDO nomenclature (Appellation D’Origine Prote´ge´e), but usually only the traditional one is
presented in labels. The matching between these two classification schemes allows to apply the same
classification standards for wines produced before 2012 in Portugal. Due to this fact, I will employ
PDO and PGI nomenclature for all years in the sample.
12In some countries, there are some few examples of PGI wines whose reputation and price exceed
those of PDO counterparts. I ignore those marginal cases as I am not able to identify them. If
anything, this omission shall attenuate the findings.
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graphical origin. They must adhere to a precise set of specifications (...).’ In the case
of wine, the International Organization of Vine and Wine adds that this nomenclature
is linked to a quality level attributed to the geographical milieu including natural or
human factors.13 The PGI denomination works similarly to PDO, although produc-
tion rules are no so stringent as those applied to PDO. These two categories contrast
with a third-category - non-classified wine.14 Wines in this category are not subject to
specific regulation or rigorous certification processes. Based on these three categories,
consumers are able to establish a ranking of wine quality. Figure 1.2 exhibits average
prices for each wine category in 2016 in some relevant European wine-producing coun-
tries. For example, in Portugal the average price per litre of PDO wine was roughly
EUR 3, higher than PGI (EUR 2.43) and non-classified wine (EUR 1). Average prices
for each of these categories in different European geographies do indeed confirm that
the market perceives each product differently. I use this categorical distinction as a
metric of product mix. In the European market, all the three categories have a signi-
ficant expression. In 2016, total production was composed by 43% PDO, 21% PGI and
27% non-classified wines (ISMEA, 2017).15
A caveat of this approach it that it does not allow to distinguish wines within each
classification. This feature marks a departure from recent literature on wine value,
which uses wine-specific metrics such as experts’ ratings or auction outcomes (Gibbs
et al., 2009; Dimson et al., 2015). Unlike my approach, these methodologies usually
focus on wines produced by famous winemakers and do not cover the entire spectrum
of companies.
13International Standard For The Labelling Of Wines, OIV.
14In some countries, this category is also called Table Wine. I opted not to use this term as it is
not consistent across countries.
15The remaining 9% is must or varietal wine. The source distinguishes these two from the three
main categories.
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Figure 1.2: Average wine price (EUR/litre) in 2016, by product category
This figure displays the average wine prices (EUR/litre) by product category for major European wine producing
countries. The product categories are: Protected Denomination of Origin (PDO), Protected Geographical Indication
(PGI), and Non-Classified Wine. Export prices, domestic consumer prices and price on large distributors are presented
for regions marked with (a), (b) and (c), respectively. All figures are reported as of 2016. Sources: Eurostat (EU-28),
Instituto da Vinha e do Vinho (Portugal), Statista.com (France and Italy) and Observatorio Espan˜ol del Mercado del
Vino (Spain).
1.2.2 Wine production in Portugal
Wine making has a long tradition in Portugal and wine has long been one of the
Portuguese most exported products. According to the International Organization of
Vine and Wine, Portugal ranked second in surface devoted to vines as a percentage of
total country surface (2,1%) in 2016, only surpassed by Italy (2,3%). This importance
extends to international trade, where Portuguese wines accounted for 2,7% of total wine
exports in the world, ranking 9th in this list. A historical driver of this international
success was an early regulation and monitoring of the sector. The first wine regulation
dates back to 1756, with the establishment of the Douro Demarcated Region (where
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the famous Port wine is produced and exported from). This fact makes that region
one of the oldest demarcated regions in the world. The idea of sector supervision
persisted strongly until today and extends now to grape and wine production in all
wine regions. A visible dimension of such supervision is the maintenance of current
accounts. This is an exhaustive registration encompassing harvest, production and
stock declared by wine makers to sector regulators on an annual basis. In order to
accomplish an effective supervision, the Portuguese territory is divided into fourteen
wine regions (figure A1). Each region has specific regulation on production processes,
quality control and certification, and is supervised by an autonomous regional regulator.
Besides ensuring companies comply with the regional-specific regulation, the regional
regulators control and issue PDO and PGI denominations.
Figure A3 depicts the main stages of the wine production process. Wineries can pro-
duce grapes in their own estates as well as acquire grapes from other winegrowers. In
Portugal, the latter is very common and allows producers to reach larger production
volumes. The vines where grapes are harvested from may be classified as suitable for
PDO or PGI (appellation system). Later on, producers will be able to request any of
these certifications only for the quantity of wine made out of those grapes. This is a
necessary, but far from sufficient, requirement for certification. Due to the appellation
system, wineries commit to a provisional “maximum-quality” annual product mix in
the beginning of each production cycle with the choice of the grapes used.16 They are
not bound to their vineyards though. In the case they own vineyards suitable for a
given classification but prefer a different product mix, they might acquire grapes with a
different or with no classification, selling their own if necessary. The next stage, shortly
after harvest and grape acquisition, is grape processing into wine. By the end of this
stage, companies are required to report production levels by type, suitability for any
16Declassification is possible but subject to regulators’ approval.
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certification and color. The current accounts are updated with this new information.
Then, ageing can last for long periods depending on the type of wine. As soon as
the wine is ready to be introduced in the market, wineries may request certification.
The certification process encompasses three consecutive stages: administrative registra-
tion, physico-chemical and sensory analysis, and labeling. Administrative registration
encompasses cross-validation of the quantity requested for certification and the one pre-
viously declared in the current accounts. In the second stage, winemakers deliver wine
samples at accredited laboratories where chemical analyses take place. In parallel to
this process, an accredited tasting panel carries out a sensory trial. Conditional on the
results, the regulator then decide whether a wine fulfills the requirements to be certified
as PDO or PGI. If a wine is approved with any of the denominations, the regulators are
also responsible for verifying that the information in the label complies with European,
national and regional guidelines and that comprehensive product information is made
available to consumers. The approval of the label translates into each bottle receiving
a numerically traceable seal of guarantee. This seal attests quality and origin of the
product to the consumers. Figure A2 illustrates PDO and IGP seals of guarantee in
Alentejo region. Wines that do not fulfill the requirements to be awarded one of the
two quality denominations can still be traded as non-classified wine. Table A1 presents
a more detailed description of each production stage.
Wine production is also divided into wine types. In Portugal there are three main types:
still, liqueur and sparkling wine. PDO and PGI denominations can be attributed to
more than one type in some regions, while in others only still wine can be granted one
of these denominations. Table A2 summarizes the certified categories by region.
Another particular difference across regions is the existence of region-specific regulation
imposing minimum ageing periods. Minimum ageing periods are mandatory by law and
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regional regulators often carry out on-site inspections to production facilities and wine
cellars.17 The required ageing periods differ across regions, type and color (red or
white). In table A2, I present the mandatory minimum ageing period (in months)
imposed by each regional-specific regulation. A company in Alentejo for instance can
produce PDO, PGI or non-classified still wine with no mandatory ageing period. In
contrast, a company in Algarve producing PGI or non-classified still wine is not subject
to any ageing restriction but faces a 6-month minimum ageing requirement on PDO red
wine production. For a large majority of regions where these regulations are in place,
they only apply to PDO wines (the only exceptions are Douro and Azores). Color is
also a distinctive feature in what concerns minimum ageing.18 Looking at the columns
that split still wine into red and white types, minimum ageing regulations apply only to
red wines for a majority of the regions. In the case they apply to both red and white,
red wines tend to have a longer minimum requirement than white wines.
The wine industry in Portugal is populated by micro, small and medium-size companies.
A large majority exhibits sole-proprietorship or private limited ownership structures and
relies on banks as the primary source of external capital. By focusing on this setting, I
ultimately depart from the existing literature that focus on large or public companies.
17Imposing minimum ageing periods is not the only way to ensure an appropriate ageing period. In
the Port Wine case, existing regulation imposes a sales limit on young wines (Viana and Rodrigues,
2006).
18Color (red, white or rose´) is a primordial division among still wines (Jackson, 2008, page 8). In
Portugal, rose´ wine does not have a significant expression when compared to the other two. Therefore,
I treat rose´ wine as white given the similarities regarding the production process.
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1.3 Data and Empirical Methodology
1.3.1 Data Sources
I obtained access to the Portuguese domestic wine file from Instituto da Vinha e do
Vinho (IVV). IVV is the national regulatory agency for the wine sector under the
Portuguese Ministry of Agriculture. It coordinates the regional regulators responsible
for the control and certification of wines and is responsible for maintaining and de-
veloping the domestic wine file (current accounts). This file is an exhaustive annual
dataset comprising information spanning the wine production cycle: harvest, produc-
tion and stock.19 Winegrowers and winemakers are required to report production levels
(Harvest-Production Declaration) and inventory levels (Inventory Declaration) in each
season in accordance with Portuguese regulation.20 The information collected in these
two fillings is the primary input of the domestic wine file. This dataset is not publicly
available and only sector aggregate statistics are published.
The data comprises all Harvest-Production and Inventory Declarations submitted by
wineries between 2006 and 2016. In the Harvest-Production Declaration, companies re-
port grape quantities by product type, color, region and destination (own production,
delivery at a cooperative winery or sale to other winemaker) as well as the produc-
tion volume of new wine by product type and color. Inventory Declaration is also a
very detailed form, where companies report stock characteristics, namely quantities by
location, product type, color, year of origin, and in-bulk/bottled status.
I supplement the main dataset with the Central Balance Sheet and Central Credit Re-
19Only producers whose wine production does not exceed 4 000 litres and is destined for self-
consumption are exempted from registration.
20Harvest-Production Declaration has to be submitted between the 1st of October and 15th of
November, by the time harvest and grape transformation (into wine) must be completed. The Inventory
Declarations are reported from the 1st of August to the 10th of September relative to inventory levels
as of 31st of July.
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gistry provided by Bank of Portugal (central bank).21 The former is a comprehensive
balance sheet dataset for Portuguese firms. The Credit Registry details information
on firm-level aggregated loan amounts and characteristics, such as total, effective, po-
tential and overdue credit amounts; corresponding breakdown by maturity, collateral
and guarantees required; and number of bank relationships. It aggregates all credit
relationships between financial institutions and financial publicly limited or limited li-
ability companies. This information is assembled by the central bank from commercial
banks and other credit institutions on a monthly basis.22
I focus on companies for which financial data is available. I eliminate firm-year obser-
vations with negative total assets, total liabilities or cash. I also remove observations
when cash or inventory are higher than total assets or when the company reports less
than two employees. In order to alleviate concerns that companies may not invest in
higher quality products because they lack the necessary knowledge or technology, I
condition the analysis on companies that report a positive production of PDO wine at
any point in time. Finally, I keep companies for which I have at least 3 years of data
and operate in only one region. All variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles.
1.3.2 Empirical Methodology
The identification strategy exploits an unexpected shock to firms’ credit availability - the
European Banking Authority’s 2011 Capital Exercise. Aiming to strengthen European
banks’ capital buffers against sovereign debt exposures, EBA announced a mandatory
increase in capital requirements in October 2011. The measure established individual
banks had to raise core tier 1 capital ratios (CT1) to 9 percent of their risk weighted
21Other papers using CB and CRC include Iyer et al. (2013) and Blattner et al. (2018).
22This dataset includes all loans above 50.e Such a low reporting threshold rules out the possibility
of under-reporting for smaller companies.
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assets (RWA).23 It targeted the major banks in each European country.
This regulation was largely unanticipated by economic agents (Gropp et al., 2018;
Blattner et al., 2018). In that year, EBA had already conducted relevant stress tests
and by that time, it had already disclosed information on the exposure of each European
bank to sovereign risk.24 Furthermore, there was no clear sign that a rise in capital
requirements would induce a credit supply shortage. In fact, EBA strongly recom-
mended banks to address capital shortfalls without reducing credit supply to the real
economy. Given the unpredictability of this exercise and of its potential impact on
the corporate sector, it is unlikely that individual companies anticipated a contraction
in credit availability. Another distinctive feature of this quasi-natural experiment is
the fact that EBA Capital Exercise targeted only the largest banks in each country,
creating a well-defined control group. Finally, the Capital exercise deadline was set at
June 2012. This exceptionally short time period (8 months) make more plausible that
any observed impact is a consequence of the capital requirement shock.
Besides all efforts to ensure that the capital ratio was not ‘achieved through excessive
deleveraging, disrupting lending into the real economy’, there is evidence that banks
restricted credit supply. Using data at the European level, Me´sonnier and Monks (2014)
show that a bank that had to increase its capital ratio by 1 percent of RWA had on
average an annualized loan growth 1.2 percentage points lower than unaffected banks.
Similarly, Gropp et al. (2018) document that targeted banks increased capital ratios by
1.9 percentage points compared to the unaffected banks, and this increase was achieved
mainly by reducing risk-weighted assets (denominator) than by increasing levels of
capital (numerator). The decrease in RWA occurred mainly through a contraction of
23This new level of core-tier-1-to-RWA ratio was not related to the risk exposure of any partic-
ular bank and represented a sizable increase relative to the previous level established under Basel
III. More information about the EBA Capital Exercise can be found at: https://eba.europa.eu/
risk-analysis-and-data/eu-capital-exercise
24None of the banks that failed the stress test were targeted by the Capital Exercise.
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outstanding loans. They examine syndicated loan data in order to disentangle shifts in
supply and demand for credit and find that affected banks reduced their credit supply
by 27 percentage points relative to the remaining banks. In Portugal, there is evidence
of a similar effect, where banks responded to higher capital requirements by restricting
lending (Blattner et al., 2018).25
I obtained information about credit relationships with affected banks at the time of
the announcement from Bank of Portugal, specifically the number of relationships with
affected banks and the share of credit granted from those banks.26 In table A3, I present
difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of EBA Capital Exercise on firms’ total
credit. In the first two columns, I present estimates on the full sample. An increase in
the share of credit from affected banks by one standard deviation is associated with a
5% decrease in total companies’ debt in the years after the shock. Next, I condition the
analysis on the sample of bank dependent companies (columns 3 and 4). The intuition
is that the effect of the shock is expected to be higher for bank-dependent companies,
i.e. companies whose bank loans represent a larger share of total financing. I define as
bank dependent all companies that have a high debt ratio (non-current liabilities scaled
by total assets above the median in the end of 2011). As expected, the impact on total
credit outstanding is stronger among this sub-sample. A standard deviation increase
in the share of credit from affected banks reduces total credit outstanding by 11%. In
the last two columns, I show the estimates of a triple difference specification on the full
sample. I find that the negative impact of the EBA Capital Exercise is driven by the
cohort of companies that have higher share of credit from affected banks but are also
bank dependent. Given these results as well as the evidence from existing literature,
25In Portugal four banks have been affected by the EBA Capital Exercise. Those are: Caixa Geral
de Depositos, SA; Banco Comercial Portugues, SA; Espirito Santo Financial Group, SA; and Banco
BPI, SA.
26Due to confidentiality, the identity of creditors was not made available.
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I exploit the EBA Capital Exercise as a quasi-natural experiment. Importantly, I do
not regard this shock as a pure reduction in leverage, which could theoretically lead
to higher debt capacity in the future. Instead, the EBA Capital Exercise adversely
impacted on credit availability in the short- and medium-term.27
I estimate the following difference-in-differences specification:
Product Mixijt = β1Postt + β2Postt × EBA Sharei + β3Postt × Bank Dep.i
+ θPostt × EBA Sharei × Bank Dep.i + γXit + δi + δt + δjt + ijt (1.1)
where Product Mixijt is the share of PDO wine of company i, in wine region j, in year
t on company’s total production. Postt is a binary variable equal to 1 after the EBA
Capital Exercise (2012 onward). The variable EBA Sharei is the share of credit from
affected banks at the time of the announcement (October 2011). Bank Dep.i is a binary
variable taking on the value of 1 if the company had a high debt ratio in the end of
2011 (non-current liabilities scaled by total assets above the median). In addition, the
specification includes one-year lagged company’s characteristics such as Sizet−1 (logar-
ithm of total assets), Internal Markett−1 (percentage of sales in the domestic market),
and Any PDOt−1 (a binary variable indicating whether the company has produced any
PDO wine in the previous year). I include firm-cluster fixed effects δi which absorb all
cluster-specific credit demand shocks (Gropp et al., 2018) and year-region fixed-effects
δjt. The latter are intended to control for specific year-region characteristics, such as
climate variation and shocks in credit supply or in consumer preferences. All standard
errors are clustered at firm level.28
27This distinction is particularly important in a setting composed by small and medium size com-
panies, where identifying financial constraints is difficult.
28Preferentially, I would like to cluster at creditor level as this is the main dimension of exposure
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The coefficient of interest θ measures the impact of an exogenous increase in the likeli-
hood of a credit contraction (as a result of exposure to EBA affected banks) on product
mix. The triple difference specification is motivated by the findings in table A3. This
approach allows to compare bank dependent companies with high exposure to affected
banks (treatment group) with companies that are not exposed to affected banks or not
dependent on bank credit (control group). Amiti and Weinstein (2018) take a similar
approach and note that “a given bank shock is likely to have a much larger impact on
the investment rate of a firm that finances, say, 80 percent of its capital through bank
loans than on a firm that finances only 1 percent of its capital from loans”. Alternat-
ively, I estimate the specification as a double-difference conditioned on bank dependent
companies.
In order to evaluate whether the length of the production cycle plays a role in product
mix decisions, I run the previous specification for groups of companies with ex-ante
different production cycle duration. In the main analysis, I split companies according
to regions where a mandatory minimum ageing regulation is in place (see section 1.2.2).
This regulation imposes a minimum ageing threshold on PDO wines. If the length of
the production process indeed constrains companies in their product mix decisions, I
expect this group of companies to exhibit a different behavior following the credit supply
shock. Yet, it is difficult to rule out other potential effects that might have occurred at
the same time and might have impacted these groups differently (e.g. different credit
supply shifts, changes in input or consumer prices, changes in consumer preferences).
In order to alleviate this concern, I include year-region fixed effects in the specification.
This attenuates the concern if those effects are likely to have taken place at region level.
Furthermore, I go one step further and analyze within-company product mix decisions.
As the minimum ageing regulations apply mainly to red wines, I analyze whether the
to the shock. Unfortunately, I do not have information on each company’s list of creditors.
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adjustment is stronger for this type of wine. If the production cycle mechanism is at
work, companies may be likely to adjust preferentially the production of red wine.
1.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
In panel A of table 1.1, I present the number of observations. I obtained production
data for 52 191 companies (278 371 firm year observations). Many of these producers
operate as individual producers and are not formally registered as a company (financial
data is not available). In effect, I have production data for 3 148 producers registered
as companies (e.g. private limited), and 574 firms with available financial data (4 235
firm-year observations). Although I end up with a small fraction of all producers, they
represent a sizable share of total wine production. The companies in the final sample
represented around 67 percent of total production in 2008. I present a similar analysis
for data on harvest and stock. By looking at a representative sample of domestic wine
producers, I distinguish from other papers that focus on wines from famous wineries
(Gibbs et al., 2009; Dimson et al., 2015). In panel B, I present descriptive statistics
for companies in the final sample. The average size (total assets) is EUR 4.13 Million
and have on average 19 employees. The typical firm in the final sample is mature (25.9
years). These companies hold high levels of inventory (24% of total assets), particularly
in the form of finished inventories (21%). Inventories are not only high in volume but
also kept for long periods. The days-sales-of-inventory ratio shows that on average
these companies take 1 397 days to convert its inventory into sales. This distribution is
skewed to the right though, with several companies with very long days in inventories.
Although shorter, the median is still 552 days in inventories.
I present some descriptive statistics regarding the EBA Capital Exercise in panel C.
At the time of the announcement (October 2011), companies in the sample had on
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Table 1.1: Number of observations and firm descriptive statistics
Panel A of this table displays the number of company-year observations for different samples. “Formally Registered”
refers to the sub-sample of entities (vintners, winemakers or bottlers) formally registered as a company. The last column
exhibits the share in volume (harvest, production or in-stock wine) of companies in final sample relative to the aggregate
total volume. These values are computed as of 2008. Panel B presents financial characteristics of companies in final
sample. Panel C presents summary statistics of bank relationships at the time of EBA Capital Exercise announcement
in October 2011 (one observation per company). The sample period is 2006-2016.
Panel A: Number of observations
All Data
Formally
Registered
Final sample
% Total volume
(2008)
Harvest 374 990 21 137 3 094 18%
Production 278 371 15 315 4 235 67%
Stock 32 958 11 589 3 870 58%
Panel B: Firm Characteristics
Obs. Mean St. Dev. 25% 50% 75%
Total Assets 5 031 4 129 119 5 204 988 581 512 1 864 778 5 282 216
Cash 5 010 118 850 220 780 8 092 28 585 105 749
Total liabilities 5 031 2 404 748 3 145 739 319 093 1 002 835 3 135 860
Sales 5 017 1 612 749 2 699 776 124 738 406 843 1 574 502
Net income 5 031 10 013 168 278 -34 519 3 908 34 480
ROA 4 556 -0.01 0.16 -0.03 0.00 0.02
Leverage 5 031 0.69 0.60 0.47 0.64 0.84
Inventory 5 031 819 329 974 276 77 882 343 483 1 268 877
Inv./Assets 5 031 0.24 0.18 0.10 0.20 0.35
Days in inv. 4 911 1396.9 2232.7 223.9 552.7 1422.1
Nr. Employees 5 031 18.7 41.4 4.0 8.0 19.0
Firm age 5 028 25.9 23.9 9.0 18.0 38.0
Pct. Domestic Market 5 017 0.88 0.21 0.85 0.99 1.00
Bank Rel. 4 787 2.8 2.6 1.0 2.0 4.0
Largest bank rel. 4 350 0.77 0.24 0.57 0.84 1.00
Pct. short-term 2 932 0.49 0.38 0.10 0.47 0.99
Personal Guarantee 2 966 0.47 0.41 0.00 0.40 0.96
Panel C: EBA capital exercise (Oct 2011)
Obs. Mean St. Dev. 25% 50% 75%
No. bank relationships:
All 439 3.2 2.6 1.0 2.0 4.0
With affected banks 439 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0
With affected banks:
At least 1 relation 439 0.75 0.43 1.00 1.00 1.00
Share of credit 439 0.49 0.41 0.00 0.51 0.94
average credit relationships with 3.2 banks and 75 percent of the companies had credit
relationships with at least one of the affected banks.29 The average share of credit from
affected banks is 49%.
Next, I present some descriptive statistics on wine production (table 1.2). PDO wine
corresponds to 60 percent of total production on average. The remaining categories
29The high number of bank relationships with affected banks reflects the sizable market share of
those banks. Recall that the EBA Capital Exercise targeted specifically the largest banks in each
country.
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Table 1.2: Wine production descriptive statistics
This table reports summary statistics related to wine production. In the last two rows, statistics are computed taking
one observation per company. All statistics are presented for the final sample.
Obs. Mean St. Dev. 25% 50% 75%
Harvest for own production 3 094 0.82 0.33 0.78 1.00 1.00
Production by denomination:
PDO 4 235 0.60 0.40 0.15 0.75 1.00
N. Class. 4 235 0.14 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.10
Production by type:
Still 4 235 0.95 0.16 1.00 1.00 1.00
Liqueur 4 235 0.03 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00
Red wine 4 235 0.58 0.33 0.27 0.68 0.85
Bottled wine 3 870 0.22 0.24 0.05 0.13 0.31
Region Min. Ageing Restriction 545 0.44 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
Producer-bottler 554 0.96 0.20 1.00 1.00 1.00
(PGI and non-classified wine) have both significant expression as well. Still wine is the
main type of wine produced (95%).30 The average company produces 58 percent of red
wine in each production cycle. Given the size of companies in the final sample, it is
composed predominantly by producer-bottlers (96%), i.e. companies that control the
production process from the wine-making phase until commercialization. Roughly half
of the companies operate in regions with minimum ageing regulations (44%).
In panel A of table A4, I present a means comparison between the sub-sample of firms
with at least 50% and the sub-sample of companies with less than 50% of credit from
affected banks. The former sub-sample is composed by larger companies (according
to total assets, number of employees and sales). Apart from size, these groups do not
differ regarding other financial characteristics or wine production characteristics (the
only exception is the production of red wine). Naturally, the sub-sample of companies
with more than 50% of credit from affected banks differs from the other group in terms
of bank relationship characteristics.
Panel B of table A4 exhibits a comparison of average characteristics of companies in
30This figure may be slightly inflated due to missing observations for companies in Douro region.
This is the region with the most significant production of liqueur wine (Port wine), both in terms of
value and volume.
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regions with and without minimum ageing regulations. Companies in these regions do
not differ in terms of financial characteristics. The only exception is the days sales of
inventory ratio. Unsurprisingly, companies in regions where an ageing restriction is in
place hold inventories over longer periods. This difference is statistically significant at
10% significance level. Companies in these regions differ in terms of wine production
characteristics though. Specifically, companies in regions with minimum ageing restric-
tion produce a lower percentage of PDO wine and more red wine. Importantly, they do
not differ in the incidence of the shock. There is no statistically significant difference
regarding the number of relationships with or the share of credit from affected banks.
This fact arises from the country-wide presence of the targeted banks.
1.4 Results
This section presents the results. I start by showing evidence in favor of the parallel
trend assumption in the context of the quasi-natural experiment induced by the EBA
Capital Exercise. I then present estimates on the effect of the EBA Capital Exercise on
product mix decisions. In order to assess the relevance of the production cycle mech-
anism, I perform the analysis on groups of companies with ex-ante different production
timings. In particular, I exploit the regional variation in the existence of minimum
ageing regulations. I further explore this mechanism by analyzing within-company
decisions, namely the production of PDO red and white wine.
I test whether adjusting production (which will be converted into cash-flow some months
or years later) is a natural response to a contemporaneous credit shock. Under financial
constraints, companies can alleviate those constraints by selling current inventories
immediately (e.g. inventory fire sales). I investigate if the effect is stronger for the set
of companies with lower stock, i.e. those for which disposing of inventory may not be
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so effective (or insufficient) in relaxing financial constraints. By providing an answer
to this question, I investigate potential complementarity between production decisions
and current stock characteristics.
Finally, I investigate whether adjustments in product mix are an efficient response to
credit constraints.
1.4.1 Credit constraints and Product Mix Decisions
The quasi-natural experiment induced by the EBA Capital Exercise allows to explore
the response of companies when faced with an exogenous contraction in credit supply.
I have shown in table A4 that more exposed (treatment) and less exposed (control)
companies do not differ in terms of financial characteristics, except in size. Due to
this fact, I control for size in all specifications. However, the internal validity in a
difference-in-differences setting requires a (pre-shock) parallel trend. In figure 1.3, I
present evidence in favor of the parallel trend assumption. I plot the coefficients and
corresponding confidence intervals of interaction regressors between all year-dummies
and a treatment binary variable.31 I observe that the two groups of companies do not
differ in terms of PDO production before the shock, but present a different behavior
right after (2012 and 2013).32 Such evidence, coupled with the very narrow adjust-
ment period imposed by EBA, makes me confident about the internal validity of this
quasi-natural experiment. Moreover, the fact that affected banks had country-wide op-
erations creates room for within-region identification as I observe affected (treatment)
and unaffected (control) companies operating in the same region. This alleviates the
concern that other variables taking place at region level could drive a different reac-
31The treatment variable assumes the value of one if a company’s share of credit from affected banks
is higher than 50% and is bank dependent.
32In figure A4 in the appendix, I plot the median and mean PDO wine production over time. It
also shows a similar evolution between treatment and control groups before the shock.
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tion between the two groups. Some examples include changes in input prices, shifts
in consumer preferences, or even differential impacts of the 2008 financial crisis across
regions.
In table 1.3, I present estimates of the effect of credit constraints on product mix
decisions. The main outcome is the share of PDO wine on company’s total annual
production. The econometric specification follows equation 1.1. I find a sizable and
statistically significant reduction in PDO wine production as a response to the credit
contraction induced by the EBA Capital Exercise. An increase in EBA Share of credit
by one standard deviation reduces the percentage of PDO in total product mix by 5
to 7 percentage points among the group of bank dependent firms. This is the group
that has been significantly affected by the shock as seen in table A3. The result is
robust to the inclusion of firm fixed and year-region fixed effects and is statistically
significant at least at 5% significance level in all specifications. I also observe that
there is a high persistence of PDO production across time. The variable Any PDO,
which equals one whenever a company has produced PDO wine in the previous year,
is a strong determinant of PDO production in the following year. Yet, the effect of the
shock is robust to the inclusion of this variable. In table A5 in the appendix, I present
similar results using a double difference specification. This analysis is conditioned on
the set of bank dependent companies. The findings are similar, although the statistical
significance is affected by the reduction in the number of observations.
A potential concern with the interpretation of the previous results arises from the fact
that the ‘Bank Dependent’ variable may be capturing other financial characteristics.
To address this issue, I extend the main specification with other financial character-
istics of interest. Specifically, I look at size, debt maturity and trade credit. Results
are shown in table 1.4. The adverse effect of the shock is stronger for large companies
and companies with a higher percentage of short term credit. Conversely, reliance on
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Figure 1.3: Parallel trend
This figure plots the coefficients and confidence intervals (95% significance level) of the effect of the EBA Capital Exercise
on PDO certified wine production. The dependent variable is the percentage of PDO wine in total wine produced. The
explanatory variables are annual dummy variables that take the value of one in year t if a given company has been
affected by the EBA Capital Exercise. I define as affected a company that had at least 50% of total credit from affected
banks and is bank dependent. The regression controls for logarithm of size and includes year fixed effects and robust
standard errors. Vertical lines delimit the period between EBA Capital Exercise announcement and deadline.
trade credit (measured by accounts payable) as an alternative source of financing at-
tenuates the adverse impact of the credit contraction. Importantly, the main coefficient
remains unaltered after the inclusion of these variables. This is evidence that the ‘Bank
Dependent’ variable is unlikely to be capturing other potential confounding financial
characteristics.
In the face of credit constraints, there are other margins in which companies in our
sample could adjust, such as total quantity produced or the percentage of grapes sold
right after harvest.33 In table 1.5, I investigate whether companies have adjusted in
any of these margins as a response to the shock. Looking at the log of quantities, I
33Another interesting margin is the adjustment in sale prices. Unfortunately, I do not have inform-
ation on prices by company.
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Table 1.3: Effect of Credit Constraints on Product Mix Decisions
This table presents the impact of the EBA Capital Exercise on product mix decision. The outcome variable is the
percentage of PDO wine in total production in year t. Post is a binary variable equal to one from 2012 onward. EBA
Share is the share of credit from affected banks at the time the announcement (October 2011). Bank dependent is a
dummy variable equal to 1 when the company has a high debt ratio (non-current liabilities scaled by total assets above
the median). Sizet−1 is logarithm of total assets in the previous year. Internal Market t−1 is the percentage of sales
in the domestic market. Any PDO t−1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the company has produced some PDO
wine in the previous year. Additional time invariant variables and interactions are captured by fixed effects and are
therefore omitted. The sample covers the period 2006-2013. Robust standard errors clustered at firm level are shown in
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post × EBA Share × Bank Dep. -0.136** -0.144*** -0.166*** -0.133** -0.132** -0.151***
[0.066] [0.054] [0.055] [0.060] [0.052] [0.052]
Post × EBA Share 0.035 0.046 0.062** 0.048 0.044 0.052*
[0.037] [0.028] [0.031] [0.033] [0.027] [0.030]
EBA Share × Bank Dep. -0.028 0.086
[0.101] [0.085]
Post × Bank Dep. 0.028 0.052 0.064* 0.063 0.058 0.064*
[0.043] [0.038] [0.039] [0.041] [0.038] [0.038]
Post 0.012 -0.013 0.026 -0.012 -0.016 0.039
[0.026] [0.019] [0.031] [0.022] [0.019] [0.070]
EBA Share 0.020 -0.018
[0.068] [0.058]
Bank Dep. 0.057 -0.019
[0.061] [0.053]
Size t−1 -0.039*** -0.018 -0.008
[0.011] [0.023] [0.023]
Internal Market t−1 -0.022 0.038 0.033
[0.079] [0.044] [0.046]
Any PDO t−1 0.531*** 0.103*** 0.106***
[0.025] [0.032] [0.036]
Firm FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year X Region No No Yes No No Yes
No. Observations 2471 2471 2320 1991 1991 1855
No. Firms 422 413 392 381
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.77 0.773 0.225 0.795 0.797
do not observe any statistically significant difference between affected and unaffected
companies.34 Similarly, I do not find a differential response regarding the percentage of
grapes kept for own production.
Overall, the results in this sub-section document an adverse impact of financial con-
straints on product market decisions of companies. This evidence is consistent with the
empirical findings in Matsa (2011); Phillips and Sertsios (2013) and Kini et al. (2017).
34Looking at total quantity is also important because the main outcome variable is the percentage
of PDO wine in total production. As I do not find any impact on quantity (denominator), the reported
decrease in the percentage of PDO wine arises is due to a lower production of PDO wine (in levels).
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Table 1.4: Is Bank Dependent Definition capturing other financial characteristics?
This table analyzes whether the Bank Dependent variable is capturing other relevant firms’ characteristics. I extend the
specification in table 1.3 with some interaction variables of interest, namely size (Large Company), debt maturity (High
Short-Term Credit) and payment terms with suppliers (High Account Payable).The outcome variable is the percentage
of PDO wine in total production in year t. Post is a binary variable equal to one from 2012 onward. EBA Share is the
share of credit from affected banks at the time the announcement (October 2011). Bank dependent is a dummy variable
equal to 1 when the company has a high debt ratio (non-current liabilities scaled by total assets above the median).
Sizet−1 is logarithm of total assets in the previous year. Internal Market t−1 is the percentage of sales in the domestic
market. Any PDO t−1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the company has produced some PDO wine in the previous
year. Additional time invariant variables and interactions are captured by fixed effects and are therefore omitted. The
sample covers the period 2006-2013. Robust standard errors clustered at firm level are shown in parentheses. *, **, ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Large company
High
Short-Term
Credit
High Acc.
Payable
(1) (2) (3)
Post × EBA Share × Bank Dep. -0.188*** -0.157*** -0.153***
[0.055] [0.056] [0.053]
Post × EBA Share 0.235*** 0.118*** 0.006
[0.080] [0.042] [0.036]
Post × Bank Dep. 0.092** 0.053 0.065*
[0.040] [0.039] [0.038]
Post -0.074 0.008 0.044
[0.090] [0.073] [0.069]
Post× EBA Share × Large -0.201**
[0.079]
Post× Large 0.118**
[0.057]
Post× EBA Share × High Short-Term -0.126**
[0.055]
Post× High Short-Term 0.076*
[0.040]
Post× EBA Share × High Acc. Payable 0.098*
[0.051]
Post× High Acc. Payable -0.034
[0.037]
Size t−1 -0.004 -0.008
[0.024] [0.023]
Internal Market t−1 0.041 0.009 0.054
[0.045] [0.050] [0.049]
Any PDO t−1 0.103*** 0.110*** 0.107***
[0.036] [0.036] [0.036]
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year X Region Yes Yes Yes
No. Observations 1855 1716 1808
No. Firms 381 352 371
Adjusted R2 0.798 0.797 0.799
1.4.2 Production cycle mechanism
There are several mechanisms one may think of through which financial constraints may
affect product market decisions. In this paper I study the production cycle mechanism.
In the face of financial constraints, companies may be compelled to adjust product mix
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Table 1.5: Effect of Credit Constraints on Quantity
This table presents the impact of the EBA Capital Exercise on quantity produced. From column 1 to 3, the outcome
variable is the logarithm of total quantity produced. In columns 4 to 6, it is the percentage of grapes harvested kept for
internal production. Post is a binary variable equal to one from 2012 onward. EBA Share is the share of credit from
affected banks at the time the announcement (October 2011). Bank dependent is a dummy variable equal to 1 when
the company has a high debt ratio (non-current liabilities scaled by total assets above the median). Sizet−1 is logarithm
of total assets in the previous year. Internal Market t−1 is the percentage of sales in the domestic market. Any PDO
t−1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the company has produced some PDO wine in the previous year. Additional
time invariant variables and interactions are captured by fixed effects and are therefore omitted. The sample covers the
period 2006-2013. Robust standard errors clustered at firm level are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Log(Quantity) % Harvest for Own Production
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post × EBA Share × Bank Dep. -0.199 -0.014 0.041 -0.051 -0.014 -0.004
[0.243] [0.141] [0.134] [0.069] [0.048] [0.048]
Post × EBA Share 0.020 -0.053 -0.075 -0.033 -0.052* -0.055*
[0.156] [0.084] [0.082] [0.043] [0.029] [0.028]
EBA Share × Bank Dep. 0.124 0.081
[0.469] [0.077]
Post × Bank Dep. 0.025 0.020 0.011 0.042 0.036 0.018
[0.156] [0.085] [0.087] [0.042] [0.035] [0.033]
Post 0.036 -0.394* 0.279*** 0.005 0.733*** 0.045
[0.095] [0.234] [0.089] [0.030] [0.139] [0.031]
EBA Share 0.391 0.057
[0.363] [0.052]
Bank Dep. -1.041*** -0.050
[0.307] [0.054]
Size t−1 0.183*** 0.025
[0.052] [0.022]
Internal Market t−1 -0.120 -0.035
[0.113] [0.036]
Any PDO t−1 -0.003 -0.006
[0.050] [0.024]
Firm FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year X Region No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
No. Observations 2471 2320 1855 1653 1513 1322
No. Firms 413 381 299 265
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.915 0.929 0.012 0.713 0.645
as a means of shortening the production cycle. In order to isolate this mechanism,
I exploit the existence of minimum ageing thresholds for some products. In particu-
lar, these restrictions apply mainly to PDO wine production. Exploiting this regional
variation enables identifying the role of this mechanism on product market decisions.
In the first three columns of table 1.6, I estimate the main specification among the group
of companies operating in regions where there is a minimum ageing restriction. I find
a significant and strong reduction in the percentage of PDO wine. An increase in EBA
Share by one standard deviation is associated with a reduction of 10 percentage points in
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the production of PDO wine among bank dependent companies. In the following three
columns, I analyze the impact of the shock in regions where there is no minimum ageing
restrictions on the production of PDO wines. The point estimates are much smaller
(and non-significant in two out the three specifications). In table A6, I show similar
results following a double-different approach. The contrasting results among the two
types of regions suggests that the ageing restriction (proxy for the length of production
cycle) plays a role and constrains companies in their product market decisions.
The previous findings rely on the assumption that these regions do not differ in other
dimensions beyond the existence of an ageing regulation. However, other variables such
as production costs might have evolved differently after the shock among the two types
of regions (e.g. cost of grapes acquired from winegrowers or certification costs). I try
to mitigate this concern in several ways. First, the inclusion of year-region fixed effects
shall attenuate this concern as it compares companies operating in the same region.
Second, I can analyze within-company product decisions. Specifically, I propose to
study the decision of producing PDO red or PDO white wines. In a large majority of
regions where minimum ageing regulations are in place, they only apply to PDO red
wines. If the crucial difference between these two types of regions is the existence of the
ageing regulation, I expect to observe a stronger impact on the specific type of wine to
which the regulation applies.
In table 1.7, I analyze the decision of producing PDO red and white wine among
companies producing in regions where a minimum ageing restriction is in place. In the
first three columns, the outcome variable is the percentage of PDO red wine. In the
remaining columns, the outcome variable is the percentage of PDO white wine. I find
that the effect reported in table 1.6 is entirely driven by an adjustment in the percentage
of PDO red wine. There is no statistically significant shift on white wine production.
Similar results are found using a double-difference specification (see table A7). By
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Table 1.6: Effect of Credit Constraints on Product Mix Decisions by Regions with
Minimum Ageing Restriction
This table presents the impact of the EBA Capital Exercise on product mix decision of companies inside or outside
regions with minimum ageing restriction. The outcome variable is the percentage of PDO wine in total production in
year t. Post is a binary variable equal to one from 2012 onward. EBA Share is the share of credit from affected banks at
the time the announcement (October 2011). Bank dependent is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the company has a
high debt ratio (non-current liabilities scaled by total assets above the median). Sizet−1 is logarithm of total assets in the
previous year. Internal Market t−1 is the percentage of sales in the domestic market. Any PDO t−1 is a dummy variable
equal to 1 when the company has produced some PDO wine in the previous year. Additional time invariant variables and
interactions are captured by fixed effects and are therefore omitted. The sample covers the period 2006-2013. Robust
standard errors clustered at firm level are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level, respectively.
Regions with Minimum Ageing Restriction
Yes No
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post × EBA Share × Bank Dep. -0.247** -0.217*** -0.237*** -0.091 -0.098 -0.112*
[0.102] [0.079] [0.080] [0.085] [0.066] [0.067]
Post × EBA Share 0.034 0.036 0.047 0.059 0.059* 0.059
[0.063] [0.046] [0.055] [0.044] [0.034] [0.036]
EBA Share × Bank Dep. -0.090 0.001
[0.142] [0.135]
Post × Bank Dep. 0.100 0.122** 0.136** -0.008 0.025 0.029
[0.068] [0.060] [0.063] [0.055] [0.046] [0.046]
Post 0.020 -0.022 -0.068 0.001 -0.011 0.040
[0.044] [0.034] [0.053] [0.031] [0.021] [0.070]
EBA Share 0.171* -0.061
[0.094] [0.089]
Bank Dep. 0.166* -0.020
[0.084] [0.077]
Size t−1 -0.045 -0.026 -0.013 0.001
[0.041] [0.041] [0.027] [0.028]
Internal Market t−1 0.166** 0.134* -0.042 -0.016
[0.070] [0.073] [0.057] [0.060]
Any PDO t−1 0.054 0.054 0.146*** 0.149***
[0.041] [0.048] [0.045] [0.049]
Firm FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year X Region No No Yes No No Yes
No. Observations 1001 752 712 1404 1181 1143
No. Firms 168 168 215 213
Adjusted R2 0.036 0.796 0.801 0.001 0.782 0.782
looking at this within-company margin of adjustment, I rule out other factors that could
have potentially affected regions or even companies in a singular way. Therefore, this
finding illustrates in a more clear-cut way the role of the production cycle mechanism.
In table A8, I present a similar analysis for regions where there is no minimum ageing
restriction. In accordance with the findings in table 1.6, there is no statistically different
response in the production of PDO red or white wine among this group of companies.
Overall, affected companies adjust product mix as a response to financial constraints.
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Table 1.7: Effect of Credit Constraints on Product Mix Decisions by Wine Color
This table presents the impact of the EBA Capital Exercise on product mix decision by wine color. The analysis is
conditioned on companies operating in regions where a minimum ageing restriction is in place. The outcome variable is
the percentage of red (first three columns) or white (last three columns) PDO wine in total production in year t. Post
is a binary variable equal to one from 2012 onward. EBA Share is the share of credit from affected banks at the time
the announcement (October 2011). Bank dependent is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the company has a high debt
ratio (non-current liabilities scaled by total assets above the median). Sizet−1 is logarithm of total assets in the previous
year. Internal Market t−1 is the percentage of sales in the domestic market. Any PDO t−1 is a dummy variable equal
to 1 when the company has produced some PDO wine in the previous year. Additional time invariant variables and
interactions are captured by fixed effects and are therefore omitted. The sample covers the period 2006-2013. Robust
standard errors clustered at firm level are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level, respectively.
Color
Red White
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post × EBA Share × Bank Dep. -0.175* -0.149* -0.219*** -0.072 -0.068 -0.018
[0.098] [0.089] [0.071] [0.046] [0.049] [0.029]
Post × EBA Share 0.001 0.027 0.041 0.033 0.009 0.006
[0.055] [0.039] [0.044] [0.028] [0.017] [0.018]
EBA Share × Bank Dep. -0.104 0.014
[0.118] [0.069]
Post × Bank Dep. 0.084 0.090* 0.111** 0.016 0.032 0.025
[0.061] [0.053] [0.054] [0.025] [0.024] [0.022]
Post 0.016 -0.016 -0.060 0.004 -0.006 -0.008
[0.038] [0.026] [0.044] [0.016] [0.012] [0.016]
EBA Share 0.177** -0.006
[0.075] [0.036]
Bank Dep. 0.159** 0.006
[0.072] [0.043]
Size t−1 -0.047 -0.017 0.002 -0.009
[0.037] [0.037] [0.015] [0.017]
Internal Market t−1 0.165** 0.103 0.001 0.031
[0.076] [0.065] [0.048] [0.029]
Any PDO t−1 0.044 0.050 0.010 0.004
[0.037] [0.043] [0.010] [0.009]
Firm FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year X Region No No Yes No No Yes
No. Observations 1001 752 712 1001 752 712
No. Firms 168 168 168 168
Adjusted R2 0.045 0.759 0.788 -0.004 0.732 0.832
The previous evidence suggests that this adjustment occurs as a means of shortening
production cycles.
1.4.3 Production Decisions and Characteristics of Current Stock
The previous results show that the credit supply shock induced by the EBA Capital
Exercise had implications on product market decisions. Affected companies seem to
respond to the shock by adjusting their product mix. Alternatively, a more direct way
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to alleviate financial constraints and generate cash flow in the short- and medium-term
would be an increase in sales (selling current inventory). This way, companies would
eventually avoid unnecessary adjustments in production. Therefore, it is important
to understand how adjusting current production (which only converts into cash flow
some months or years later) can help ease financial constraints as opposed to selling
inventory. In this section, I analyze whether there is a relation between adjustment in
production and levels of inventory.
In table 1.8, I observe how the adjustment in product mix relates to levels of current
stock. I split companies according to low (below median) and high (above median)
inventories over total assets, either measured as balance sheet inventories (columns 1
and 2) or total wine in stock (columns 3 and 4).35 The effect of the shock is very
strong and statistically significant among the group of companies with low levels of
inventory. Although the point estimates are negative among the other group as well,
the effect is not statistically significant. These results show that the adjustment in
production occurred precisely in companies with low levels of inventories i.e. the group
of companies for which disposing of inventory may not be so effective in alleviating
financial constraints. These results point to a complementarity between production
and levels of current stock. As managers see lower inventory levels and eventually get
closer to stock-out, they seem to start adjusting production in order to produce faster
and replace inventories at a faster rate. In our setting, it translates into a change in
product mix.
35Although positively correlated, the later measure differs from the former as it does not take into
account the value of the inventories.
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Table 1.8: Complementarity between Production Decisions and Characteristics of Cur-
rent Inventory
This table presents the impact of the EBA Capital Exercise on product mix decision by levels of inventory. A company
is defined as having a high level of inventory if it is above the median in the corresponding distribution. The median
was computed on the entire sample, i.e. before dropping observations. The outcome variable is the percentage of PDO
wine in total production in year t. Post is a binary variable equal to one from 2012 onward. EBA Share is the share of
credit from affected banks at the time the announcement (October 2011). Bank dependent is a dummy variable equal
to 1 when the company has a high debt ratio (non-current liabilities scaled by total assets above the median). Sizet−1
is logarithm of total assets in the previous year. Internal Market t−1 is the percentage of sales in the domestic market.
Any PDO t−1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the company has produced some PDO wine in the previous year.
Additional time invariant variables and interactions are captured by fixed effects and are therefore omitted. The sample
covers the period 2006-2013. Robust standard errors clustered at firm level are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Inventories/Total Assets Stock/Total Assets
Low High Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post × EBA Share × Bank Dep. -0.350*** -0.097 -0.218*** -0.052
[0.118] [0.065] [0.078] [0.073]
Post × EBA Share 0.096* 0.026 0.003 0.054
[0.051] [0.042] [0.057] [0.041]
Post × Bank Dep. 0.135*** 0.035 0.135** 0.029
[0.051] [0.048] [0.061] [0.052]
Post -0.036 0.086 0.041 0.109
[0.406] [0.057] [0.124] [0.073]
Size t−1 -0.040 -0.019 -0.017 -0.017
[0.048] [0.034] [0.038] [0.029]
Internal Market t−1 -0.029 0.088 -0.045 0.083*
[0.083] [0.062] [0.080] [0.049]
Any PDO t−1 0.045 0.092** 0.135* 0.101**
[0.060] [0.041] [0.072] [0.048]
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year X Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Observations 453 1402 712 961
No. Firms 145 311 214 237
Adjusted R2 0.72 0.825 0.765 0.863
1.4.4 Performance
In the previous sections, I document that companies adjust product mix as a response to
credit constraints. In this section, I investigate whether this is an optimal response from
the perspective of a company. I start by showing the direct impact of the EBA Capital
Exercise. The EBA Capital Exercise induced an exogenous credit contraction. Thus,
if anything, I expect to see a negative effect on performance outcomes of companies
affected by this additional constraint relative to unconstrained companies. Then, it
is also important to understand whether, among the set of affected companies, those
that have adjusted their product mix indeed performed better than the ones whose
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production remained unaltered. If anything, I expect companies that decreased the
percentage of PDO wine to have improved performance relative to the other group
(negative relation).
In panel A of table 1.9, I present the direct effect of the EBA Capital Exercise on
performance. The outcome variables are operating profit margin and return on assets.
According to the prediction, companies affected by the EBA Capital Exercise present
lower performance relative to unaffected companies. The coefficients are not statistically
significantly different from zero though. Next, I present the effect on performance
mediated by the adjustment in product mix. Specifically, I analyze the effect that the
adjustment in PDO wine production has on performance outcomes among the group
of affected companies. It is important to recognize that this exercise is not clearly
identified as deciding on how much PDO wine to produce is an endogenous decision.
Even though, it may give some indication about the direction of the effect. In panel
B of table 1.9, I show the results on this mediated effect. I interact the Post indicator
with the percentage of PDO wine. Across the different specifications and outcome
variables, I find a negative coefficient and significantly different from zero at least at
10% confidence level. Among the companies that were effected by the shock, those that
adjusted the production of PDO wine downwards present higher performance ratios.
This interpretation is consistent with the initial prediction and suggests that adjustment
in production was an optimal response to the shock in the short-term.
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Table 1.9: Effect on Performance
This table presents the impact on performance. In panel A, I estimate the direct impact of EBA Capital Exercise on
performance. In panel B, I present the impact on performance mediated by the adjustment in the percentage of PDO
wine. Analysis in panel B is restricted to treatment companies (companies with at least 50% of credit from EBA banks).
From columns 1 to 3, the outcome variable is the operating profit margin scaled by total assets, where operating profit
margin is defined as sales minus cost of goods sold. In columns 4 to 6, the outcome variable is return on assets defined
as net income over total assets. Post is a binary variable equal to one from 2012 onward. EBA Share is the share of
credit from affected banks at the time the announcement (October 2011). Bank dependent is a dummy variable equal to
1 when the company has a high debt ratio (non-current liabilities scaled by total assets above the median). The sample
covers the period 2006-2013. Robust standard errors clustered at firm level are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Direct Impact (Triple Difference)
Operating Profit Margin Return on Assets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post × EBA Share × Bank Dep. -0.077 -0.041 -0.012 -0.083* -0.051 -0.025
[0.050] [0.039] [0.032] [0.050] [0.042] [0.038]
Post × EBA Share -0.002 -0.002 -0.008 -0.002 -0.001 -0.006
[0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009]
EBA Share × Bank Dep. -0.019 -0.009
[0.020] [0.020]
Post × Bank Dep. 0.032** 0.022 0.018 0.035** 0.024* 0.021
[0.014] [0.015] [0.015] [0.014] [0.015] [0.016]
Post -0.004 -0.006 -0.011 -0.008 -0.010 -0.012
[0.006] [0.007] [0.020] [0.005] [0.006] [0.020]
EBA Share -0.004 -0.004
[0.007] [0.006]
Bank Dep. -0.026** -0.035***
[0.011] [0.011]
Size t−1 0.005 -0.004 0.013 0.007
[0.019] [0.021] [0.021] [0.026]
Internal Market t−1 -0.014 -0.014 -0.012 -0.009
[0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010]
Any PDO t−1 0.018** 0.014* 0.018** 0.012*
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007]
Firm FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year X Region No No Yes No No Yes
No. Observations 3022 2096 1865 3022 2096 1865
No. Firms 405 382 405 382
Adjusted R2 0.027 0.321 0.464 0.031 0.284 0.392
Panel B: Mediated Impact (conditioned on treatment companies)
Operating Profit Margin Return on Assets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post × PDO (%) -0.056** -0.042** -0.053* -0.053* -0.048* -0.057*
[0.027] [0.021] [0.029] [0.027] [0.026] [0.030]
Post 0.018** 0.017*** -0.023 0.012 0.014** -0.022
[0.008] [0.006] [0.020] [0.007] [0.006] [0.021]
PDO (%) 0.000 -0.030 -0.030 0.000 -0.034 -0.037
[0.009] [0.031] [0.032] [0.008] [0.031] [0.032]
Size t−1 0.019 0.032 0.030 0.044
[0.036] [0.045] [0.043] [0.056]
Internal Market t−1 -0.003 -0.007 0.008 0.008
[0.015] [0.017] [0.014] [0.017]
Any PDO t−1 0.009 -0.003 0.015 -0.004
[0.014] [0.009] [0.017] [0.008]
Firm FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year X Region No No Yes No No Yes
No. Observations 1285 1036 946 1285 1036 946
No. Firms 203 194 203 194
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.542 0.523 0.012 0.411 0.39
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1.5 Robustness tests
In this section I present robustness tests. A substantial part of the previous analysis
relies on the existence of minimum ageing regulations as a proxy for production cycle
length. In order to tackle the concern that these regions could differ in other potential
dimensions, I looked at the within-company decision of producing red and white wines
and show that companies adjust the production of the most restricted product (PDO
red wine). As a robustness test, I try to proxy the duration of the production cycle with
the most basic measure of inventory timing in the literature: Days Sales of Inventory
ratio. If time is indeed a constraining factor, this variable should point towards a similar
effect.36 In table 1.10, I run the main specification among the group of companies with
high and low Days Sales of inventory. The results are consistent with previous evidence.
The adjustment occurs for companies with long inventories, i.e. those for which it takes
longer to convert inventory into cash flow.
A second question is whether companies reduce PDO production due to higher certific-
ation costs. In table 1.11, I show that the reduction in PDO wine is accompanied by an
increase in the production of PGI wine. If certification costs were a driving mechanism
of the effect reported in the previous sections, I should expect companies to reduce PDO
in favor of non-classified wine (the type that does not undergo certification processes).
Therefore, I find evidence against this alternative mechanism.
I now perform several additional tests. In figure A5, I plot the histogram of average
PDO wine production (in percentage) per company. There is clustering around 0 and
1. As a robustness test, I estimate the main model following a Tobit specification
36This variable needs to be interpreted carefully due to the possibility of measurement error. Many
wineries have a vertically integrated productive process and part of the grapes used in wine production
may come from own grape production. Given that this measure uses COGS, it is ultimately dependent
on how companies report internal production. See Viana and Rodrigues (2006) for a survey of other
accounting problems in the wine industry.
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Table 1.10: Effect of Credit Constraints on Product Mix Decisions by Days Sales of
Inventory Ratio
This table presents the impact of the EBA Capital Exercise on product mix decision by companies with high and low
days sales of inventory. A company is defined as having high days sales of inventory if days sales of inventory ratio
is above the median. The outcome variable is the percentage of PDO wine in total production in year t. Post is a
binary variable equal to one from 2012 onward. EBA Share is the share of credit from affected banks at the time the
announcement (October 2011). Bank dependent is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the company has a high debt
ratio (non-current liabilities scaled by total assets above the median). Sizet−1 is logarithm of total assets in the previous
year. Internal Market t−1 is the percentage of sales in the domestic market. Any PDO t−1 is a dummy variable equal
to 1 when the company has produced some PDO wine in the previous year. Additional time invariant variables and
interactions are captured by fixed effects and are therefore omitted. The sample covers the period 2006-2013. Robust
standard errors clustered at firm level are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level, respectively.
Days Sales of Inventory
High Low
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post × EBA Share × Bank Dep. -0.168* -0.175** -0.150 -0.080
[0.096] [0.072] [0.114] [0.083]
Post × EBA Share 0.063 0.085* 0.039 0.48
[0.063] [0.050] [9.064] [0.034]
EBA Share × Bank Dep. -0.010 -0.085
[0.121] [0.156]
Post × Bank Dep. 0.001 0.101* 0.057 0.021
[0.067] [0.057] [0.070] [0.053]
Post 0.038 0.078 -0.023 -0.195
[0.044] [0.077] [0.045] [0.127]
EBA Share 0.017 0.030
[0.084] [0.102]
Bank Dep. -0.000 0.134
[0.074] [0.091]
Size t−1 0.002 0.066**
[0.035] [0.030]
Internal Market t−1 0.040 0.077
[0.082] [0.061]
Any PDO t−1 0.133** 0.067
[0.060] [0.047]
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Year X Region No Yes No Yes
No. Observations 1248 974 1181 854
No. Firms 242 233
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.762 0.010 0.859
with left- and right-censoring (table 1.12). Results are similar to the ones found in
table 1.3. Additionally, I present estimates of a Probit model where the outcome
variable equals one when the company produces 100% PDO wine. The likelihood of
a treatment company producing 100% PDO wine reduced by 31 percentage points on
average following the shock.
In table 1.13, I present results using alternative definitions of treatment. Specifically,
I consider as treated all companies with at least one bank relationship with affected
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Table 1.11: Can certification costs explain the adjustment in product mix?
This table presents the impact of the EBA Capital Exercise on different product categories. The outcome variable is the
percentage of PDO wine (columns 1 and 2), percentage of PGI wine (columns 3 and 4) and percentage of non-classified
wine (columns 5 and 6) in total production in year t. The first two columns correspond to columns 1 and 6 of table
1.3 and are presented here to facilitate comparison. Post is a binary variable equal to one from 2012 onward. EBA
Share is the share of credit from affected banks at the time the announcement (October 2011). Bank dependent is a
dummy variable equal to 1 when the company has a high debt ratio (non-current liabilities scaled by total assets above
the median). Sizet−1 is logarithm of total assets in the previous year. Internal Market t−1 is the percentage of sales
in the domestic market. Any PDO t−1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the company has produced some PDO
wine in the previous year. Additional time invariant variables and interactions are captured by fixed effects and are
therefore omitted. The sample covers the period 2006-2013. Robust standard errors clustered at firm level are shown in
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
% PDO % PGI % Non-Classified
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post × EBA Share × Bank Dep. -0.136** -0.151*** 0.102* 0.118** 0.033 0.033
[0.066] [0.052] [0.058] [0.057] [0.054] [0.040]
Post × EBA Share 0.035 0.052* -0.054* -0.049 0.019 -0.003
[0.037] [0.030] [0.032] [0.034] [0.032] [0.030]
EBA Share × Bank Dep. -0.028 -0.029 0.057
[0.101] [0.088] [0.067]
Post × Bank Dep. 0.028 0.064* -0.022 -0.026 -0.005 -0.038
[0.043] [0.038] [0.040] [0.043] [0.033] [0.029]
Post 0.012 0.039 0.001 -0.050 -0.013 0.011
[0.026] [0.070] [0.022] [0.074] [0.023] [0.021]
EBA Share 0.020 0.035 -0.055
[0.068] [0.056] [0.053]
Bank Dep. 0.057 0.008 -0.065
[0.061] [0.050] [0.043]
Size t−1 -0.008 -0.003 0.011
[0.023] [0.024] [0.018]
Internal Market t−1 0.033 -0.034 0.000
[0.046] [0.044] [0.032]
Any PDO t−1 0.106*** -0.105*** -0.000
[0.036] [0.035] [0.033]
Firm FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year X Region No Yes No Yes No Yes
No. Observations 2471 1855 2471 1855 2471 1855
No. Firms 381 381 381
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.797 -0.001 0.767 0.004 0.747
banks (panel A), companies with at least 50% share of credit from affected banks (panel
B) and a continuous variable of share of credit from affected banks weighted by each
banks’ distance to EBA Capital Exercise target capital ratio (Panel C). All alternative
specifications document an overall negative impact of the shock on production of PDO
wine and a stronger impact among regions with minimum ageing restrictions (column 2).
Finally, I consider different time periods or samples. In panel A of table 1.14, I include
2014 in the analysis. In panel B, I exclude 2011 from the analysis. In panel C, I include
companies that always produced PDO wine (these companies were initially removed
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Table 1.12: Robustness test: Tobit and Probit
This table presents the impact of the EBA Capital Exercise on product mix decision. Here, I present the estimates based
on tobit and probit specifications. In the first three columns (tobit), the outcome variable is the percentage of PDO
wine in total production in year t. In the last three columns (probit), the outcome variable is a dummy variable equal
to one if a company produces only PDO wine in year t. The later present marginal effect coefficients at the mean. Post
is a binary variable equal to one from 2012 onward. EBA Share is the share of credit from affected banks at the time
the announcement (October 2011). Bank dependent is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the company has a high debt
ratio (non-current liabilities scaled by total assets above the median). Sizet−1 is logarithm of total assets in the previous
year. Internal Market t−1 is the percentage of sales in the domestic market. Any PDO t−1 is a dummy variable equal
to 1 when the company has produced some PDO wine in the previous year. Additional time invariant variables and
interactions are captured by fixed effects and are therefore omitted. The sample covers the period 2006-2013. Robust
standard errors clustered at firm level are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level, respectively.
Tobit Probit (100% PDO)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post × EBA Share × Bank Dep. -0.223*** -0.208*** -0.246*** -0.217** -0.224** -0.312***
[0.072] [0.074] [0.077] [0.093] [0.091] [0.118]
Post × EBA Share 0.052 0.049 0.079 0.078 0.079 0.145*
[0.046] [0.048] [0.050] [0.054] [0.054] [0.082]
EBA Share × Bank Dep. -0.004 0.079 0.039 0.139 0.143 0.130
[0.124] [0.120] [0.086] [0.089] [0.090] [0.096]
Post × Bank Dep. 0.057 0.068 0.089* 0.068 0.088 0.139*
[0.045] [0.046] [0.048] [0.058] [0.056] [0.074]
Post -0.016 -0.021 0.117 -0.068* -0.070* 0.081
[0.030] [0.031] [0.189] [0.036] [0.039] [0.228]
EBA Share -0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.062 -0.025 -0.031
[0.083] [0.080] [0.057] [0.062] [0.061] [0.072]
Bank Dep. 0.027 -0.017 -0.021 -0.018 -0.045 -0.062
[0.078] [0.076] [0.055] [0.055] [0.058] [0.064]
Size t−1 -0.038** 0.000 -0.046*** -0.028**
[0.016] [0.012] [0.013] [0.014]
Internal Market t−1 -0.001 -0.041 -0.018 -0.065
[0.063] [0.060] [0.057] [0.072]
Any PDO t−1 0.304*** 0.324*** 0.140*** 0.115**
[0.032] [0.033] [0.031] [0.045]
Firm FE No No No No No No
Year X Region No No Yes No No Yes
No. Observations 2471 1991 1855 2471 1991 1670
No. Firms 422 392 381
from the sample). The results are robust to any of these alternative specifications.
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Table 1.13: Robustness: Alternative Definitions of Treatment
This table presents the impact of the EBA Capital Exercise on product mix decision using alternative definitions of
treatment. In panel A, I define as treatment group all companies with at least one bank relation with affected banks.
In panel B, treatment is a dummy variable equal to one whenever a company has a share of credit from affected banks
higher than 50%. Panel C uses a continuous measure of exposure to treatment using each bank’s distance to EBA target
capital ratio. Specifically, I take the logarithm of the weighted average share of credit from affected banks whose weights
correspond to each creditor’s distance the EBA threshold. The outcome variable is the percentage of PDO wine in total
production in year t. Post is a binary variable equal to one from 2012 onward. EBA Share is the share of credit from
affected banks at the time the announcement (October 2011). Bank dependent is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the
company has a high debt ratio (non-current liabilities scaled by total assets above the median). All regression include the
following controls: Sizet−1, Internal Market t−1 and Any PDO t−1. The sample covers the period 2006-2013. Robust
standard errors clustered at firm level are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: At least 1 bank relationship with EBA banks [binary]
All Sample
Min. Ageing
Restriction
No Min.
Ageing
Restriction
(1) (2) (3)
Post × Treat. × Bank Dep. -0.101* -0.229** -0.048
[0.059] [0.095] [0.070]
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year X Region Yes Yes Yes
No. Observations 1855 712 1143
No. Firms 381 168 213
Adjusted R2 0.796 0.8 0.782
Panel B: At least 50% share of credit from affected banks [binary]
All Sample
Min. Ageing
Restriction
No Min.
Ageing
Restriction
(1) (2) (3)
Post × Treat. × Bank Dep. -0.126*** -0.204*** -0.093
[0.045] [0.068] [0.056]
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year X Region Yes Yes Yes
No. Observations 1855 712 1143
No. Firms 381 168 213
Adjusted R2 0.797 0.801 0.782
Panel C: Log(Average share of credit from affected banks weighted by
bank’s distance to EBA threshold) [continuous]
All Sample
Min. Ageing
Restriction
No Min.
Ageing
Restriction
(1) (2) (3)
Post × Treat. × Bank Dep. -0.036* -0.048* -0.033
[0.019] [0.025] [0.024]
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year X Region Yes Yes Yes
No. Observations 1398 540 858
No. Firms 381 129 158
Adjusted R2 0.811 0.839 0.788
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Table 1.14: Robustness: Different time period or sample
This table presents robustness tests using different time periods or samples. In panel A, I include 2014. In panel B, I
exclude 2011 from the analysis (EBA Capital Exercise announcement). In panel C, I present the results when including
companies that have produced always 100% PDO wine throughout the period. The outcome variable is the percentage
of PDO wine in total production in year t. Post is a binary variable equal to one from 2012 onward. EBA Share is the
share of credit from affected banks at the time the announcement (October 2011). Bank dependent is a dummy variable
equal to 1 when the company has a high debt ratio (non-current liabilities scaled by total assets above the median).
All regression include the following controls: Sizet−1, Internal Market t−1 and Any PDO t−1. Robust standard errors
clustered at firm level are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
Panel A: Including 2014
All Sample
Min. Ageing
Restriction
No Min.
Ageing
Restriction
(1) (2) (3)
Post × EBA Share × Bank Dep. -0.156*** -0.262*** -0.102
[0.049] [0.074] [0.064]
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year X Region Yes Yes Yes
No. Observations 2182 861 1321
No. Firms 410 192 218
Adjusted R2 0.795 0.815 0.773
Panel B: Excluding 2011
All Sample
Min. Ageing
Restriction
No Min.
Ageing
Restriction
(1) (2) (3)
Post × EBA Share × Bank Dep. -0.169*** -0.293*** -0.110
[0.061] [0.093] [0.079]
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year X Region Yes Yes Yes
No. Observations 1571 610 961
No. Firms 379 167 212
Adjusted R2 0.799 0.806 0.784
Panel C: Including companies that produce 100% PDO throughout the
period (initially removed)
All Sample
Min. Ageing
Restriction
No Min.
Ageing
Restriction
(1) (2) (3)
Post × EBA Share × Bank Dep. -0.136*** -0.216*** -0.103
[0.050] [0.079] [0.064]
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year X Region Yes Yes Yes
No. Observations 1942 737 1205
No. Firms 403 178 225
Adjusted R2 0.806 0.81 0.791
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1.6 Conclusion
Financial frictions may impact project maturity decisions of companies. Inefficiencies
may arise as companies favor short-term projects which provide short-term cash-flow
at the expense of long run cash flows.
I find that affected companies adjust product mix as a response to the credit contrac-
tion induced by the EBA Capital Exercise. Specifically, affected companies reduce the
percentage of PDO wine on total company’s production. Next, I analyze the role of
the production cycle mechanism. In other words, I investigate whether the reduction
in the production of PDO wine is driven by the need of shorter production cycles and
eventually quicker cash conversion. To do so, I split companies according to regions
where there is a minimum ageing regulation on the production of PDO wine.These
regulations establish a lower bound on the production cycle length. In regions where
a regulation is in place, companies need to shift production of the constrained product
to other products in order to produce faster. I show that the impact found in the full
sample is entirely driven by companies in these regions. The contrasting results among
the two types of regions suggest that the ageing restriction plays a role and constrains
companies in their product market decisions.
I investigate why adjustment in product mix is a natural response to an adverse fin-
ancial shock. Alternatively, a more direct way of alleviating financial constraints and
generating cash-flow in the short-term would be increasing sales (selling current invent-
ory). Hence, I expect the adjustment in production to be stronger among companies
with lower inventories. I find evidence that this is the case by splitting companies with
high and low inventory levels. These results point towards a complementarity between
production decisions and levels of current stock.
Finally, I analyze whether affected companies that have adjusted their product mix
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perform better than affected companies whose production remained unaltered. I find
evidence that companies that adjusted production of PDO wine downwards present
higher performance ratio. Overall, this result suggests that the adjustment in produc-
tion was an efficient response to the shock on the companies’ perspective.
My results suggest that the adverse impact of financial constraints on product markets
may increase with longer, less flexible, production cycles.
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Figure A1: Wine regions in Portugal
Geographical distribution of wine regions in Portugal. Source: Wines of Portugal: http://www.winesofportugal.info/
pagina.php?codNode=18012&market=1
Figure A2: Example of seal of guarantee - PDO and IGP Alentejo
This figure illustrates the seal of guarantee issued by Alentejo regional industry regulator (CVRA). On the left (right),
it is presented the PDO (PGI) seal of guarantee. Source: Wines of Alentejo: https://www.vinhosdoalentejo.pt/en/
cvr-alentejana/certification-process/
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Figure A3: Representation of wine-making process
This diagram depicts the main decision nodes in the wine-making process. Solid arrows indicate the main production
flows. Dashed arrows indicate other, less relevant, in or outflows. This figure was constructed by the author based on
conversations held with winemakers.
Figure A4: Evolution of PDO wine production in percentage of total
This figure displays the evolution of median (left) and mean (right) PDO wine production in percentage of total annual
production. In the top figures, treatment is defined as companies with a share of credit from affected banks above
50%. In the bottom figures, treatment is defined as the intersection between companies with a high share of credit from
affected banks (above 50%) and bank dependent companies. Bank dependent is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the
company has a high debt ratio (non-current liabilities scaled by total assets above the median). Vertical lines delimit
the period between the EBA Capital Exercise announcement and deadline.
Treatment Median Mean
High EBA
Share
High EBA
Share
+
Bank
Dependent
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Figure A5: Histogram of PDO production
This figure depicts an histogram of the PDO wine production (in percentage of total production). It is computed based
on each company’s mean over time.
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Table A1: Description of Production Stages
This table describes each of the main stages in the wine production process (see figure A3).
Stage Description
Harvest
Harvesting is the first step in the wine making process. Grapes should be harvested at the precise time, preferably when
physiologically ripe for the intended type of wine. In Portugal, it occurs between August and October.
Wineries can produce grapes in their own estates or acquire grapes from external winegrowers or cooperative. Tradi-
tionally, vineyard management and wine-making were separated activities. Nowadays, winemakers own large vineyard
plots. Yet, acquiring grapes from winegrowers is still very common as it allows wineries, in particular large ones, to
acquire raw-materials necessary to satisfy large production levels. This is the case in Portugal, particularly due to tight
permits for new vineyard planting and limits on maximum yield.
The appellation systems (appellation controˆle´e) in place in many European Countries intend to control production and
ensure quality standards in each wine region. These regulations often start with vineyard planting and classification.
Typically, planting new vineyards can only be carried out following regulators’ permits and is subject to narrow annual
quotas. Moreover, each vineyard can be classified as PDO or PGI. This classification depends on vineyard characteristics,
number of vines and grape varieties. This classification is usually fixed throughout the vineyard useful life. In order to
produce wine with any of these certifications, grapes must come from vineyards classified in the same way. This is a
necessary but far from sufficient step (more details about certification are given below). Regional authorities keep track
of grape classification and respective quantities declared by any agent that produces grapes for commercial purposes
(‘current accounts’), as well as sales between agents (‘movements’). Every time a movement occurs, the current accounts
of both seller and buyer are updated.
At this stage, companies buy and sell grapes with different classifications to attain the desired product mix in each year.
Production
Production occurs right after the harvest and includes crushing and pressing, fermentation and clarification.
By the end of this stage, winemakers are required to declare total production levels by type and color. They also report
the certification a given quantity is suitable for (PDO, PGI or non-classified wine). At this point, this is based on the
classification of grapes it was made from. The current accounts are updated with this new information and it limits the
quantity a company can request for certification.
Ageing and
Bottling
The last stage of the wine production process involves ageing and bottling. Depending on the type and color of wine,
the winemaker can bottle wine immediately after clarification or can be given additional maturation (usually in oak
barrels or stainless steel tanks).
Ageing is considered to follow two phases. The first – maturation – refers to the period between fermentation and
bottling. It frequently lasts from 6 to 24 months. The second phase – reductive ageing - starts with bottling and occurs
in the absence of oxygen.
In Portugal, wineries are required to declare inventory levels and respective characteristics (year of harvest, type, color,
quantity) every year to regional regulators.
Certification
Companies can request certification and the respective numbered seals of guarantee as soon as the wine has been
produced. The timing may depend on technical factors, such as the optimal ageing point or the existence of minimum
ageing regulations, or economic variables, such as market dynamics (e.g. demand).
The first step of a certification procedure is the validation of the request against company’s current accounts. Then, a
sample of wine is subject to physicochemical analysis at the regulators’ laboratories. Simultaneously, a sensory analysis
is performed by a tasting panel. After that, if all requirements are met, the wine is certified as PDO or PGI and the
respective seals of guarantee are issued. The newly certified wine is ready to be introduced in the market.
In opposition, producers may request declassification of wine previously registered in their current accounts as suitable
for PDO or PGI wine. The request must be submitted to regional regulators who may approve or refuse it (IVV, 2018).
Further details on the institutional organization of the wine sector can be found on Decree-law 212/2004, Ministry of
Agriculture, Portugal https://dre.pt/web/guest/pesquisa/-/search/479875/details/maximized.
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Table A2: Description of products per wine regions in Portugal
This table describes products in each wine region in Portugal with regard to certification and type. It also presents the
trading name of each product. From column 4 to 8, it reports the mandatory minimum ageing period (in months) for
each type of wine (and color in the case of still wines). ’x’ indicates that PDO or PGI certification exists for each type of
wine (still, liqueur or sparkling) in each region. I replace ’x’ by the corresponding minimum ageing period (in months)
for wines with mandatory minimum ageing. For the sake of simplicity I omit semi-sparkling type and rose color. Last
column indicates the regions where there are minimum ageing restrictions on PDO production cycle. Minimum ageing
periods for PDO Porto (Port wine) can vary from several months to decades, depending on the sub-type and quality. Due
to the complexity of this product regulation, I prefer not to report any minimum ageing period [a]. Source: IVV technical
specifications (http://www.ivv.gov.pt/np4/528/) and IVV yearbook 2016 (http://www.ivv.gov.pt/np4/Anua´rio).
Region Certif. Trading name
Min. Ageing
Min. Ageing
Restriction
Still
Liq. Spark.
Red White
Vinho Verde
PGI Minho x x x x
No
PDO Vinho Verde x x 9*
Tra´s-os-Montes
PGI Trasmontano x x
No
PDO Tra´s-os-Montes x x x x
Douro
PGI Duriense 6 x 9
YesPDO Douro 8 1 18 9
PDO Porto [a]
Ta´vora-Varosa
PGI Terras de Cister x x x
No
PDO Ta´vora-Varosa x x 9
Bairrada
PGI Beira Atlaˆntico x x x
No
PDO Bairrada x x x 9
Beira Interior
PGI Terras da Beira x x x
No
PDO Beira Interior x x x
Da˜o
PGI Terras do Da˜o x x x
YesPDO Da˜o 8 x 9
PDO Lafo˜es 6 x
Lisboa
PGI Lisboa x x x x
Yes
PDO Encostas D’Aire 8 x
PDO O´bidos 8 x 9
PDO Alenquer 8 x
PDO Arruda 14 3
PDO Torres Vedras 8 3
PDO Bucelas x x x
PDO Carcavelos 30
PDO Colares 24 9
Tejo
PGI Tejo x x x
Yes
PDO DoTejo 6 x x 9
Pen. de Setu´bal
PGI Pen. de Setu´bal x x x x
NoPDO Setu´bal 18
PDO Palmela x x x x
Alentejo
PGI Alentejano x x x x
No
PDO Alentejo x x x x
Algarve
PGI Algarve x x x x
Yes
PDO Lagos 6 x
PDO Portima˜o 6 x
PDO Lagoa 6 x
PDO Tavira 6 x
Madeira
PGI Terras Madeirenses x x
YesPDO Madeira 2
PDO Madeirense 6 x
Ac¸ores
PGI Ac¸ores 8 6 8 x
Yes
PDO Biscoitos 6 6 24 x
PDO Graciosa 6 6 24 x
PDO Pico 6 6 24 x
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Table A3: EBA Capital Exercise Impact on Firms’ Total Credit
This table presents the impact of the EBA Capital Exercise on firms’ total credit. The outcome variable is non-current
liabilities scaled by (lagged) total assets. Columns 1 and 2 present the results for the entire sample. In columns 3 and
4, I condition the analysis on companies that are bank dependent. Bank dependent is a dummy variable equal to 1
when the company has a high debt ratio (non-current liabilities scaled by total assets above the median). In columns
5 and 6, I present the results on a triple difference interaction with Post, EBA Share and Bank Dependent. Post is
a binary variable equal to one from 2012 onward. EBA Share is the share of credit from affected banks at the time
the announcement (October 2011). Sizet−1 is logarithm of total assets in the previous year. Additional time invariant
variables and interactions are captured by fixed effects and are therefore omitted. The sample covers the period 2006-
2013. Robust standard errors clustered at firm level are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
All Sample Bank Dependent All Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post × EBA Share -0.108** -0.120** -0.260** -0.261** 0.003 -0.014
[0.051] [0.054] [0.120] [0.114] [0.016] [0.020]
Post 0.043*** 0.075*** 0.103*** 0.159*** -0.006 0.022
[0.016] [0.027] [0.033] [0.050] [0.011] [0.019]
Post × EBA Share × Bank Dep. -0.263** -0.246**
[0.121] [0.110]
Post × Bank Dep. 0.109*** 0.117***
[0.034] [0.038]
Size t−1 -0.143* -0.218** -0.141*
[0.075] [0.107] [0.073]
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Observations 2672 2672 1096 1096 2648 2648
No. Firms 436 436 187 187 428 428
Adjusted R2 0.356 0.381 0.307 0.352 0.362 0.387
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Table A4: Comparison of Means
Panel A of this table presents a comparison of means between the sub-sample of companies with at least 50% of credit
from affected banks and the sub-sample of companies with less than 50% of credit from affected banks at the time of
the EBA Capital Exercise announcement (October 2011). Companies with no credit outstanding are excluded from the
analysis. Panel B presents a mean comparison between companies inside and outside regions where minimum ageing
restrictions are in place. All means are reported at the end of 2011. In the last column I present the difference in means.
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: At least 50% Share of Credit From Affected Banks
At least 50% Share of Credit From Affected Banks
Yes No
Diff.
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean
Total Assets 201 5765681.3 197 3592126.5 -2173554.8***
Nr. Employees 201 26.98 197 14.77 -12.21*
Sales 201 2222195.8 197 1363153.4 -859042.41**
ROA 199 -0.02 195 -0.03 -0.01
Leverage 201 0.73 197 0.67 -0.06
Inv./Assets 201 0.26 197 0.25 -0.01
Days in inv. 199 1534.02 192 1361.45 -172.57
Bank Rel. 201 3.27 197 3.25 -0.02
Largest bank rel. 201 0.76 197 0.76 0.00
Pct. short-term 182 0.48 185 0.43 -0.05
Region Min. Ageing Restriction 193 0.50 196 0.44 -0.06
PDO 162 0.55 154 0.55 0.00
Harvest for own production 121 0.91 109 0.91 0.00
Red wine 162 0.59 154 0.51 -0.08*
Bottled wine 176 0.20 161 0.20 0.00
No. bank relationships:
All 201 3.28 197 3.28 0.00
With affected banks 201 1.69 197 0.80 -0.89***
With affected banks:
At least 1 relation 201 1.00 197 0.53 -0.47***
Share of credit 201 0.86 197 0.11 -0.75***
Panel B: Region with Minimum Ageing Restriction
Region with Minimum Ageing Restriction
Yes No
Diff.
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean
Total Assets 207 4381979.2 259 3489156.2 -892823
Nr. Employees 207 18.42 259 14.16 -4.258
Sales 207 1546460 259 1293609.3 -252850.7
ROA 203 -0.02 254 -0.04 -0.028
Leverage 207 0.75 259 0.70 -0.052
Inv./Assets 207 0.25 259 0.23 -0.012
Days in inv. 202 1779.21 252 1294.15 -485.1*
Bank Rel. 196 3.05 241 2.74 -0.308
Largest bank rel. 185 0.77 211 0.76 -0.010
Pct. short-term 172 0.50 191 0.43 -0.069
Region Min. Ageing Restriction -
PDO 126 0.43 240 0.63 0.198***
Harvest for own production 96 0.88 185 0.86 -0.028
Red wine 126 0.72 240 0.47 -0.253***
Bottled wine 166 0.17 206 0.24 0.066**
No. bank relationships:
All 183 3.32 206 3.19 -0.128
With affected banks 183 1.21 206 1.24 0.025
With affected banks:
At least 1 relation 183 0.77 206 0.76 -0.008
Share of credit 183 0.51 206 0.45 -0.055
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Table A5: Effect of Credit Constraints on Product Mix Decisions (double
difference)
This table presents the impact of the EBA Capital Exercise on product mix decision using a double-difference
specification. The analysis is conditioned on bank dependent companies. The outcome variable is the
percentage of PDO wine in total production in year t. Post is a binary variable equal to one from 2012
onward. EBA Share is the share of credit from affected banks at the time the announcement (October
2011). Bank dependent is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the company has a high debt ratio (non-
current liabilities scaled by total assets above the median). Sizet−1 is logarithm of total assets in the
previous year. Internal Market t−1 is the percentage of sales in the domestic market. Any PDO t−1 is a
dummy variable equal to 1 when the company has produced some PDO wine in the previous year. Additional
time invariant variables and interactions are captured by fixed effects and are therefore omitted. The sample
covers the period 2006-2013. Robust standard errors clustered at firm level are shown in parentheses. *, **,
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post × EBA Share -0.100* -0.098** -0.099** -0.081 -0.089** -0.085**
[0.054] [0.047] [0.045] [0.051] [0.045] [0.043]
Post 0.040 0.039 -0.028 0.050 0.041 0.126
[0.035] [0.033] [0.147] [0.035] [0.033] [0.100]
EBA Share -0.008 0.041
[0.074] [0.063]
Size t−1 -0.014 -0.016 0.004
[0.017] [0.037] [0.037]
Internal Market t−1 -0.063 0.003 -0.008
[0.100] [0.070] [0.086]
Any PDO t−1 0.526*** 0.108* 0.151***
[0.040] [0.055] [0.056]
Firm FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year X Region No No Yes No No Yes
No. Observations 1001 1001 978 803 803 782
No. Firms 182 181 166 165
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.686 0.696 0.234 0.713 0.73
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Table A6: Effect of Credit Constraints on Product Mix Decisions by Regions with
Minimum Ageing Restriction (double difference)
This table presents the impact of the EBA Capital Exercise on product mix decision of companies inside or outside
regions with minimum ageing restriction using a double-difference specification. The analysis is conditioned on
bank dependent companies. The outcome variable is the percentage of PDO wine in total production in year t.
Post is a binary variable equal to one from 2012 onward. EBA Share is the share of credit from affected banks at
the time the announcement (October 2011). Bank dependent is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the company
has a high debt ratio (non-current liabilities scaled by total assets above the median). Sizet−1 is logarithm of
total assets in the previous year. Internal Market t−1 is the percentage of sales in the domestic market. Any
PDO t−1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the company has produced some PDO wine in the previous year.
Additional time invariant variables and interactions are captured by fixed effects and are therefore omitted. The
sample covers the period 2006-2013. Robust standard errors clustered at firm level are shown in parentheses. *,
**, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Regions with Minimum Ageing Restriction
Yes No
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post × EBA Share -0.213*** -0.187*** -0.165** -0.032 -0.038 -0.043
[0.080] [0.068] [0.072] [0.073] [0.057] [0.054]
Post 0.121** 0.100* 0.067 -0.007 0.013 0.114
[0.051] [0.051] [0.051] [0.045] [0.041] [0.099]
EBA Share 0.081 -0.059
[0.106] [0.102]
Size t−1 -0.080 -0.034 0.004 0.016
[0.080] [0.088] [0.039] [0.044]
Internal Market t−1 0.039 -0.047 -0.006 0.043
[0.113] [0.157] [0.087] [0.101]
Any PDO t−1 0.047 0.057 0.146** 0.208***
[0.099] [0.114] [0.065] [0.060]
Firm FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year X Region No No Yes No No Yes
No. Observations 400 303 289 597 496 493
No. Firms 69 69 96 96
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.729 0.735 0 0.705 0.731
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Table A7: Effect of Credit Constraints on Product Mix Decisions by Wine Color
(double difference)
This table presents the impact of the EBA Capital Exercise on product mix decision by wine color using a double-
difference specification. The analysis is conditioned on bank dependent companies. The analysis is conditioned
on companies operating in regions where a minimum ageing restriction is in place. The outcome variable is the
percentage of red (first three columns) or white (last three columns) PDO wine in total production in year t. Post
is a binary variable equal to one from 2012 onward. EBA Share is the share of credit from affected banks at the
time the announcement (October 2011). Bank dependent is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the company has
a high debt ratio (non-current liabilities scaled by total assets above the median). Sizet−1 is logarithm of total
assets in the previous year. Internal Market t−1 is the percentage of sales in the domestic market. Any PDO t−1
is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the company has produced some PDO wine in the previous year. Additional
time invariant variables and interactions are captured by fixed effects and are therefore omitted. The sample covers
the period 2006-2013. Robust standard errors clustered at firm level are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Color
Red White
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post × EBA Share -0.174** -0.125 -0.158** -0.039 -0.062 -0.007
[0.081] [0.081] [0.063] [0.037] [0.048] [0.024]
Post 0.100** 0.076 0.053 0.020 0.024 0.014
[0.048] [0.046] [0.047] [0.020] [0.022] [0.011]
EBA Share 0.073 0.008
[0.092] [0.059]
Size t−1 -0.068 -0.007 -0.012 -0.027
[0.074] [0.086] [0.026] [0.030]
Internal Market t−1 0.143 0.004 -0.104 -0.051
[0.123] [0.120] [0.099] [0.062]
Any PDO t−1 0.057 0.075 -0.010 -0.017
[0.087] [0.098] [0.021] [0.025]
Firm FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year X Region No No Yes No No Yes
No. Observations 400 303 289 400 303 289
No. Firms 69 69 69 69
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.698 0.746 -0.006 0.672 0.805
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Table A8: Effect of Credit Constraints on Product Mix Decisions in Regions with
No Minimum Ageing Restriction
This table presents the impact of the EBA Capital Exercise on product mix decision by wine color. The analysis
is conditioned on companies operating in regions where there is no minimum ageing restriction in place. The
outcome variable is the percentage of red (first three columns) or white (last three columns) PDO wine in total
production in year t. Post is a binary variable equal to one from 2012 onward. EBA Share is the share of credit
from affected banks at the time the announcement (October 2011). Bank dependent is a dummy variable equal to
1 when the company has a high debt ratio (non-current liabilities scaled by total assets above the median). Sizet−1
is logarithm of total assets in the previous year. Internal Market t−1 is the percentage of sales in the domestic
market. Any PDO t−1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the company has produced some PDO wine in the
previous year. Additional time invariant variables and interactions are captured by fixed effects and are therefore
omitted. The sample covers the period 2006-2013. Robust standard errors clustered at firm level are shown in
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Color
Red White
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post × EBA Share × Bank Dep. -0.107* -0.065 -0.068 0.016 -0.033 -0.044
[0.057] [0.042] [0.043] [0.076] [0.056] [0.055]
Post × EBA Share 0.018 0.029 0.029 0.041 0.030 0.029
[0.038] [0.031] [0.032] [0.035] [0.022] [0.024]
EBA Share × Bank Dep. -0.014 0.015
[0.084] [0.139]
Post × Bank Dep. 0.009 0.015 0.019 -0.017 0.010 0.010
[0.035] [0.028] [0.027] [0.048] [0.040] [0.038]
Post 0.019 0.003 0.045 -0.019 -0.013 -0.005
[0.023] [0.019] [0.064] [0.026] [0.014] [0.020]
EBA Share 0.023 -0.083
[0.060] [0.090]
Bank Dep. -0.034 0.013
[0.045] [0.079]
Size t−1 -0.019 -0.013 0.006 0.014
[0.021] [0.022] [0.016] [0.018]
Internal Market t−1 -0.018 -0.011 -0.024 -0.005
[0.045] [0.046] [0.041] [0.043]
Any PDO t−1 0.111*** 0.114*** 0.035 0.034
[0.036] [0.039] [0.026] [0.027]
Firm FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year X Region No No Yes No No Yes
No. Observations 1404 1181 1143 1404 1181 1143
No. Firms 215 213 215 213
Adjusted R2 0.009 0.736 0.739 0.001 0.89 0.894
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2.1 Introduction
Management practices help to explain differences in firm productivity and profitability,
and development levels across countries (e.g., Bloom and Van Reenen (2011); Bloom
et al. (2013)). This literature mostly focusses on lower or middle management of larger
corporations or on founders/CEOs of small or micro-enterprises. There is no quasi-
experimental evidence on executives of larger companies even though their potential
impact on economic development is also larger as they effectively control a large part
of the economy. In this paper, we conduct a randomized controlled trial (RCT) with
top-level executives of medium and large companies in Mozambique, who participate in
an executive education programme in finance. The programme focus on investment and
capital allocation decisions as well as firm financial policies. While financial decisions
are irrelevant in a frictionless world, the ability to make optimal financial decisions may
have a positive impact on firm value in contexts where financial frictions are potentially
severe such as in developing economies. The World Bank Enterprise Survey (2018)
identifies “Access to Finance” together with “Corruption” as the biggest obstacles for
firms in Mozambique, followed by “Practices of the informal sector”, “Crime”, and
“Political Instability”. In terms of financing, only 10% of the firms have a bank loan or
a line of credit, compared to about 44% that refer to still need a bank loan. More than
21% of the firms had a recent loan application that was rejected. One reason could
be collateral requirements as more than 90% of the loans required a collateral, with an
average of 271% of the loan value being requested as collateral.
We document a positive treatment effect of the executive education programme on
financial policies and firm profitability. Using survey data and financial accounting
data from one of the world’s largest accounting firms (KPMG), we find that managers
adjust some firm financial policies. The largest treatment effects are for short term
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financial policies related to working capital, which generates a positive impact on cash
flows due to reduction in accounts receivable and inventories but no observed change in
accounts payable. We also find a smaller yet significant positive change on investment
in fixed capital, in response to the treatment. We find these policy changes to improve
firm performance, which is consistent with efficiency gains.
Our findings suggest that individual CEOs, and, in particular, their financial education
matter for corporate policies and, ultimately, for corporate performance. These findings
are consistent with Bertrand and Schoar (2003) who argue that individual CEOs help
to explain observed heterogeneity in management practices and corporate policies, and
conclude that CEOs possess different “styles”.37 With respect to financial expertise,
existing research shows that managers’ financial expertise impacts revenues and survival
rates of corporations in the context of small and micro-entrepreneurs in developing
countries (Drexler et al., 2014; Anderson-Macdonald et al., 2014) and is correlated with
firm financial policies in developed countries such as the U.S. (Custodio and Metzger,
2014). Custodio and Metzger (2014) document that firms run by financial expert CEOs
hold less cash, more debt, and engage more intensively in share repurchases, especially
when there is a relative tax advantage with respect to dividends payments. They also
find that financial expert CEOs are more aware of common capital budgeting decisions
mistakes. Overall, the evidence suggests that the impact of financial expertise of CEOs
on economic outcomes is potentially large. Our study makes three contributions to the
literature. First, we show in a RCT setting that individual CEOs, and in particular
their financial skills, have real effects on firm financial policies and profitability. Second,
we show that Executive Education matters, and that relatively low-cost interventions,
37There is substantial research linking CEO styles to preferences and traits (e.g., Malmendier and
Tate (2005, 2008), Malmendier et al. (2011), Kaplan et al. (2012), Graham et al. (2013), Hirshleifer
et al. (2012)), to education (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar (2003), and Malmendier and Tate (2005)), or to
industry-specific work experience (e.g., Custodio and Metzger (2013, 2014) and Custo´dio et al. (2013);
Custodio et al. (2017).
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such as an 18-hour MBA-style finance executive education course, help to build-up
finance expertise. Last, our results suggest that improving short term financial policies
such as working capital can potentially relax financial constraints, at least in the short
run, by improving firm liquidity.
We start by documenting substantial heterogeneity in financial expertise by CEOs in
Mozambique. About 43% of the CEOs have a background in finance, either by educa-
tion or work experience. When analyzing financial practices in firms with and without
financial expert CEOs, we find large differences in their practices. For example, we find
significant differences between these two groups in the way they evaluate investment
projects. While a large majority of CEOs with a background in finance is making use
of sophisticated valuation techniques such as net present value (NPV) (70%), or con-
ducts sensitivity analysis (63%), this is relatively uncommon for CEOs without such
a background. Only 25% of CEOs with no financial background use NPV, and only
33% of them perform sensitivity analyses in their capital budgeting calculations. At
the same time, they are more likely to use less sophisticated valuation techniques such
as hurdle rates (63%). These findings are consistent with US evidence by Bertrand
and Schoar (2003) and Custodio and Metzger (2014) who found CEOs with MBAs or
financial expertise are much more likely to follow financial theory and textbook rules,
and to avoid common mistakes such as using a unique firm cost of capital irrespective
of the nature of the project (the WACC fallacy).38 While these results are suggestive
of an effect of financial expertise on financial policies, omitted variables may bias the
coefficients.
In order to identify a potential treatment effect of financial expertise on firm policies, one
would need to observe exogenous variation of financial expertise across firms. One way
38The use of companywide discount rates to evaluate investment projects rather than project-specific
ones has been called the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) fallacy (Graham and Harvey, 2001;
Kru¨ger et al., 2015).
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of doing so would be an actual random allocation of CEOs to firms. Unfortunately,
this type of experiment is not feasible in the context of large firms. We propose a
different solution, by randomizing financial education of top managers, and, at the
same time, keeping the match between CEOs and firms constant. We “treat” managers
with financial expertise by offering a free MBA-style course on corporate finance to
top managers of 93 medium and large firms in Mozambique. Similar approaches are
commonly employed in the development economics literature and have been used to
measure the impact of financial literacy on revenue and survival rates for small and
micro-entrepreneurs (Drexler et al., 2014; Anderson-Macdonald et al., 2014), but have
not been applied to larger companies. An exception is Bloom et al. (2013) who use a
randomized controlled experiment to measure the effects of management practices on
the productivity of large plants in India.39 However, they focus on lower-tier, plant
managers rather than on executives, and they do not study financial education and
financial policies. Our paper is the first RCT project in economics whose intervention
targets executives of relatively large companies.40
To address concerns of endogenous selection into the treatment, we randomly staggered
the timing of the treatment of firms that expressed their interest in participating in the
executive education programme. Firms were randomly allocated into two cohorts: a
treatment group and a control group. Randomization was done in a stratified way so
that both groups are balanced in terms of industries. The first cohort - the treatment
group - received the treatment in May 2017, while the second cohort - the control
group - received the same treatment in November 2018 / April 2019. We offered the
39Other experiments find mixed evidence of the impact of basic business training to micro and
small enterprises in developing countries (Karlan and Valdivia, 2011; Bruhn and Zia, 2013; Bruhn
et al., 2012; Karlan et al., 2012).
40Their experiment was carried out in 17 firms operating 28 plants; this relatively low number of
observations reflects the difficulty to obtain big samples in the context of RCTs with large corporations.
In this respect, a sample size of 93 firms appears notable.
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control group the course to provide an incentive to participate in the experiment, and
to make detailed financial data available. During the fifteen-month period, both firms
were contacted to collect financial data and to conduct follow-up surveys on financial
practices. One survey was conducted immediately after the intervention to evaluate the
intentions of executives to change their behavior, and a second survey was conducted
15 months after the intervention to evaluate implemented changes.
The main results can be summarized as follows: i) treated firms report high inten-
tions to change financial policies after the participation in the course (73% of the firms
intend to adjust their working capital management, 70% risk management, 42% valu-
ation techniques and 48% capital structure). The survey also reveals that a sizeable
fraction of firms is not able to adjust their capital structure (32.5%), risk management
and valuation practices (17.5% each), mostly because they are subsidiaries and these
policies are set somewhere else in the business group. ii) 30.8% of treated firms report
that they have implemented changes in working capital management 15 months after
the treatment. Corresponding figures for other financial policies are lower (11.5% for
capital structure decisions and valuation, and 7.7% for risk management). Moreover,
firms report that they implemented these changes because of the treatment (i.e., the
course they participated in 15 months before). While these results are suggestive of
a treatment effect, we also make use of the control group to address the concern that
we may be capturing for instance a pure time-effect. Indeed, it might be the case that
changes in the economy led companies to change their financial policies, irrespective
of the treatment. When we compare mean differences between treatment and control
groups (using a one-sided t-test), we find a large and significant difference for changes in
working capital management (significant at the 1%-level) and changes in capital struc-
ture and risk management (significant at the 10%-level). iii) we make use of accounting
data to validate the survey evidence and to analyze potential implications for firms’ ef-
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ficiency. Using a difference-in-difference estimator, we find evidence that is supportive
of the survey results. We find a large and negative effect on working capital: working
capital decreases by 0.86 standard deviations for the treated firms when compared to
the control group. When decomposing the effect, we find that treated firms decrease
their collection period, reducing account receivables, as well their inventories. These
changes are expected to have a positive effect on liquidity in the short run. We do not
find any effect on cash holdings or leverage. Consistent with these findings, we find that
treated firms use that cash inflow, at least partially, to increase capital expenditures.
Whether these changes have led to policies that are more efficient or not is not clear
ex-ante. For instance, by collecting receivables too quickly or reducing inventory too
much, sales might be adversely affected. To test whether firms have indeed moved
towards more efficient policies as a response of the treatment, we analyze whether
treated firms show better performance relative to the control group. Given that most
firms are private, we do not observe their market values.41 Hence, we rely on accounting
ratios to measure efficiency. Analyzing return on assets (ROA), we find that treated
firms’ ROA increases by 0.37 standard deviations compared to control firms. We also
find that return on invested capital (ROIC) improves, whereas at the same time, we
do not find any adverse effect on sales growth. The point estimates of the treatment
effects are large, but not implausible, particularly given that the confidence intervals
include more modest estimates. 42
Attending the intervention, a course on Corporate Finance, might affect financial
policies through different, non-exclusive channels. Participants may learn new cor-
porate finance concepts and methodology from the instructor, they may refresh or
41There were 8 listed firms in Mozambique in 2019. Out of these, 6 are non-financial firms and 3 of
them participated in our program. Two of these companies where in the treatment group and one of
them went public after the intervention.
42Bruhn et al. (2019) make a similar argument when measuring the impact of consulting for small-
and medium-sized firms in Mexico.
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consolidate previous knowledge, they may learn from their peers, or they might gen-
erate new business from networking with their classmates. While we cannot formally
rule out that networking is driving the results, we do not believe that there is strong
support for the networking channel. While our results on ROA are consistent with a
network channel, it is less obvious why networking should decrease working capital for
the average treated company. Moreover, we would expect to see a positive effect on
sales growth if networking translated into new business among treatment firms. Last,
during the delivery of the course for the treatment group in May 2017, we organized a
networking event for the control group, allowing this group to network as well. Though
the duration of this event was admittedly shorter than the duration of the course,
this gave control group participants the opportunity to know each-other and exchange
contacts.
Our RCT setting overcomes several of the most common identification issues in the
literature that tries to establish a relation between the characteristics of managers
and firm-level outcomes (it generates exogenous variation amongst participating firms).
However, the internal validity of our research design could still be compromised by
systematic differences in treatment and control groups due to the small sample, high or
uneven attrition rates, contagion effects, or changes in the expectations or behavior of
treated managers due to being part of an experiment. We perform differences-on-the-
mean and -median tests to compare the two groups and find that almost all differences
at the mean and especially at the median are not statistically significant. Moreover,
for the validity of our experiment, it would be alright if the groups differed in levels
but exhibited parallel pre-treatment evolution. We test the parallel trends assumption
non-parametrically and do not find evidence on its violation for the main variables of
interest. With respect to non-compliance, our programme participation is very high:
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the compliance rate is 91%, with only 4 firms dropping out of the course.43 We also
repeat all our tests on the population of firms that were assigned to treatment and
estimate intention-to-treat effects (ITT). The results are very similar. Managers of
treated companies might also change their behaviour and expectations differently from
the control firms because of the intervention. For instance, managers might update their
expectations with respect to firm performance and respond accordingly (see Chemla and
Hennessy (2019)). In our setup this is less of a problem as both treatment and control
managers expect to receive treatment. Another concern is that they might engage in
specific behaviour such as engaging in earnings management, because they want to
impress or please instructor/researchers or because they feel they are under scrutiny.
This can also get reflected in compliance to share financial data with the researchers.
While all firms signed an agreement to share data, we were not able to collect data from
all the companies. This is potentially problematic if the willingness to share the data
for the treatment groups is different from the control group. By offering the course to
both treated and control firms we attempt to mitigate these potential differences, as
this should better align the behaviour of treated and control firms. Moreover, we make
use of external data, that is not self-reported to us, and show similar treatment effects,
addressing the concern that strategic data disclosure is biasing our estimates.
We perform several additional robustness checks to our baseline results. In specific, we
use different estimation windows by varying the sample period before the intervention,
we exclude firms that had CEO turnovers after the treatment, we restrict the analysis to
data obtained from KPMG, we focus on the largest segments of each business group, we
use alternative definitions of financial ratios to measure working capital and accounting
43For the 41 treated firms that took up the course, class attendance at the manager level was high
at 92%, with 72% of the managers attending all of the classes. Class attendance aggregated at the
firm level was higher at 93%, with 85% of the firms (at least one participant per firm) attending all
the classes. High attendance can be explained by the requirement to attend at least 75% of the classes
to receive a certificate of participation.
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performance, and we exclude firms that operate in the financial industry.44
Whether our findings can be generalized to other contexts in or outside Mozambique
is difficult to answer. However, we provide several tests that support the external
validity of our findings. When we compare firms that applied to our program with
other firms that are present in the KPMG reports, we do not find firms that enrolled
in the program to be significantly different from the non-enrolling firms on observable
firm characteristics. We also compare the characteristics of participating executives
with executives of firms in Mozambique that are present on the LinkedIn network and
find no significant differences in tenure or level of education. More interestingly, we
also compare our participants with the sample in Graham and Harvey (2001) for firms
of similar size (according to revenues) and find not significant differences in tenure or
education.
Overall, our results show that financial expertise of managers has a positive and econom-
ically significant impact on firm performance through the adoption of financial practices
that promote value creation. Moreover, our results suggest that relatively small inter-
ventions such as financial education improve financial practices and decision-making
and may ultimately affect economic development. Using the median participating firm
as a benchmark, we estimate an average impact from the intervention of 1.28 million
USD; this estimate is considerably smaller, at about 30,000 USD when we are very con-
servative and use the lower bound of the confidence interval of the treatment effect. In
any case, the treatment effects seem to exceed the direct expected costs of participating
in such a programme which are estimated at around 10,000 USD, taking into account
the tuition fees.
Given the large positive impacts, why had firms and managers not already taken up
44Banks were initially excluded from our experiment, but we still kept firms with other operations
in the financial industry (e.g., insurance).
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a finance course? There are several non-mutually exclusive potential reasons for this.
First, there are no similar courses available locally, which significantly raises the total
cost of participating in such a program (incl. traveling and opportunity costs). Second,
firms might simply not be aware of the benefits of such an executive training. Kremer
et al. (2019) argue that this behavior can also be consistent with behavioral biases by
managers of firms in developing countries, such as an inattention or an underestimation
of returns or an overestimation of the risks involved, for instance.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: the next section gives an over-
view on financial education and financial practices of firms in Mozambique. In section
2.3, we present the experimental design, describe the executive education programme
(intervention) and the data collection process. Section 2.4 shows the results of our
intervention based on survey and accounting data. In Section 2.5, we interpret the
findings and make some policy recommendations. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Financial Education and Financial Policies of
Medium and Large Enterprises in Mozambique
This section motivates our decision to conduct the experiment in Mozambique and
explains the selection of firms considered for the experiment. It also describes the
design and outcome of an explorative stage in which we collected information on the
background (including financial education and experience) of CEOs as well as on firms’
current financial practices. The results of this explorative stage were helpful for several
reasons. First, there is no data on financial expertise and financial policy available
for a large set of firms in Mozambique. Understanding the status quo, in terms of
CEO backgrounds and current finance practices, as well as learning more about the
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functioning of the financial markets was important to design a meaningful course for
that target audience. Second, it helped us to understand whether there was an interest
in participating in an “executive education” programme in finance, and what content
could be relevant for Mozambique. Last, it allowed us to compare financial expertise
and practices of these firms with evidence of firms of similar size and sectors from the
US.
2.2.1 Mozambique and the Selection of Firms for the Experi-
ment
We have chosen Mozambique to conduct the RCT for several reasons. First, we expected
to observe more heterogeneity in terms of financial education among executive man-
agers when compared to managers of US-American or European firms due to the lack of
executive education programmes in finance available in the country.45 This heterogen-
eity might be helpful when measuring effects of financial education on financial policies
and firm performance. Second, survey statistics collected by the World Bank Enterprise
Surveys (2018) suggest that Mozambique is representative of other Sub-Saharan (SSA)
economies. Some details of this survey are summarized in Section B1 in the Appendix.
Third, Mozambique has an important advantage for the implementation stage: most
large companies’ headquarters are located in the capital, Maputo. This helps with the
logistics and organization of the intervention, and was expected to increase participation
rates. Last, we benefited from the existing links between NOVAFRICA, a knowledge
center by Nova School of Business and Economics, and governmental organizations as
well as NGOs in Mozambique that helped to increase visibility and credibility of the
project.
45For instance, there is only one business school providing an MBA programme on a regular basis
(in cooperation with a Portuguese business school).
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We focused the intervention on medium and large firms because they control a large
fraction of assets in the economy. Potential efficiency gains of these firms are, therefore,
more likely to be economically relevant. Moreover, some capital allocation inefficien-
cies previously documented in the literature are mostly relevant for large and multi-
divisional firms. For instance, Kru¨ger et al. (2015) show that firms do not properly
adjust for risk in their capital budgeting decisions, and that conglomerates underinvest
(overinvest) in relatively safe (risky) divisions.
In the long-run, there might be also some spillovers of best financial practices from
large firms to smaller ones. First, large firms might be role models for smaller firms and
those firms may adopt some of the practices of large corporations. Second, there might
be some direct knowledge / practice spillovers originating from human capital that is
moving across companies. Both channels are likely to be more prominent in large firms.
In addition, financial literacy has been mostly studied in the context of small enterprises
(e.g., Drexler, Fischer, and Schoar, 2014), but little is known at the level of large
corporations beyond the fact that there is a correlation between financial expertise and
financial polices (Custodio and Metzger, 2014; Gu¨ner et al., 2008).
2.2.2 Financial Practices of Firms
An explorative stage of the project took place in 2015 where we collected information
about managers, including demographics and financial education and experience, as
well as firms’ characteristics and financial policies. We used this information to design
the executive education programme and to compare financial expertise and finance
policies of medium and large enterprises in Mozambique with US evidence.
The exploratory stage run between June and July 2015 (see Figure 2.1). During this
period, we contacted 218 companies obtained from KPMG “Top-100 Companies in
79
Chapter 2
Figure 2.1: Project timeline
This timeline describes the field work between June 2015 and April 2019. For each stage, it describes the work performed
as well as information collected regarding companies and managers.
Mozambique” reports from 2010-2014 and had 65 meetings with executives. Out of the
65 meetings, we were able to collect 63 questionnaires.46 The questionnaires were filled
in during a 30-minute face-to-face interview. The interview was conducted at company’s
premises by a member of the research team. Although we specifically invited the CEO,
sometimes our request was forwarded to the CFO, to a member of the accounting team,
or in a few cases, to a non-finance related staff.
These questionnaires surveyed financial practices, manager characteristics and overall
business aspects of the companies, following Graham and Harvey (2001, 2002). We
also used the survey to assess the interest of managers for a free of charge Executive
Programme on Financial Management. We specifically asked which topics they would
find more relevant, including capital budgeting, risk management, capital structure,
46Two participants were busy at the scheduled time and committed to send us the questionnaire
later by e-mail, which did not happen. These 63 pilot questionnaires correspond to 62 business groups
(in this case single companies), as we surveyed separately two managers from the same company.
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Figure 2.2: Financial Experience and Financial Policies
This graph displays the percentage of managers using different valuation techniques according to financial experience.
Financial experience is defined as previous background in finance, i.e. managers who have attended at least one finance
course at any higher education degree. Source: Survey Jun-Jul 2015.
pay-out policy and mergers and acquisitions. Finally, we inquired the executives’ time
availability for such a programme and about the optimal schedule to follow it out in
order to maximize attendance.
These questionnaires also allowed to have a first look at financial expertise, financial
policies, and the interaction between the two in Mozambique. We start by documenting
substantial heterogeneity in financial expertise by CEOs in Mozambique. About 43%
of the CEOs have a background in finance, either by education or work experience.
When analyzing financial practices in firms with and without financial expert CEOs,
we find large differences in their practices. For example, Figure 2.2 shows financial
practices related to capital budgeting/valuation by firms that are run by financial expert
CEOs compared to non-financial expert CEOs. While a large majority of CEOs with a
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background in finance is making use of sophisticated valuation techniques such as net
present value (NPV) (70%), or conducts sensitivity analysis (63%), this is relatively
uncommon for CEOs without such a background. Only 25% of CEOs with no financial
background use NPV, and only 33% of them perform sensitivity analyses in their capital
budgeting calculations. At the same time, they are more likely to use less sophisticated
valuation techniques such as hurdle rates (63%). These findings are consistent with US
evidence by Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and Custodio and Metzger (2014) who found
CEOs with MBAs or financial expertise are much more likely to follow financial theory
and textbook rules, and to avoid common mistakes such as using a unique firm cost of
capital irrespective of the nature of the project (the WACC fallacy).
2.3 Design and Implementation of the Experiment
This section presents the experimental design and sample description. It then details
the contents of the programme as well as its implementation. Finally, we discuss the
data collection procedure.
2.3.1 Experimental Design and Sample Description
Our experimental design is motivated by two common challenges faced by researchers
when analyzing the effect of financial education on financial policies: i) the endogenous
decision to obtain financial education and ii) limited availability of data.
While the documented correlations between the financial expertise of CEOs and their
financial practices in the previous section are consistent with the view that CEO edu-
cation affects financial policies, a clean interpretation of these correlations remains
difficult. Researchers have examined whether corporate outcomes are affected by CEO
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characteristics, but no consensus has been reached (e.g., see Chemmanur and Simonyan
(2017) for a survey of the literature). CEOs and firms are not randomly matched, and
there is the concern that endogenous matching biases the estimates. Indeed, the lit-
erature on effects of managerial human capital on firm policies heavily relies on cross-
sectional analysis that makes causal inference very challenging. Some studies such as
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) use panel regressions and estimate potential CEO effects
making use of within-firm variation due to CEOs switching firms. However, Fee et al.
(2013) cast doubt on this methodology for identifying managerial style effects on policy
choices. They argue that CEO turnover events are endogenous and managerial “style
changes” are anticipated by corporate boards at the time of the CEO selection decision.
In other words, while firm-fixed effects allow to control for unobserved firm heterogen-
eity that is time-invariant, it cannot be ruled out that firm time-varying characteristics,
unobserved by the econometrician such as some strategic decisions, drive both financial
policies and the characteristic of the CEO that is appointed. In the context of financial
expertise, Custodio and Metzger (2014) show that firms run by managers that have
past work experience in finance have better access to external financing and allocate
the firms’ financial resources more efficiently. At the same time, however, they also
provide evidence that financial expert CEOs are more likely to be appointed by more
mature firms.
In order to identify a treatment effect of financial expertise on firm policies, one would
need to randomize financial expertise across firms. One way of doing so would be an
actual random allocation of CEOs to firms. Unfortunately, this type of experiment is not
feasible in the context of large firms. We propose a different solution, by randomizing
financial education of top managers, and, at the same time, keeping the match between
CEOs and firms constant. To be specific, we “treat” managers with financial education
by offering free MBA-style lectures on corporate finance and risk management to top
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managers. Such a randomized controlled trial (RCT) can be used to identify a treatment
effect of finance education on financial policies.
A second challenge for our study is the availability of data. First, most companies are
private and the access to financial statements is limited. Moreover, some outcomes,
such as the use of specific valuation techniques or risk management instruments, are
difficult to measure in those statements. For that reason, we provide incentives to firms
to share financial statements with us and complement those statements with survey
data from interviews, allowing us to collect non-standard data. For a large set of firms,
we complement this data with accounting information directly from external reports,
“Top-100 Companies in Mozambique” published annually by KPMG Mozambique.47
The last piece of data allows us to validate the self-reported data and helps to address
the concern that some firms might be strategic in their choice of sharing data with us.48
We construct the treatment and control group of our experiment in two steps. First,
we invited 577 medium and large companies to sign up for an executive education pro-
gramme on finance. The list of invited companies is primarily composed of companies
appearing in a KPMG report at least once in the period 2009-2016 (391 companies).
Additionally, we invited companies associated with local business associations, namely
CTA – Confederac¸a˜o das Associac¸o˜es Econo´micas de Moc¸ambique and ACIS (186 com-
panies).49 We restrict our sample to companies that are headquartered in Maputo.50
47These reports contain name and information of many of the largest corporations in Mozambique.
These reports are publicly available and are used by local and foreign investors, public administration
and other institutions. Each report lists and ranks the 100 largest companies (according to total
revenue) from the pool of companies that fill-in the KPMG annual survey. For each company, it
provides main financial accounting figures such as revenues, net income, assets, liabilities, equity,
number of employees and new investments.
48We discuss this concern in more detail in Section 2.4.5 of the paper.
49We partnered with these two business associations as their work receives national recognition.
This fact contributed to raise public awareness about our project.
50Sutton (2014) presents detailed profiles of 40 Mozambican companies, chosen to represent the
leading firms in several industries. Out of those 40 companies, 24 appear in our set of invited companies.
The match is much larger when we exclude companies from extractive industries (the ones located in
specific regions of the country and usually outside Maputo). Out of 19 remaining firms, 16 were invited
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This enabled in-person interaction with participants, which was crucial throughout the
project to engage the participants with the programme and facilitate data collection.
This requirement also reduced non-compliance of participants as it minimized the par-
ticipants’ cost of attending the training. We focussed on executives of these companies
as those usually take most strategic decisions, including financial decisions (see Harvey
et al. (2015)).
To address the concern of endogenous selection into the treatment, we randomly al-
located firms that enrolled in the programme into two groups: the treatment group
and the control group. The randomization was done within industry to make sure the
same industries were represented in both groups.51 We then offered the treatment, the
course on finance, to the two groups in a staggered way. The first cohort - the treat-
ment group - received the treatment in May 2017, while the second cohort - the control
group - received the same treatment in November 2018/April 2019.52 The reasoning
for teaching the control group as well has the following rationale: First, it incentivizes
the control group to share their accounting data and participate in the surveys as well.
Second, it helps addressing the concern that the formation of expectations may bias the
experiment (Chemla and Hennessy, 2019) because treatment and control group both
expect to be treated.
The advertised course was an Executive-level Programme in Finance - “Finance and
to take part in our project.
51The randomization procedure was done at company level and stratified by industry. As noted by
Sutton (2014), a sample stratified by industry provides a ‘fair and complete picture of the country’s
industrial capabilities’. However, there were several business groups in our sample (i.e., one manager
might oversee several companies belonging to the same group). Given that the intervention is at
manager level, we could not allow for treatment and control companies within a given manager.
Therefore, after an initial random assignment on the pool of companies, we observed the assignment
of the most relevant company (according to size) in each business group and extend that assignment
to all companies within manager.
52While not affecting the internal validity of the experiment, it is still interesting to analyze the
characteristics of firms and executives who are interested in attending the course versus who are not.
Please see also Section B2 in the appendix of the paper.
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Strategy – Value Creation in Emerging Markets” - promoted under Imperial College
Executive Education branding. The course was offered in Maputo, free of charge and
limited to the companies participating in the research project. Additional information
about the course was openly available at the Imperial College Executive Education
webpage, including a market price of £6,500 per participant / free of charge for invited
participants.53
Upon receiving 109 positive responses, we scheduled face-to-face meetings to present
further details about the programme. Managers that were interested in the programme
formalized their interest on behalf of the company by submitting an application form.
This form collected information on manager characteristics (demographics, educational
background and professional experience) and company characteristics. The registration
form also contained a data access agreement for the provision of financial information
(income statement and balance sheet). We allowed each company to send up to two
attendees imposing that at least one of them was a senior manager.54 We received
application forms from 111 participants, corresponding to 93 firms. Those companies
were then randomly allocated into treatment (45 companies) and control group (48
companies) two weeks before the first intervention. We made sure companies that
were part of the same business group were allocated to the same cohort. 46 managers
effectively participated in the programme, representing 41 companies and 31 business
groups (Table 2.1).
Table 2.2 panel A shows summary statistics for the participating firms (treatment
and control groups) and differences between the two groups, in the year before the
intervention. The average treated firm has total assets of 22.3 million USD, total
revenue of 15.8 million USD, and 191 employees. The distributions are very skewed,
53See the webpage and brochure in Appendix B4 of the paper.
54We required one application form per attendee.
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Table 2.1: Number of managers and companies participating in the programme
The table displays the number of participating companies and managers at different stages of the project.
Time What Firms Managers
Pre-Treatment Invitations and applications to the programme; ran-
domization
Companies that applied to the programme 93 -
- Treated companies 45 -
- Control companies 48 -
Financial data
- Treated companies 36 -
- Control companies 42 -
Treatment (2017) Intervention I
- Programme attendees 41 46
- Control event attendees 18 17
Post-Treatment 15month survey
- Treated companies 30 22
- Control companies 39 31
Financial data
- Treated companies 32 -
- Control companies 35 -
and, by chance, there are two large firms in the control group, resulting in higher means
of size related variables in the control group (significant at the 10 percent level). When
we compare financial ratios or the medians, both differences between the two samples
are much smaller.55
Panel B of Table 2.2 shows summary statistics for the top managers in the treatment
and control groups, as well as the differences across the two groups. About 61% of the
managers in the treatment groups are the CEO of the company and 29% the CFO.
These managers are in general highly educated, with 57% having a masters degree or
higher. A large fraction also has a finance or accounting related education, with only
19% of them reporting no education in finance or accounting at any level. About 19%
of the executives are female. Differences across the two groups are not statistically
significant. The only exception is nationality. About 55% of the managers in the
treatment group are Mozambican, compared to 78% in the control group.
55Appendix table B9 describes variables construction and respective sources.
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Even though the experimental setup helps to identify a causal effect of financial exec-
utive education on firm outcomes, there are still limitations. For instance, attendance
of the course is voluntary and (failing of) sharing of the data might be non-random.
Moreover, the mechanisms through which a finance executive education course impacts
firm outcomes may be wider than the learning channel itself. Indeed, the classroom
experience may affect dimensions that are not directly related to the content of the
course. Managers may benefit from networking with managers of other firms while
attending the course. If they start doing business together, it can eventually trans-
late into higher revenues, even though it is unrelated to learning. In order to alleviate
some of the potentially confounding effects of networking, we organized a networking
event for companies in the control group. This event took place around the dates of
the first intervention, i.e. when the treatment group attended the course. We discuss
the networking event as well as some other threats to the internal validity and the
interpretation of our findings in detail in Section 2.4.5 of the paper.
2.3.2 Design of the Course
The course was designed as a general course in corporate finance, but emphasized topics
identified as weaknesses by the managers at the explorative stage (see Section 2.2.2).
We also used the survey and face-to-face interviews conducted during the explorative
stage to evaluate the trade-off between the executives’ willingness to participate and the
course content and duration to maximize participation. The proposed course contains
standard topics of any corporate finance course (i.e., capital budgeting, valuation, and
capital structure) plus modules on working capital and risk management. The course
consisted of four modules:
1. Capital Budgeting and Valuation: This module covered standard techniques
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of firm and project valuation such as discounted cash flows methods, net present
value, internal rate of return, payback period. It also covered asset pricing mod-
els such as CAPM as a tool to estimate project discount rates. Some common
valuation mistakes such as the misuse of the weighted average cost of capital
irrespective of the specific risk of the project were also covered in the course.
2. Capital Structure: This module presented a practical view of assessing the
optimal capital structure of the firm, listing the advantages and disadvantages of
debt financing such as the tax shield of debt and bankruptcy costs, respectively.
3. Managing Working Capital: This topic covered the concept of working cap-
ital and the impact of efficient working capital management on cash flows and
cash holdings. This module also covered cash management, and management of
account receivables and account payables. For instance, participants were taught
how to calculate the cost of trade credit and compare it to other sources of fin-
ancing.
4. Risk Management: This module covered the identification of risks and associ-
ated potential costs, analysis of the causes of risk of financial loss, determination
of various hedging strategies, implementation of the risk management strategies,
and management and monitoring of results. The approach to this topic was that
an effective risk management programme can reduce losses and improve financial
performance.
The intended learning outcomes of these four modules can be summarized as follows:
1. Read, understand and process (for instance calculate basic financial ratios) finan-
cial information from financial reports.
2. Understand the impact of efficient working capital management on firm liquidity
and funding needs.
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3. Understand the appropriate valuation techniques to use when making capital
budgeting decisions, and avoid common mistakes in valuation, for instance do not
take the time value of money into account.
4. Trade-off the costs and benefits of a given financial structure and source of finan-
cing.
5. Identify sources of risk and risk management practices, for instance hedging using
insurance or financial instruments.
The course was organized in four modules spanning 18 hours (4.5 hours each). While
this may appear relatively short, courses in related studies have similar durations (e.g.,
two days or two half days (Bruhn and Zia, 2013; Field et al., 2010)). Moreover, our
course is at the shorter end but in line with sessions on related topics in typical MBA
core courses in corporate finance. Given that participants were top executives, our
survey results also suggested that many CEOs/CFOs found it difficult to accommodate
longer duration courses in their agendas. By keeping the intervention short, we may
have increased participation, potentially at the expense of the intensity of the interven-
tion.56 At the same time, shorter courses are cheaper and simpler to organize from a
logistical point of view, a potentially important criterion from a policy point of view.
The format of the course was a mixture of lectures and case studies. The case studies
illustrated the different topics in a relevant setting for larger firms operating in emerging
markets. For instance, we made use of the following Harvard Business School case
studies: New Earth Mining (evaluating a new investment opportunity in South Africa),
Mozal (large investment project in Mozambique), Supply Chain Finance at Procter and
Gamble and Fibria (working capital management and its liquidity consequences in the
US and Brazil). The course was delivered both in Portuguese and English (the group
56It might be interesting to experiment with the length of such a course in future extensions of this
project.
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was split according to their language preferences), by the same instructor. Participants
who attended a minimum of 75% of the classes received a participation certificate from
Imperial College Business School.
2.3.3 Delivery of the Course and Data Collection
2.3.3.1 Intervention 1 - Delivery of the Course for Cohort 1 (Treatment
Group) and Networking Event for Cohort 2 (Control Group)
The first edition of the course took place in May 2017. Out of the 45 treatment firms, 41
showed up and stayed for the full duration of the course (participation rate of 91%).57
Figure 2.3 reports the number of companies participating in different stages of the
project.
First, the participants were required to fill-in a pre-learning survey. This survey rep-
licated the exploratory project survey and collected baseline information on current
financial practices of the company. At the end of the course, participants filled in a
post-learning exit survey. The post-learning exit survey was divided into a confidential
part, where participants were asked to evaluate the course, and a non-confidential part,
where they described their intentions to change financial practices in future.
A concern that remains is that there are confounding effects related to the treatment.
In particular, network effects instead of the content of the course itself may lead to
changes in some outcomes of interest. While these potential network effects are less
obvious for financial policies, we are more concerned with them affecting profitability.
57Four companies did not adhere to the randomized protocol. Two of them enrolled through
email/phone and promised to deliver the application form later on. We were not able to reach them
later. The other two enrolled and confirmed attendance in the first edition but did not show up on
the day of the course. After a follow-up call, one manager stated he was away due to an unexpected
meeting in Angola, whereas another firm was experiencing an internal re-structuration that required
manager’s presence.
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Figure 2.3: Number of companies in different stages of the experiment
This diagram shows the number of companies participating in each stage of the experiment (round brackets). It also
reports the number of companies for which we have at least one year of financial data either from KPMG or self-reported
data (square brackets) or from KPMG (angle brackets).
Profitability is a critical outcome to understand whether potential changes in financial
policies lead to more efficient outcomes. Networks can affect profitability in several
ways: attendees may form new business relationships or share relevant information or
knowledge. To address this concern, we organized an afternoon networking event for
the control group, whose purpose was to give control group the opportunity to mingle
and to network. This event featured a short presentation of the Executive Education
programme as well as short interventions from public and private-sector invited keynote
speakers.58
2.3.3.2 Intervention 2 - Delivery of the Course for Cohort 2 (Control
Group)
Between September and November 2018, we contacted and visited companies in the
control group (40 meetings out of 48 control companies). In these meetings, we run
58Importantly, the network event did not overlap with the content of the course.
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the pre-learning questionnaire (similar to the one applied in the treatment group).
Moreover, we also asked which financial practices had changed since May 2017 and
investigated expectations regarding future changes. This survey was intended to provide
a counterfactual for implemented changes in financial practices by the treatment group.
In these interviews, we also requested financial accounting data.
In a few cases, the manager that had applied to the programme was replaced. For
these cases, we briefed the new manager about the programme and invited her or him
to participate in the second intervention. The second cohort of the course was taught
in November 2018 (in Portuguese) and in April 2019 (in English). The course’s content
and teaching method was replicated from the first edition. At the end of the course,
participants were required to fill-in the post-learning exit survey as described in the
previous subsection.
Out of 48 control companies, 27 showed up on the days of the course (participation
rate of 56%).
2.3.3.3 Follow-up survey and Financial Reports
Approximately 15 months after the first intervention, between September 2018 and
November 2018, we surveyed managers in the treatment group. We asked them about
implemented changes with respect to financial policies since the first intervention. We
also requested their financial reports data between 2013 and 2018. We provided com-
panies with a template spreadsheet including balance sheet, income statement and
statement of cash flows items to fill in.
We also collected financial information for the period between 2008 and 2018 from the
report “Top-100 Companies in Mozambique” published annually by KPMG Mozam-
bique. We use this data to add financial information of companies that did not or
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could not share their financial data, and to assess the quality and consistency of the
data provided by the companies through the Excel spreadsheets. This information was
collected for both treatment and control firms. Financial data was available in dollars
and/or Metical depending on the source. We converted all values in Metical to Dollars
using the exchange rate of the reporting date. Out of 93 participating companies, we
were able to obtain at least one year of financial data for 86 companies.
2.4 The Effect of Financial Education on Financial
Policies and Efficiency
This section analyses the effect of financial education on financial policies. We meas-
ure the intentions of treated firms to implement changes of financial policies after the
courses in May 2017 and November 2018 / April 2019, respectively. We also compare
implemented changes of financial policies of firms taught in May 2017 (treated firms)
and firms yet to be treated (control firms) in September-October 2018, i.e., before the
delivery of the course to the control group. We use both survey evidence and accounting
data to measure the outcomes of interest.
2.4.1 Intention to Change Financial Policies (Exit Survey)
We start our analysis by evaluating the intentions of treated firms to change financial
policies. We focus on valuation techniques, working capital management, capital struc-
ture, and risk management, the main themes of the delivered courses. Table 2.3 shows
the results of the exit survey by the participants at the end of the courses.
Panel A of Table 2.3 presents the results for the first cohort that was treated in May
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Table 2.3: Intention to change Financial Policies (Exit Survey)
The table displays the intentions of managers to change corporate policies. The data was collected in the
exit survey at the end of the course. “N/A” means that a corporate policy cannot be changed because
firm does not have discretion over that policy (e.g., subsidiary of a foreign firm). “Miss.” refers to a
missing answer. Depending on the specification, we disregard this answer in the aggregation or, being
conservative, interpret it as a “No”. The left tables show the raw answers of the individual managers.
Source: Exit survey of cohort 1 (May 2017), Exit survey of cohort 2 (November 2018, April 2019).
Panel A: Cohort 1 (May 2017)
Intention to implement changes in corporate policies
Yes No N/A Miss. # % Yes % Yes
(incl.
miss-
ing, excl.
N/A)
Working capital 27 7 3 3 40 73% 73%
Risk management 23 6 7 4 40 64% 70%
Valuation 14 12 7 7 40 42% 42%
Capital structure 13 8 13 6 40 38% 48%
Panel B: Pooled cohorts 1 & 2 (May 2017, November 2018, April 2019)
Intention to implement changes in corporate policies
Working capital 44 14 4 6 68 71% 69%
Risk management 40 15 8 5 68 63% 67%
Valuation 30 19 8 11 68 53% 50%
Capital structure 27 18 16 7 68 44% 52%
2017 (treatment group). The survey reveals several interesting findings. i) There is
large heterogeneity in terms of firms’ ability to implement changes across different
policies. “N/A” denotes cases when firms argue that they cannot adjust a particular
policy. Capital structure appears to be the policy where managers have the least
discretion over. Almost 40% of the companies (13 out of 34) say that they cannot
change the capital structure themselves. Survey questions that aimed to understand the
origins of those constraints suggest that some companies are subsidiaries of larger (often
international firms) and do not have the flexibility to set their own capital structure.
ii) Managers aim to implement changes in all financial policies. Among firms that have
the discretion to set their own policies and we disregard cases when managers did not
answer a question (“missing”), between 38% and 73% intend to implement changes in
their policies that were discussed in the course. When we treat missing answers as
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“no”, the corresponding numbers are between 48% and 73%. iii) Depending on the
policy, there is substantial heterogeneity in the intention intensity. Working capital
management and risk management are the policies that managers are most likely to
change (73% and 70%). There are fewer intended changes of capital structure and
valuation techniques (48% and 42%, respectively).
Panel B shows corresponding results when we include answers of the second cohort that
was treated in November 2018 / April 2019. While there are some minor differences
in the level, the qualitative picture remains robust. Overall, the exit surveys provide
strong evidence that firms intend to change their financial policies after the treatment.
2.4.2 Changes of Financial Policies (15-months Survey)
Even though firms express their intentions to change several corporate policies, it re-
mains unclear to what extent they (are able to) implement those changes. To shed
light on actual implementation we surveyed participating companies, i.e., treatment
and control firms, about 15 months after the first intervention and before the second
intervention. There are indeed reasons why firms may end up not implementing inten-
ded changes. For example, firms may not have the resources or the personnel to do so,
there might be other items on the agenda with higher priorities, external conditions
might impose constraints, etc. Moreover, there could be reasons unrelated to the treat-
ment that lead firms to change their policies. To better understand the effect of the
treatment itself we explicitly asked firms whether they changed firm polices because
of the course. More importantly, we also survey the population of control firms. This
allows us to compare changes in financial polices between treatment and control firms
as well.
Table 2.4 shows the results. First, between 7.7% and 30.8% of the firms mention that
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they have implemented changes of financial policies in the preceding 15 months. Not
unexpectedly, implementations rates are much smaller compared to the intentions that
were reported in the exit survey. Consistent with the exit survey, working capital man-
agement is the most affected policy (about one third of treated companies state that
they have implemented changes in their working capital management). Capital struc-
ture and valuation techniques are relatively less revised, consistently across the two
surveys. One exception is risk management that ranked very high on the list at the
exit survey but only very few companies (two companies) state that have implemented
changes 15 months later. In the survey, we also asked for reasons which prevented firms
from implementing planned changes. One main reason for not changing risk manage-
ment practices appears to be the limited supply of hedging instruments / products to
the Mozambique market. Second, analyzing the motivation for implementation changes
in financial policies, firms seem to respond to the treatment. Almost all firms that re-
ported that they implemented changes in financial policies declared that they did so
because of the course (second column of Table 2.4).
While these results are suggestive, we can also make use of the control group to address
the concern that we may capture a pure time-effect, for instance. Indeed, it might be
the case that changes in the economy may have led companies to change their financial
policies, irrespective of the treatment. We conducted the survey for the control group
at the same time of the survey for the treatment group, before the second intervention
of November 2018 (when the treatment group participated in the course). The middle
panel of Table 2.4 shows the corresponding evidence for the control group. Only two
firms reported that they have implemented changes related to financial policies (work-
ing capital management and valuation) over the preceding 15 months. The right panel
of Table 2.4 tests for statistical differences between the means of treatment and con-
trol group (using a one-sided t-test). We find a large and significant difference of 27.1
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percentage points of firms having implemented changes in working capital manage-
ment. This difference is significant at the 1%-level. With respect to working capital
management, additional open questions in the survey reveal that the main issue that
most companies identified for themselves after the course has been long collection peri-
ods. Companies aimed to tackle this problem in several ways, e.g., by i) tracking (late)
payments in a more systematic manner, ii) shortened terms, or iii) hired additional per-
sonal for A/R management. The differences in terms of changes in capital structure,
risk management, and valuation techniques are smaller and less significant.
Overall, the comparison of treatment and control group is consistent with the view
that attending the course led firms to change certain financial policies, especially those
they have discretion over. Moreover, the 15-months survey results are also in line with
the intentions by the treated firms to change financial policies during the exit survey,
right after the treatment. Implementation rates are, however, lower compared to the
intentions.
2.4.3 Changes of Financial Policies (Financial Accounting Data)
While the last two sections make use of survey data by treatment and control firms, we
can also measure potential changes of financial policies in their financial reports. The
financial statements contain information that allow us to investigate potential changes
in working capital management, investment and capital structure. Changes in risk
management and valuation techniques are more difficult to measure without survey
data. The financial data also allows us to measure potential efficiency effects of the
executive education programme.
Table 2.5 reports the estimates of treatment effects on main financial policies using
ordinary least squares (OLS) to compare treatment and control firms in the cross section
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(specification (1)), and firm fixed effects exploiting within firm variation (specifications
(2) to (5)). We control for general changes in the business environment by including
year fixed effects in specifications (4) and (5). In the last specification, we add firm
size as an additional control. In most regressions, we cluster standard errors at the
firm level; standard errors are bootstrapped in specification (3). Overall, the estimated
coefficients show little variation across these different specifications.
As suggested by the survey evidence of Sections 4.1. and 4.2., we start our analysis by
investigating changes to the working capital (WC) management in Panel A of Table
2.5. The coefficient of interest is the interaction term, corresponding to a difference-
in-difference estimate. In columns (1) to (5), we scale WC by lagged assets and in
columns (6) to (10), WC is scaled by contemporaneous sales. When we scale WC by
lagged assets, we find a point estimate of -0.170 that is significant at 10% level. This
corresponds to a negative impact on working capital of 0.49 standard deviations (based
on the pooled sample of treatment and control firms). Columns (2)-(5) show firm
fixed effect estimates. We find similar, slightly larger coefficients between -0.198 and
-0.216. Estimates are statistically significant at the 5% level across firm fixed effects
specifications and year dummies. Columns (6)-(10) shows the impact of the treatment
on working capital scaled by sales. Consistently, the effects are negative - treated firms
decrease their working capital by about 0.44 standard deviations - and significant at
the 1% level.
In Panels B and C of Table 2.5, we analyse the different components of Working Capital
in more detail. Consistent with evidence from the 15-months survey (see Section 2.4.2),
we find large and significant effects on accounts receivables (A/R). The difference-in-
difference estimate is about -18%, corresponding to a drop of about 0.60 standard
deviations or a reduction of about 60-65 days on the collection period. We do not find
any significant effect on accounts payable (A/P) which is consistent with the survey
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evidence as well. We can only speculate why firms change A/R but not A/P after the
intervention. One potential reason is that firms can more easily change their own terms
(with clients), while negotiating longer payment periods with suppliers might be more
difficult. Last, we also find a negative effect on inventories. The point estimates range
between -0.149 and -0.160 and are statistically different from zero at the 10%-level.
Overall, the results on working capital management suggest that firms respond to the
treatment by decreasing the collection period as well as their inventories. This reduction
in working capital leads to a cash inflow, potentially affecting other corporate polices
beyond a direct effect of the treatment.
Table 2.6 reports the impact of the treatment on other firm policies: leverage, cash
holdings and total investment in fixed assets (capex). Panel A shows that the effect of
the intervention on the capital structure (leverage and cash holdings) is not statistic-
ally significant. This does not necessarily mean that firms do not adjust their capital
structure in response to the treatment. Indeed, different companies could react to the
treatment by adjusting their leverage, for instance, in different directions given that
some companies might be below their optimal leverage level, while other companies
were above. However, those findings are also well in line with the survey evidence on
capital structure decisions in which only 3 companies stated that they implemented
changes. As discussed before, some firms are subsidiaries of larger (often international)
corporations and do not have discretion of those policies. They also claim that credit
markets in Mozambique are tight and it is very difficult or too expensive to obtain debt.
If companies do not change their capital structure nor their cash holdings in response
to the inflow of cash after the reduction of their working capital, it is interesting to
investigate how this cash is used. For instance, companies may increase their dividends,
use this cash to invest into fixed capital or engage in other expenses. Although we
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do not have payout or granular expense data, we can analyze long term investment
(capital expenditures). In Panel B of Table 2.6, we document a positive and significant
treatment effect of the course: firms that were part of the treatment group increased
their capital expenditures between 12 and 14 percentage points compared to the control
group. This corresponds to a positive impact on capital expenditures of 0.70 to 0.80
standard deviations.
We estimate an average positive impact on cash flows of 1.13 million USD from account
receivables and 0.98 million USD from inventories. Using the lower bound of the con-
fidence intervals as a much more conservative estimate, the total impact on cash flow
is at 0.19 million USD. This is a short term, one-off effect on cash flow as a result of
the change in working capital. The reduction in account receivables might be related
to the collection of existing receivables, potentially late ones, or due to the negotiation
of new contracts with lower collection periods. Because we find a positive treatment
effect on CAPX we estimate the corresponding cash out flow. We find an average cash
flow impact of – 0.81 million USD, with a conservative estimate of 0.21 million USD.
2.4.4 Efficiency of Implemented Changes of Financial Policies
(Financial Accounting Data)
Whether the implemented changes led to policies that are more efficient or not is not
clear ex-ante. For instance, reducing inventories and collecting receivables earlier will
increase free cash flows in the short run. However, there might be adverse effects in the
long run if inventories become too low or if collection periods are too short (customers
may be scared away because of products being out-of-stock or unattractive payment
options, for instance).
To test whether firms have indeed moved towards more optimal policies as a response
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to the treatment, we analyse whether treated firms become more efficient relative to
the control group. Given that most firms are private, we do not observe their market
values. Hence, we rely on accounting ratios such as return on assets (ROA) and return
on invested capital (ROIC) to measure firm efficiency. We also analyse sales growth
to test if there are any adverse effects on sales. One limitation of those accounting
measures is that they are not forward-looking and only capture potential adverse effects
that materializes in the short-run and we cannot exclude, for instance, that sales will
be decreasing in a longer horizon.
Table 2.7 shows regression on firm performance. Panel A shows the treatment effect on
ROA. We find a positive impact on firm performance between 0.21 and 0.22 using OLS
and firm fixed effects, respectively. The effect on ROA is also statistically significant
at the 5% level. The effect is equivalent to up to 0.85 standard deviations of ROA. In
Panel B., columns (1)-(5) show results using a measure of return to capital invested
(ROIC). The estimated coefficient is between 1.47 using OLS and 1.56 using firm fixed
effects, which represents between 0.75 and 0.8 standard deviations of ROIC. This effect
is statistically significant at 10% level. The point estimates of the most treatment
effects are large, but not implausible, particularly given that the confidence intervals
include more modest estimates as well.
Last, we analyse sales growth to test if there are any adverse effects of reducing in-
ventories or collecting receivables more quickly. We do not find evidence of such an
effect. The point estimates of the intervention on sales growth are actually positive
though they are not statistically different from zero. Overall the results suggest that
finance expertise of managers affect financial policies and that these policy changes can
improve firm performance.
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2.4.5 Threats to the Internal Validity and Robustness Tests
While the experimental setup hypothetically identifies the effect of the financial educa-
tion programme on financial policies, there may be certain limitations that may affect
the internal validity of the experiment in practice. In this section, we discuss some of
these threats in more detail and provide additional tests on the internal validity.
2.4.5.1 Heterogeneity in Small Samples and Pre-trends
As described in Section 2.3, we have randomized the treatment status among firms
that signed up for the programme and, by construction, there should be no system-
atic differences between treatment and control firm. However, in small samples, this is
not necessarily true. There is the concern that, just by chance, there is heterogeneity
between treatment and control groups that is driving our findings. Table 2.2, Panel
A and B show that firms and managers of those firms are not systematically different.
Almost all differences in mean and, especially, at the median are not statistically dif-
ferent across the two groups. However, given the small sample size, the power of those
tests might be rather weak. For that reason, we also use the panel dimension of our
data and test whether treatment and control firms are on common trends before the
intervention. For the validity of our experiment, it is alright if the two groups were on
different levels as long as they were not on different pre-trends (common trend assump-
tion in difference-in-difference tests). We test this assumption non-parametrically, by
plotting corresponding graphs for the main outcomes.
Figure 2.4 shows averages of those financial policies for firms in the treatment and
control groups over the 2015-2018 period. The figures illustrate that, despite some
differences in levels before the intervention, treatment and control group usually have
parallel trends (especially in the year before the intervention between 2016 and 2017).
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One exception are capital expenditures for which trends between the two groups appear
to be different. However, in that specific case, the treatment group was actually on a
positive trend before the intervention, while firms in the control group were decreasing
their capital expenditures. Overall, the graphical analysis suggests that the parallel
trends assumption is not violated, as treated and control groups follow parallel trends
before the intervention across a majority of outcomes of interest.
2.4.5.2 Non-complying Firms
In our main analysis, we estimate the average effect of treatment on the treated (ATT)
effect. While we have a very high compliance rate of about 91% (compared to about
53% in Bruhn et al. (2012), for instance), there is the concern that control firms that
did not show up to the course may bias our results. Ex-ante, the direction of that bias is
unclear though. For instance, it might be the case that only “good” firms do not show
up for the course because they do not expect to profit from participating in the course;
it might be also the case that firms that are in trouble do not show up for the course
as they are too busy otherwise. Badly performing firms dropping out of the sample
would indeed be in line with our results on ROA but it would be more difficult to tell
a consistent story why those remaining firms do also decrease their working capital.
In practice, we do not believe that there are systematic reasons though for why firms
who initially enrolled in the course did not show up. For instance, two CEOs who
initially expressed their interest in participating in the course (and were allocated to
the treatment group) never replied to our invitation to enrol in the course; one other
CEO had an unexpected meeting abroad during the period of the first intervention.
However, we can also include those four treatment firms that did not attend the course
and estimate the intention-to-treat (ITT) effect of our intervention.59 Table B1 in the
59Bruhn et al. (2018) estimate ITTs as their main specification.
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Figure 2.4: Evolution of Selected Financial Outcomes
The graphs present mean financial outcomes over time for 85 firms included in the treatment and control samples.
Financial outcomes are Working capital, Average Collection Period, Inventories, Capital Expenditure and Return on
Assets (ROA). The vertical line denotes the date of the first intervention (treatment group). On the horizontal axis,
each date represents the beginning of each year.
(a) Working Capital / (Lag) Assets (b) Average Collection Period
(c) Inventory /Sales (d) Capex/(Lag) Assets
(e) Return on Assets (ROA)
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appendix shows the results for our main variables of interest. We do not find any strong
evidence of certain types of firms systematically dropping out. The point estimates and
standard errors remain basically unchanged.
2.4.5.3 Disclosure of Data
While all firms signed a data agreement at enrolment into the program, not all firms
could share their data in the end. There is the concern that compliance to share financial
data is systematically different for firms from the treatment and control group. In the
case of ROA, for instance, it might be the case that well performing firms are more
likely to share their financial data with us. If that was true for firms from both the
treatment and the control group, the difference-in-difference estimates might be still
unbiased though. It would be concerning though if badly performing firms from the
treatment group were not to share their data but the same was not true for badly
performing firms from the control group. In that case, sample selection could bias our
findings.
We address this potential threat to the internal validity of our experiment in the fol-
lowing way. For a substantial subset of our data (i.e., firm-years), we also have access
to external accounting data from a large accounting firm (KPMG) and that is not self-
reported by the firms to us. This data should not suffer from the concern described
above. We can use this external data to estimate a difference-in-difference effect for a
subset of outcomes. Unfortunately, the granularity of the accounting data by the third
party does not allow us to estimate the effect of the intervention on all different com-
ponents of working capital. Table B2 in the appendix is showing the results for working
capital and ROA. The point estimates have the same sign and are larger in absolute
terms compared to our estimates when using all data, suggesting that -if anything- we
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might be underestimating the magnitude of the effect in our baseline specifications.
2.4.5.4 Other Threats to the Internal Validity of the Experiment
In this section, we discuss other threats to the internal validity that are not explicitly
testable (or we have not found a good way of doing so).
There is the concern that our experiment suffers from ‘contamination’. For instance,
we cannot fully rule out the possibility that treated managers shared their knowledge
or course materials with managers of the control group, because Maputo is a relatively
small city. However, it would actually work against us finding any results. We also
tried to prevent the most likely contagion to occur by performing randomization at the
business group level, as opposed to at the firm level. This implies that all managers
from the same business group are part of the same cohort. Moreover, the treatment
took place in a classroom setting, with an instructor and therefore it is unlikely that the
control group would have access to the same treatment as the treatment group. The
most plausible type of interaction between treatment and control groups could be the
sharing of materials, for which close substitutes were already available, either online or
in textbooks.
Another concern is that the managers of treated companies change their behavior, and
update their expectations differently from the control firms, because of the interven-
tion. For instance, managers might update their beliefs with respect to future firm
performance and respond accordingly (see Chemla and Hennessy (2019)). In our setup
this is less of a problem as both treatment and control managers expect to receive the
same treatment.
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2.4.5.5 Robustness Checks
We run a battery of additional robustness tests. First, some firms belong to the same
business group. As a first robustness test, we exclude all non-core subsidiaries from our
data. Table B3 shows the results for the main outcomes of interest. The results are
unchanged (the point estimates are even slightly higher).
Then, we consider different time periods in our estimation of the treatment effect.
Table B4 shows results for our main outcomes when we consider data after 2013, 2015,
or 2016. While the point estimates slightly change depending on the time period, the
qualitative results remain unchanged.
Because some firms experienced a CEO turnover during the period of the experiment,
we have excluded them from the analysis. Table B5 shows the results which qualitatively
remain unchanged. We have fewer observations though, and some coefficients are only
significant at the 10-percent level.
We exclude firms that also operate in the financial industry (e.g., insurance companies).
Table B6 shows the results. The main results remain unchanged.
Last, we use alternative definitions of financial ratios to measure working capital and
accounting performance. In our main specifications we use the lagged value of book
value of assets in the denominator. Table B7 displays the results when we scale the
outcomes by contemporaneous book value of assets. The results are consistent with our
baseline definition.
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2.5 Interpretation and Policy Recommendations
While the experimental design helps to identify the treatment effect of the intervention,
it remains unclear what exactly the channel is through which the executive education
course on corporate finance affect financial policies. While answering this question is
interesting in itself, it may also have important implications for policy.
The treatment, i.e., the participation in the executive education program, is basically
a bundle of different simultaneous experiences: i) there is potential learning from the
instructor, ii) there is potential learning from classmates, and iii) there might be aspects
of the classroom experience, unrelated to the content of the course, that may affect
outcomes (e.g., networking and generation of new deals between participants). It is
difficult to identify the exact learning channel. However, we have several pieces of
evidence that suggest that networking is not the main driver for our findings. While
the results on ROA could be potentially in line with the hypothesis that treated firms
interact with each other to generate new business, we do not find a significant impact
on sales (see Panel B of Table 2.7). This is not too surprising as firms came from
different segments and opportunities to establish business ties appear rather limited.
Moreover, the documented changes in working capital are also not easy to reconcile
with a network story. Last, we organized an event for the firms from the control group
that took place around the dates of the first intervention. This event gave control firms
the opportunity to get to know each other and to mingle. A remaining caveat is that
the placebo-event was shorter than the 18-hours course for the treatment group and
there might have been fewer opportunities to establish relationships. Taken together
though, support for a networking explanation of the findings appears rather limited.
The importance of the classroom setting versus learning the content somewhere else,
e.g., by self-studies or by enrolling into an online course, is also related to the question
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what frictions prevented executives to obtain education on finance before. One poten-
tial reason is just unawareness of the importance of finance education for corporate
efficiency. In that case, self-studies or the enrolment in online courses appear to be
a good and cheap way of implementing financial education. Another reason could be
the limited supply of such programs in Mozambique. Indeed, in Mozambique, there
are no comparable executive education programs on finance (yet). Online courses or
textbooks may be only very imperfect substitutes to a classroom education, that is led
by a professor and making use of case discussions and active participation. To the best
of our knowledge, the closest available programs are based in South Africa and expected
costs (money and time-wise) are higher.
A second interesting question is whether participants learned something completely new
or whether they were just reminded of the importance of some financial concepts. A
hybrid version of these two extreme ends would be the case in which executives learned
the foundations during (pre-experience) university degrees but only the professional
experience combined with a more applied teaching method (e.g., case based) allowed
them to apply the theoretical concepts in practice. We believe that a pure reminder
(and versions of that such as the uptake of self-studies after the enrolment into our
program) cannot explain the findings. Indeed, one advantage of our setup is that the
control group knows that it will be treated as well and the enrolment to the program
would remind both, treatment and control group.
From a policy point of view, it is not only important to know how to increase finance
education among executives but also whether such an improvement of finance educa-
tion is welfare improving. While we can certainly not answer this question with our
setup, we believe it is still valuable to speculate about potential welfare implications.
First, one may argue that large parts of the effect of the intervention go through ac-
counts receivable. If accounts receivables of one firm go down, accounts payable of its
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customers must go down as well and the overall impact on societal welfare is somehow
unclear. One may also argue though, that some customers are from abroad including
customers or firms of developed countries. In that case one could argue that the eco-
nomy of Mozambique is likely to benefit. Moreover, we show that other policies such
as inventories or capital expenditures are affected what may increase the productivity
of firms. Finally, there might also be other policies that are more difficult to measure
that benefit from the improved financial decisions.
Whether our findings can be generalized to other firms in or outside Mozambique is
difficult to answer. However, we provide several tests that support the external validity
of our findings. When we compare firms that applied to our program with other firms
that are present in the KPMG reports but did not apply, we do not find them to
be significantly different in terms of observable firm characteristics (Panel A of Table
B8). We also compare the characteristics of participating executives with executives
from firms in Mozambique that are present on the LinkedIn network. Panel B shows
the results. When using the full LinkedIn sample we find no significant differences in
tenure and MBA training. When we restrict the sample to include only firms with
at least 25 employees or 100 followers, to better match our own sample in terms of
firm size, we find no significant differences between the two samples except for gender.
More interestingly, we also compare participants in our programme with the sample in
Graham and Harvey (2001). Results are presented in Panel C. Again, we restrict the
Graham and Harvey (2001) sample to firms of similar revenue to our sample. We also
do not find any significant differences in tenure or education.
Overall our sample of firms and managers seems to be comparable to other firms and
managers in Mozambique when it comes to observable characteristics. When it comes
to the US, we also find managers’ characteristics to be similar to the ones of firms of
similar size in Mozambique.
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2.6 Conclusion
This paper evaluates the impact of managers’ financial expertise on firm financial
policies and performance. A randomized controlled trial with top managers of 93 me-
dium and large companies in Mozambique shows a positive effect on firm return on
assets of an 18-hour executive education programme in finance. Our results suggest
that deficiencies in managerial financial expertise at large firms can be an important
constraint to firm growth.
Using survey data and firm financial information, we find that managers changed firm
financial policies after the intervention. We find a significant and large treatment ef-
fect in working capital and average collection period. The effects on working capital
management are large and significant: working capital decreases by 0.49 standard de-
viations for the treated firms when compared to the control group. This is likely to
alleviate, at least in the short run, potential financial constraints. The effects on firm
performance are economically relevant: ROA increases up to 0.85 standard deviations
for treated group when compared to the control firms.
These results confirm that financial expertise of managers has a large impact on firm
performance through the adoption of financial practices that promote value creation and
alleviate financial constraints at the firm level. Moreover, our results suggest that relat-
ively low-costs interventions such as an 18-hour executive education course on corporate
finance and risk management can improve financial practices and decision-making and
may ultimately affect economic development. In comparison, the experiment by Bloom
et al. (2013) that was carried out in 28 plants operated by 17 firms ran about three
years with a total consulting cost of USD 1.3 million, approximately USD 75,000 per
treatment plant and USD 20,000 per control plant.
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B1 Mozambique and other Sub-Saharan Economies
Survey statistics collected by the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2018) suggest that the
macroeconomic and investment environment in Mozambique is similar to that of other
Sub-Saharan economies (henceforth SSA). In Mozambique, this survey covered 601
large, medium and small firms. In line with the purposes of our study, we have chosen
some indicators that allow us to draw such analogy. For instance, regarding general
firm characteristics, firms are, on average, 15 years old. In addition, both Mozambique
and SSA share similarities in the ownership of firms. About 23% of firms have at least
10% of foreign ownership in Mozambique (16.6% in SSA) and 0.7% are government-
owned (1.5% in SSA). Lastly, 44.5% of firms have their financial statements reviewed by
external auditors in Mozambique, similarly to 48.6% of firms in SSA. Related to human
capital, top managers have an average of 15 years of experience in the firms’ working
sector, both in Mozambique and in SSA. Interestingly, almost 16% of top managers in
Mozambique and in SSA are female, a number that is approximated to the one in our
sample.
Another important comparison is the credit market environment in Mozambique and
SSA. Access to credit requires high collateral values (270% of the value of the loan in
Mozambique and 220% in SSA). This leaves firms relying mostly on internal funds, 80%
in Mozambique and 75% in SSA. Given these constraints in the credit market, 21% of
firms in Mozambique use supplier/customer credit to finance working capital (25% in
SSA).
124
Appendix of Chapter 2
B2 Participation in the Treatment
We also analyze the determinants of participation. The information obtained during
the exploratory project is useful in this regard, as it allows analyzing enrolment rates
(second stage) for different manager characteristics. Regarding gender, participation
rates is higher among female respondents. Three out of six female participants we
interviewed in 2015 ended up enrolling in 2017. The participation rate among male re-
spondents is lower (39%). The participation rate is slightly higher among Mozambican
respondents compared to other nationalities. When we analyze the roles, we also ob-
served the enrolment rate is higher if we first met with the CFO (45%) then with general
managers/CEO. The breakdown according to the maximum education attainment re-
veals that the participation rate is not monotonically related to education. Among
participants with any higher education degree (excluding PhD), the enrolment rates
vary between 37% to 47%. This pattern contrast with participants without any higher
education degree (20%). Finally, we observe whether participation rates vary according
to previous attendance of finance or accounting courses. We observe the course seems
to be more attractive to the group of respondents that have no previous background in
those fields (67%) compared to the ones who do (36%).
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Table B2: External data only KPMG
The table displays the difference in difference estimator for firm financial performance. The sample in-
cludes treated and control firms that participated in the programme for which financial data from KPMG is
available. The sample period is 2008-2018. *, **, *** Significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively.
Working Capital ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment x Post -0.275*** -0.224*** -0.214*** 0.416 0.502* 0.552*
[0.094] [0.081] [0.076] [0.253] [0.289] [0.320]
Treatment -0.193** -0.288
[0.081] [0.254]
Post 0.137* 0.083 -0.377 -0.417
[0.077] [0.069] [0.227] [0.267]
Constant 0.193*** 0.452*
[0.059] [0.246]
Observations 321 321 321 315 315 315
R-squared 0.125 0.031 0.111 0.013 0.008 0.063
Firm FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes No No Yes
Control for size No No Yes No No Yes
Bootstrap s.e. No No No No No No
Clustered s.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of firm id 49 49 48 48
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Table B7: Outcomes scaled by contemporaneous total assets
The table displays the difference in difference estimator for firm financial performance. The sample includes
treated and control firms that participated in the programme for which financial data is available. Working
Capital and ROA are scaled by contemporaneous book value of total assets. The sample period is 2008-2018.
*, **, *** Significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively.
Working Capital ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment x Post -0.070 -0.106* -0.110* 0.198** 0.194** 0.198**
[0.065] [0.063] [0.057] [0.093] [0.090] [0.090]
Treatment -0.181*** -0.061
[0.068] [0.073]
Post 0.052 0.024 -0.167*** -0.191***
[0.044] [0.043] [0.061] [0.060]
Constant 0.191*** 0.200***
[0.045] [0.065]
Observations 466 466 466 607 607 607
R-squared 0.082 0.008 0.031 0.010 0.016 0.090
Firm FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes No No Yes
Control for size No No Yes No No Yes
Bootstrap s.e. No No No No No No
Clustered s.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of firm id 71 71 81 81
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B4 Webpage, Brochure, and Course Description
Exhibit A: The Webpage at Imperial College London Business School
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Exhibit B: The Brochure
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Exhibit C: The Schedule of the Course
Day 1 – Morning Day 1 – Afternoon Day 2 – Morning Day 2 – Afternoon
The basics: time value
of money; investment
decision rules
Capital budgeting and
Valuation
Working capital man-
agement
Capital Structure
(Debt vs. Equity
decisions)
Risk Management (In-
surance and Hedging
decisions)
The case of New Earth
Mining (Capital budget-
ing and valuation in emer-
ging markets)
The case of Fibria Ce-
lulose SA and Procter
and Gamble (Working
capital in emerging mar-
kets)
The case of UST (Lever-
age recapitalization)
The case of Mozal (Risk
Management)
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Central Government Performance
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Randomized Experiment
This chapter was written in co-authorship with Bruno Carvalho, Cla´udia Custo´dio, Susana
Peralta and Benny Geys. This work was funded by Fundac¸a˜o para a Cieˆncia e Tecnologia
(UID/ECO/00124/2013 and Social Sciences Data Lab, Project 22209), POR Lisboa (LISBOA-0-0145-
FEDER-007722 and Social Sciences Data Lab, Project 22209) and POR Norte (Social Sciences Data
Lab, Project 22209). We are deeply thankful for the comments of Miguel Portela, Leif Helland, Jon
Fiva and Pedro Freitas. Susana Peralta wrote this paper while visiting Banco de Portugal, whose
hospitality is gratefully acknowledged. We also thank Nova School of Business and Economics and
Instituto de Contabilidade e Administrac¸a˜o de Lisboa and all its professors and students for the interest
and availability to participate in the experiment.
141
Chapter 3
3.1 Introduction
The recent debate about how the so-called fake news may have influenced the 2016
US presidential election, the 2016 Brexit referendum or the 2018 Brazilian election has
sparked renewed interest in the role of information on electoral outcomes (Allcott and
Gentzkow, 2017; King et al., 2017). Election periods are awash with official campaign
coverage through outdoor and social media advertising, interviews and debates where
political agents either self-promote or attack other candidates. It is of crucial import-
ance to understand how people react to this information when shaping their electoral
behavior.
Much of the information spread out around election periods is not related with the
government layer for which elections are being held. In sub-national elections, for
instance, it is common that politicians aligned with upper-level governments try to
capitalize on their policies, while the opposition tries to point out their flaws.
In this paper we ask whether the perception about central government performance
affects individual voting behavior at municipal elections. To address this research
question, we conducted a randomized controlled trial where we exogenously induce
changes in perception about central government performance and then evaluate how
these changes impact local voting behavior.
Our experiment exposed 1800 students of two business schools in Lisbon to an inform-
ation bundle about the central government in charge during the 2017 Portuguese local
election, held on October 1st. In the two weeks prior to the election, we ran a baseline
survey to collected respondents’ socio-demographic and political characteristics, and
then we conducted the randomized intervention. In the week following the election, a
follow-up survey was implemented to gather information about self-reported realized
voting outcomes.
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The treatment consisted of exposing participants to positive, neutral or negative-tone
news articles about central government activity. Our design allows us to explore how
the tone of the information provided affects perception updating. News articles were
selected from national media outlets and covered policy areas relevant to central govern-
ment action, ranging from macroeconomic topics (public finance, pensions and youth
employment) to some specific areas (national health service, road safety and educa-
tion). For each policy area, we selected two news articles from the same source and
within a negligible time gap: one conveying a negative and another conveying a positive
message about central government action. The articles were then combined to generate
12 different treatment versions: 6 versions conveying negative information and another
6 conveying positive information. The control group received neutral information re-
garding government activity, namely about a Portuguese, non-endangered, dog breed.
Some important contributions of our work derive from our experimental design. First,
the information provided is truthful and taken from credible media outlets. In that
way, we guarantee that asymmetric responses to the information are not driven by dif-
ferences in the credibility that respondents assign to each of the news. This allows us to
avoid a caveat in James (2011), where the negative information provided is not factual.
As the author points out, this negative information may contradict prior beliefs and
thus affect the respondents’ reaction to the treatment. Second, our 12 different treat-
ment versions cover a variety of topics, which allows us to measure the reaction to the
tone of the message, without being tied to the particularities of a specific policy area.
Although Olsen (2015) explores the reaction to equivalent satisfaction and dissatisfac-
tion measures about the same factual information, the experiment relies on information
about the Danish hospital services, which may have different salience depending on the
respondents. Lastly, because for each positive-tone information we have a comparable
negative survey covering the same topics, we can ensure the reaction to the treatment
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does not stem from the negative information being more interesting or relevant than the
positive one, for instance. The treatment in Soroka and McAdams (2015), who conduct
a psycho-physiological experiment and show that viewers react more to negative-tone
TV news, encompasses a variety of subjects, however negative and positive information
is not directly comparable.
The goal of our informational treatment is to induce exogenous variation in the per-
ceived performance of the central government activity. We start by showing how parti-
cipants’ perception regarding the specific policy areas covered is affected by the treat-
ment. Both positive and negative information have the expected impacts: negative
treatment induces a downward revision while positive treatment translates into an up-
ward assessment of government performance. This result is robust to several specific-
ations and to the inclusion of controls. Then, we evaluate how respondents aggregate
this updated policy-specific perception into a general performance perception about
the central government. In this case, the impact of positive information declines in size
and in most specifications loses significance. Conversely, the negative treatment has
a robust and sizable effect on the general perception of central government perform-
ance. We thus find evidence that negative information is more salient than positive
information in our study.
This finding, known as negativity bias, reinforces the conclusions of several previous
studies both in political and non-political contexts. Lau (1982, 1985), for instance, dis-
cusses why and how different dimensions of negativity affect political behavior, using
survey experiments. Using Danish data, Nannestad and Paldam (1997) show that eco-
nomic voting is more pronounced when the economic activity is slowing down. James
and John (2007) study the impact of performance information on electoral support
for the incumbent, finding that incumbents with low performance are punished in the
polls. More recently, Lockwood and Rockey (2015) frame negativity bias in terms of loss
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aversion in a probabilistic voting model and shows, using data on elections in the US,
that loss aversion affects both electoral competition and election outcomes. Based on
survey data from the UK, Tilley et al. (2018) show that voters punish incumbent gov-
ernments in elections as a reaction to the worsening of personal financial circumstances,
particularly if that reduction derives from government actions. Regarding non-political
settings, Baumeister et al. (2001) discuss the reasons why negative information or ex-
periences have stronger effects on a broad range of psychological phenomena. In turn,
James and Moseley (2014) perform a field experiment in two British municipalities
and shows that information about low absolute performance of waste recycling services
lowers citizen satisfaction with no corresponding effect for positive information.
Taking advantage of the comprehensive information we gathered about baseline re-
spondents’ characteristics, we investigate whether the information provided triggers a
different response according to levels of awareness. We use two proxies for awareness.
One is the self-reported interest degree in each policy area covered in the news articles.
A second measure relies on parents’ occupation as a proxy for access to information.
For example, participants whose parents are doctors are expected to have higher ex-ante
exposure to information about the National Health System. Using these two measures,
we find evidence that the ex-ante stock of information plays a role: the response to
information is lower among participants with higher levels of awareness. This fact illus-
trates the common view that fake news may spread out more easily among less literate
sectors of population.
Regarding our second research question, we assess whether the exogenously-induced
change in perception about government performance impacts on local election behavior.
The connection between the two may occur for several reasons. First, voters can see
the party system as a selection mechanism for local candidates (Geys and Vermeir,
2014). Hence, whenever the party in charge of the government is performing well, local
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candidates aligned with that party can be perceived as more capable. Second, local
elections can be seen as second order elections. In this case, voting behavior in such
elections can be a channel to send a message of approval or punishment to the central
government (Marien et al., 2015). Lastly, voters may expect to draw benefits from
having local representatives with closer ties to central government, such as an increase
in public transfers to their municipalities (Fiva and Halse, 2016).
We focus on turnout and voting decisions as local election outcomes.60 If a connection
between central politics and local voting exists, the probability of a local candidate
aligned with the parties ruling at the central level getting a vote would increase with
the positive treatment and decrease with the negative one. Our findings suggest that
there is no average treatment effect on neither turnout nor on the local candidate
chosen. The non-significant treatment effect can be interpreted in at least two ways.
On the one hand, local election behavior may not be driven by the perception about
central government performance. In this case, it is less likely that local elections work
as second order elections, where voting would be essentially driven by non-local factors.
On the other hand, it may arise due to a treatment dilution problem. As a robustness
test, we apply an instrumental variable approach to deal with this concern, as suggested
in Angrist (2006). Specifically, we instrument the post-treatment general government
performance assessment with the treatment assignment. The fitted values of this re-
gression are then used to assess the impact of the treatment on voting outcomes. Still,
the evidence of the impact is weak. Thus, our results suggest that central government
performance is not a key driver of voting on local elections.
Although we do not find a significant treatment effect on local election outcomes, central
60There is a substantial literature examining the determinants of voter turnout, see Cancela and
Geys (2016) for a meta-analysis and discussion. Some of these studies, like Kahn and Kenney (1999);
Moeller et al. (2014) or Baekgaard et al. (2014), focus on the impact that information provision has
on turnout.
146
Chapter 3
government performance may be relevant for the subsets of voters for whom voting
preferences are less rigid. In our sample, first time voters and voters who were still
undecided about the candidate on whom to vote in the week before the election can
be seen as two of these subsets. We do not find significant differences on first time
voters’ behavior. However, among the subset of undecided voters, we show that the
negative treatment increases the likelihood of voting for parties not associated with the
central government in power (mainly opposition parties). This change is mostly driven
by a reduction in the likelihood of casting a blank vote. In this light, our results show
that information affecting the perception about central government performance may
be relevant when it comes to undecided or potentially swing voters.
By evaluating how performance-related information affects election outcomes, our work
provides an important contribution to the literature on economic voting. In a seminal
paper, Kramer (1971) uses aggregate data to evaluate whether national economic con-
ditions and the perceived performance of the incumbent party affect voting behavior
for the US House of Representatives. More recently, James (2011) shows that published
information influences performance perception and satisfaction, particularly when par-
tisan effects are present. In a more aggregate perspective, Taniguchi (2016) evaluates
whether economic indicators can act as a determinant of upper house elections in Ja-
pan, while Kappe (2018) uses UK data to evaluate reference-point-dependent behavior
in economic voting. From a theoretical standpoint, Ashworth et al. (2018) show that
voter rationality can be reconciled with the effects of exogenous shocks (outside of the
control of politicians, like natural disasters) affecting the probability of reelection of an
incumbent. Economic voting in multilevel governance is discussed in Anderson (2006),
who shows that economic voting is weaker in countries with stronger multilevel gov-
ernance, particularly when responsibilities are shared by different government levels.
In Portugal, Martins and Veiga (2013) show that the countries’ economic performance
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affects the success of candidates in local municipal elections, particularly if they are
from the same party of the incumbent central government. While many of these stud-
ies report positive correlations between economic performance and the likelihood of
incumbents to be reelected, the quasi-experimental evidence is limited.
Our work also contributes to the literature on second order elections. Clark and Rohr-
schneider (2009) and Schakel and Jeffery (2013) evaluate the relationship between vot-
ing behavior in European elections and national development and Marien et al. (2015)
studies the relationship between voting in local and federal elections in Belgium. Addi-
tionally, our work relates to the literature on media coverage impact and bias. Soroka
(2006), DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007), Garz (2014), Eberl et al. (2017) and Haselmayer
et al. (2017) do empirical assessments of media coverage (in some cases, specifically neg-
ative news) and their impacts on election outcomes. It is also related with studies that
evaluate messages conveyed during the campaign period, either about candidates’ skills
or ideology. The first work about negative campaigning effects was developed by An-
solabehere et al. (1994), where the authors show that negative campaigning reduces
voter turnout through an experiment in California. More recently, in a field experiment
around the 2004 US presidential election, Arceneaux and Nickerson (2010) show that
in-person delivered messages can influence voting preferences. Kendall et al. (2015)
performed a large scale experiment in an Italian municipality, during the 2011 local
elections, concluding that information treatments (particularly about candidate skills)
impact actual vote and individual vote declarations. Finally, in a relatively new branch
of literature that explores citizen heterogeneity and its influence on campaigning effect-
iveness, Galasso and Nannicini (2016) conducted a survey and a natural experiment in
two municipal elections in Italy, finding that females react more to positive information,
while males to negative information.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. We start with an overview of the
148
Chapter 3
political institutional setting in Portugal, a description of the experimental design and
estimation strategy in section 3.2. In section 3.3 we present the data. In sections 3.4
and 3.5 we present the main results. We conclude in the final section.
3.2 Experimental Design and Methodology
This section begins with a description of the institutional setting. Next, we describe the
experimental design including its timeline, the structure of the implementation process
and the randomization procedure. By the end of the section, we present the estimation
strategy.61
3.2.1 Institutional Setting
The Portuguese political administration is organized in three levels. The first level
comprises the central government. The second level corresponds to municipalities.
There are 308 municipalities in Portugal. Municipalities are then divided into a third
administrative division comprised by civil parishes. Municipalities and civil parishes
represent the local government and together are responsible for improving the well-being
of inhabitants through the promotion of social and economic development, territorial
planning and local public goods provision.
Local government representatives are elected simultaneously in a nationwide local elec-
tion taking place every four years. The municipal government is composed of an execut-
ive branch – the Town Council – and a legislative one – the Municipal Assembly. Both
bodies are directly elected and seats are allocated to parties proportionally following the
d’Hondt method according to the number of votes. The first ranked candidate of the
61This experiment was registered at the American Economic Association, the information submitted
can be found at https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2539.
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most voted party for the Town Council is appointed as Mayor. The Town Council, and
the Mayor in specific, is the most prominent administrative body at local government
level. Central government elections are held every four years, differing from the local
election by a two-year period.
The Portuguese political landscape is dominated by five main parties that run for
both central and local government elections.62 From left to right, those are Bloco
de Esquerda (BE), Coligac¸a˜o Democra´tica Unita´ria (CDU), Partido Socialista (PS),
Partido Social-Democrata (PSD) and Centro Democra´tico e Social (CDS). The low
degree of fragmentation of the political scene may potentially create room for connection
between central and local government outcomes through the party system.
Our experiment took place around the 2017 local election. In this election, PS emerged
as the main winner by appointing 159 out of the 308 mayors, while the main opposition
party (PSD) has appointed 98 mayors. The previous central government election had
occurred two years ago, in 2015. In the 2015 election, the incumbent centre-right
coalition (PSD + CDS) obtained the highest vote share but failed to secure a majority
in the parliament. In turn, PS was able to obtain a majority supported by left-wing
parties (BE + CDU) and was appointed to form a government.63 By the time of our
experiment, participants are expected to have had enough time to build up a belief
about performance of the government in charge.
62Together, either running alone or in coalition, these parties gathered 86% of all votes for the Town
Council in 2017. The remaining candidates include other parties, independent candidates and formally
organized groups of citizens.
63The centre-right coalition (PSD + CDS) obtained 38,5% of the votes, while PS, BE and CDU
obtained 32,32%, 10,19% and 8,25%, respectively.
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3.2.2 Experimental Design
We aim to evaluate whether central government performance impacts the voting de-
cision in local government elections. Addressing this question poses an identification
challenge. While some people might consider current government performance as good
or acceptable, others might actually regard it as bad or unacceptable. Therefore, there
might be a large heterogeneity regarding perceived performance. A potential problem
of this is that perceived performance may be determined by factors that also affect
local election behavior. One example may be political alignment. In order to identify a
causal impact of central government performance on local election outcomes, one needs
exogenous variation in perceived performance.
In this experiment we propose to induce exogenous variation in perceived performance
by exposing participants to factual information about current government action. We
rely on information as a driving mechanism of perceived performance. This assumption
is not straightforward though and it leads us to pursue our goal in two stages:
1. Is information a driving mechanism of perceived perception?
2. Does (exogenously driven) perceived performance about central government im-
pacts local election behavior?
We implemented a randomized controlled trial at the time of the 2017 local election.
The treatment consisted of exposing participants to positive, neutral or negative-tone
information about central government performance. We denote these groups as positive
treatment, control and negative treatment, respectively. Each respondent was presented
with two news articles about different central government policy areas, adapted from
mainstream national media outlets.64
64News were edited by eliminating less relevant sentences with the purpose of focusing readers’
attention on the most important parts. All information has been presented in Portuguese.
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The articles were selected following four predefined guidelines. Firstly, they should be
as recent as possible. Secondly, central government policy areas with varying degrees of
media coverage should be selected. We selected articles on the following policy areas:
public finance (public debt and investment), social security (pensions), national health
system, national education system, youth employment and road safety. Then, for each
policy area, positive- and negative-tone news should be available from the same source
and within a negligible time gap. For instance, if a positive treatment consists of two
positive news articles about public finance and pensions, then there is a corresponding
version with two negative-tone articles on the same areas, from the same media outlets.
Finally, to the extent possible we aimed at diversifying media outlets. We end up
selecting articles from two newspapers and one radio station.
As an example, on the 6th of September 2017, a national radio station (TSF) reported
that the Ministry of Education planned to hire 1 500 auxiliary teaching staff over the
next school year. Two days later, the same source reported that there were schools
delaying the beginning of the school year due to staff shortage. Another example is the
National Health System, where the positive news is about a higher budget allocation to
the Ministry of Health, while the negative reports an increase in the outstanding debt
of the National Health System.
We created 13 information bundles – six positive, six negative, and one neutral in-
formation bundle – according to the following structure. The first three information
bundles contain a first article in public finance and a second article in either youth
employment, road safety, or pensions. The remaining three bundles include the article
on the national health system together with either youth employment, road safety, or
national education system. It is important to highlight that public finance was attract-
ing substantial media coverage by the time of the experiment, with the government
claiming a substantial improvement in the country’s financial position. In contrast,
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policies targeting the national health system received considerably lower media atten-
tion in the months before the election. The remaining policy areas were chosen to cover
both macroeconomic outcomes (youth employment and pensions) and microeconomic
policies (road safety and education) in order to minimize the likelihood of our results
being driven by specific policy areas. The control group was presented with two news
articles about a non-endangered Portuguese dog breed, the Serra da Estrela, designed
to have a similar extension and format as the treatment ones. A detailed description
of all information bundles is provided in panel B of table C1.
The format chosen for the information bundles achieves several goals. Firstly, combining
two news articles in each information bundle increases the probability of conveying new
information. Even if the participant is aware of information contained in one of the two
articles, it is less likely that he or she has had previous access to both. Secondly, relying
on factual and credible information allows us to avoid the caveat in James (2011), who
does not find evidence of negative bias in a set of two lab experiments. As the author
points out, the negative information made available for respondents was not real and
was instead created to mimic the positive information. Thus, the absence of negativity
bias may be associated with the non-credible information provided, contradicting the
prior perception of the citizens. Finally, by creating a large set of information bundles,
we can disentangle the impact of giving information about a given policy area from the
actual tone of the message, besides reducing the likelihood of contagion across different
treatment groups.65
The experimental design encompassed three survey rounds. A detailed implementation
calendar is shown in figure 3.1. A baseline survey was implemented two weeks before
the election and aimed at collecting baseline data such as socio-demographic context,
65This is an important concern given that surveys were administered in a classroom setting, where
treatment and control subjects responded to the survey side-by-side.
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political preferences, awareness and motivation. Respondents were also asked about
their intended voting behavior in the local election taking place within two weeks. The
second survey round (treatment survey) took place in the week before the election.
In this round we carried out the intervention by randomly exposing participants to
one of the 13 information bundles. Each information bundle appeared in the middle
of the treatment survey and included the headline (in bold bigger font) and the news
article. The first article included a graph created by the researchers based on real
statistics to support the information conveyed in the text. The graphs were built to be
visually similar across the positive and negative-tone news. The second news article was
accompanied by an illustrative picture common to the positive and the negative-tone
article. An example of a negative and the corresponding positive information bundle is
provided in figures C1 and C2.66 The follow-up survey was implemented in the week
following the election with the purpose of collecting self-reported voting behavior. Panel
A of table C1 summarizes the type of information collected in each survey round.
As in Galasso and Nannicini (2016), the treatment is administered in the final of the
two-week official political campaign period, when politicians tend to invest great effort
in campaigns.67 Hence, it is likely that participants were exposed to other sources of
information. It is important to recognize that our intervention constitutes a marginal
source of information whose intensity may depend on several factors. It may happen
that the information provided is not new to participants. In this regard, we adopted a
intention-to-treat interpretation, i.e. regardless of whether participants fully adhere to
the treatment.
66We do not intend to test the effectiveness of different delivering formats, but rather to test positive
and negative-tone information conveyed in a similar format.
67The official campaign period starts two weeks before the election date and ends two days prior
to the election, as defined by Law 1/2001 that regulates the electoral procedures for local government
bodies.
154
Chapter 3
Figure 3.1: Timeline of Experiment Implementation
This timeline describes the field work conducted between September 18th and October 6th, 2017.
3.2.3 Sampling and Randomization
The experiment took place in two business schools in Lisbon, Portugal (NovaSBE and
ISCAL) between September 18th and October 6th 2017. We targeted both undergradu-
ate and graduate (master-level) students. All surveys were administered in a classroom
setting in a total of 71 classes.68
The surveys were filled in on paper, either at the beginning or at the end of each
class, under the supervision of a member of the implementation team.69 Participation
was voluntary and anonymous, and there were no monetary incentives for participants.
Respondents were asked to create a unique anonymous identifier at the beginning of the
baseline survey, combining digits of their birth dates and phone number, which they
could easily retrieve in the following rounds.70 This ensures anonymity, while enabling
researchers to link responses across the different survey rounds. This information was
clearly stated in the survey cover page and was read by a member of the implementation
team.
68At NovaSBE, each survey was implemented in a different round (one round a week, over 3 weeks).
At ISCAL we collapsed the baseline and treatment surveys due to reasons related to the academic
calendar.
69The implementation team was composed by the authors and some Ph.D. students who received
specific training in order to adopt a standardized procedure.
70In total, the identifying code allows for 365 000 possibilities.
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There are several advantages of conducting this experiment with university students
through in-classroom implementation. Firstly, the opportunity cost of responding the
survey is fairly low. This not only allows to collect more data (longer surveys), but also
to obtain a higher response rate. The aggregated length of the surveys across the three
rounds is around 30 minutes at NovaSBE and 20 minutes at ISCAL. Secondly, given
that we target participants attending higher school programmes, we are confident in
their ability to comprehend the written information content of the treatment. Moreover,
a large percentage of students at universities in Lisbon are actually displaced students.
This allows us to obtain heterogeneity in terms of birth places as well as voting constitu-
encies. Finally, we expect a large percentage of first-time or low-experienced voters, for
which the information may have a differential impact. In turn, the main caveat of our
approach is that it does not rely on a representative sample of the population.
The randomization procedure was made at the individual level.71 We organized the
surveys by creating blocks of six surveys according to the following sequence: 1 control,
2 positive, 1 control and 2 negative-tone surveys (CPPCNN). Positive and negative
treatment surveys were randomly drawn from the pool of different versions. These
blocks were then distributed in classroom, row-by-row. Such a procedure aimed at
ensuring adequate randomization (balancing) and minimizing contagion between treat-
ment groups as a result of positive and negative surveys being answered side-by-side.
This option comes at the expense of potential contagion from treatment to the control
group. In any case, we tried to minimize this effect by requesting the class to keep
silent during the surveys and by creating surveys with similar appearance.
71The alternative would be randomization by classroom. We discarded that for two reasons. Firstly,
because of uneven class sizes, which would make it difficult to have balanced treatment and control
groups. Secondly, our findings could capture the effect of spillovers among individuals within classroom
and not the updated perception based on the information provided.
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3.2.4 Estimation Strategy
We split our analysis into two parts, corresponding to the two research questions ex-
plained in Subsection 3.2.2. In order to evaluate the effect of information on the per-
ception about central government performance, we ask the participants about their
assessment of the central government performance after the treatment. The same ques-
tion was also in the baseline survey, which allows to compute the change. We provided
participants with a Likert-type scale ranging from “Very Unsatisfactory” to “Very Sat-
isfactory”, not allowing for neutral views.72
Besides the general government performance, we also include questions on specific policy
areas. In the baseline survey, we ask about the perception of performance on specific
policy areas under the jurisdiction of the central government. These include, but are not
limited to, all the areas covered in the news articles. Then, in the treatment survey, we
asked whether and to which extent the news articles changed perception about central
government action regarding the specific policy area the article is about. The scale
is ’Yes, improved a lot’, ’Yes, improved’, ’Did not change’, ’Yes, worsened’ and ’Yes,
worsened a lot’. As an example, figure C4 shows how the question was presented in
the survey version containing a road safety article. In a similar way, we ask about the
impact of the information on the perception of the performance of the party in charge
of the government (PS). The potential correlation between the two answers illustrates
to which extent the opinions about the central government are tied to the performance
perception of the party has a whole.
The main outcome variables in this first step are the perceptions on general and area-
72See figure C3. This scale was later converted to range from -1 (negative) to 1 (positive).
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specific government performance. We estimate the following equation:
Performance Perceptioni = α + β1T.NEGi + β2T.POSi + γXi + εi (3.1)
where Performance Perceptioni is the metric of performance reported by subject i;
T.NEGi and T.POSi are indicator variables equal to one if respondent i belongs to
the negative or positive treatment groups, respectively; and Xi is a vector of control
variables, including socio-demographic and political variables.73 In all regressions we
include class dummies to account for class-specific effects associated with the imple-
mentation process. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.74
Then, we evaluate whether the exogenously driven perceived performance about central
government impacts local election behavior. For that, we rely on the self-reported (ret-
rospective) voting behavior inquired in the follow-up survey. The estimation strategy
follows equation 3.1, where we replace the outcome variable with turnout and voting
decision.
73Socio-demographic controls include dummies for university, gender, whether the student is living
in an address different from his parents (displaced student), whether the respondent is allowed to
vote for the first time in the 2017 local election, whether either one or both parents are unemployed
and if the respondent identifies as Catholic. Additionally, we control for the age of the respondent,
the number of household members and a measure of the household log-equivalent income. Political
preferences are accounted for with a 3-level scale variable that measures the interest in politics, a
dummy variable for whether the respondent reports their position in the political spectrum (left-right
axis) and two additional variables that assume the value of one when reports a left-wing or centre
position. We also include a dummy for the cases where respondents say that one of the reasons for
which they position themselves in a given part of the spectrum is because their family and friends
have that same ideology. Lastly, we also include two dummies that are associated with their political
understanding and beliefs. The first is equal to one if they state that often politics are too complicated
to understand and the other whenever they state that the person in power matters a lot for political
and economic outcomes.
74Our results remain unchanged if we cluster standard errors at the class level.
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3.3 Data
Our data consists of around 4800 individual survey responses in the three survey rounds.
Keeping the individuals for whom we are able to link all surveys, we end up with a final
sample of 1 800 participants. Around 27% are students at NovaSBE.75 In each round,
we implemented surveys in 71 classrooms, with a number of attendees ranging from 15
to 150.
In table C2, we present the percentage of responses by survey version. As expected
given our CPPCNN randomization procedure, each of the three groups corresponds
to around one third of the sample. We also perform balance tests on several baseline
characteristics and find that groups do not differ from each other at 5% confidence level
(table 3.1).
In table C3, we present the main descriptive statistics. A large majority of our sample
is composed of undergraduate students, with an average age of 21.3 years. Although
age ranges from 16 to 54 years, the distribution is skewed to the right. Unsurprisingly,
a large majority of our sample is composed by inexperienced voters. Around 5% are
under 18 (non-eligible to vote) in the 2017 election, and 47% are allowed to vote for the
first time. Around 60% of the sample is female and 29% are displaced students. Al-
though a substantial share of participants is originally from Lisbon region, we also have
respondents from many other constituencies. In specific, our sample covers 170 out of
308 municipalities in Portugal. A spatial representation of voting areas (municipalities)
is mapped in figure 3.2.
We also collected baseline information on respondents’ political knowledge, interest,
experience, and preferences (panels B, C and D of table C3). Party affiliation is reported
75We tested for differential attrition in both universities. We find no statistical differences on
dropout rates. Similarly, we also do not find differences between the two treatment and the control
groups. Results are available upon request.
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Table 3.1: Balance Tests
This table presents a baseline balance test for some demographic variables across treatment and control
groups. The last two rows present the p-value of a t-test for mean equality. The “T. Pos. vs. T. Neg.” tests
equality in means between positive and negative treatment groups, while the “T. vs. C.” tests the difference
between (polled) treatment and control groups.
Group Female ISCAL Age Displaced
HH
income
Gov. perf.
perc.
T. Pos 0.59 0.73 21.0 0.29 2530.4 0.16
T. Neg 0.60 0.74 21.7 0.29 2546.9 0.15
Control 0.57 0.74 21.2 0.29 2479.6 0.15
T. Pos. vs. T. Neg. 0.871 0.927 0.057 0.829 0.926 0.887
T. vs C. 0.344 0.959 0.646 0.979 0.704 0.772
by 6% of the respondents, while 26% report a low understanding of politics. Overall,
30.7% of the respondents identify as left or centre-left, 19% as centre and 48.3% as
centre-right or right. Less than 2% report far-right or far-left ideologies.76 We depict
the distribution of respondents along the political spectrum for each school in figure 3.3.
Most respondents are aware of the local election to be held soon, and 77% state in the
baseline survey that they are willing to vote. We collected voting intention not only for
the ones who intend to vote (’Which candidate do you plan to vote for?’), but also for
the remaining ones (’In case you would vote, which candidate would you vote for with
the highest probability?’). We specifically include the option “Prefer not to answer”.
After pooling the answers from these two groups, 23% do not know for whom they plan
to vote. Another 23% plan to (or would) vote PS (the party in charge of the central
government). The most common reason for abstention was distance from the voting
station/constituency (36%).
Panel E shows summary statistics on performance perception. Regarding general gov-
ernment performance, the average is 0.15 on a scale from -1 (Very Unsatisfactory) to 1
76We asked respondents to self-locate on a left-right scale. We opted to focus on this standard classi-
fication and not ask about the conservative/liberal axis, given the over-representation of inexperienced
voters.
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Figure 3.2: Geographical Dispersion of Voting Areas (Municipalities)
This figure depicts the geographical dispersion of voting areas. Each voting area corresponds to
a municipality. Different color intensities are associated with the number of respondents voting
in each area. In parenthesis, we summarize the total number of municipalities in each respondent
count bin.
(Very Satisfactory) (statistically different from zero at 1% confidence level). This may
reflect the government popularity at the time. As regards perception about specific
areas, government is seen as being performing well in economy and public finance di-
mensions, and so does culture. Agriculture, forests and sea, together with health are
rated negatively.77
In order to understand which policy areas drive the general baseline perception, we
regress that on the perception of performance in specific areas. The results presented
in table C4 show that economy and public finance are the most relevant dimensions.
This result holds when we consider the sub-sample of ISCAL respondents, with a higher
77The negative result on agriculture, forests and sea is not surprising given the unprecedented forest
fires in 2017, which spread due to a severe drought but also ineffective emergency response. There
were 109 deaths and a four-fold increase in the burnt surface relative to the previous 10-year average.
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Figure 3.3: Political Spectrum Distribution
This figure exhibits the self-reported political spectrum distribution of participants in the two
business schools.
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percentage of left-wing participants (column 2). In columns 3 and 4, we split the
estimation by voters that in 2015 (last parliamentary elections) voted for PS or for the
opposition parties (PSD + CDS). Again, economy and public finance stand out as key
policy areas. Economic salience has been widely explored in the literature. Lewis-beck
and Stegmaier (2000) argue, based on a survey of the literature, that voters generally
weigh economic issues heavier than other issues when deciding on whom to vote for.
More recently, Singer (2011a,b) discusses how economic salience fluctuates, particularly
during financial crisis. It is not surprising that after the Portuguese sovereign debt crisis,
respondents’ opinion about the central government performance is mostly driven by the
performance in economic-related areas.
Still in the baseline survey, we try to understand whether voting in local elections
is somehow related to the central government. In particular, we asked respondents
whether they consider using the vote in local elections to send a message to the gov-
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ernment. One-third of the sample say so, and among those, 42% would send a positive
message.
Next, we present descriptive statistics on realized voting outcomes. In the follow-
up survey, 64% of the respondents state that they indeed voted. Official figures set
the national turnout at 55%, which is lower than the self-reported turnout rate in
our sample. This is consistent with self-reporting bias in post-election surveys due
to misreporting of non-voters (Selb and Munzert, 2013). The gap in our experiment
is however smaller than the average identified in that study.78 Around 33% of our
experiment’s participants voted or would have voted for PS. According to official figures,
PS received 38% of the votes in the 2017 election.
3.4 Perception on Central Government Performance
The treatment consists of an information bundle with a positive, neutral or negative-
tone towards central government performance. It is intended to have induced exogenous
variation in perceived performance. In this section we assess how participants’ percep-
tion have been updated when exposed to the treatment.
Table 3.2 documents the immediate effect of information on self-reported perception.
We start by showing the perception update in the specific policy area after each news
article, both regarding the government (columns 1 and 3) and PS (columns 2 and 4).
The direction of the effect goes as expected: participants tend to rate the govern-
ment and PS positively after positive-tone news and do the opposite when exposed
to negative-tone information. It is interesting to notice the strong correlation of an-
swers concerning both the government and PS (0.65 for article 1, and 0.78 for article
78The authors compare survey turnout with actual turnout rates in 130 elections (covering 43
countries), and find an the average discrepancy of 13%, with a maximum of 42%.
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2). Next, we evaluate whether the update in perceived performance in specific areas
actually translates into the overall government performance assessment. Although all
groups tend to rate the government positively, we document a monotonic increase in
averages from negative treatment to control to positive treatment group (column 5).
Yet, and although we have documented groups are comparable, this evaluation may be
capturing underlying characteristics of each group. In order to tackle this issue, we can
use the perception assessed in the baseline survey and compute the change. Column 6,
shows the average change in general perception. On average, respondents that received
the positive (negative) treatment improved (worsened) their perception about central
government performance, with the negative impact being slightly larger in terms of
magnitude. Both differences are statistically significant at 1% confidence level. We also
find a slight upward adjustment among the control group, although the impact is only
significant at 10% significance level. This may reflect events that happened in the week
between the baseline and treatment rounds.79
We investigate further by estimating equation (3.1), where the outcome variable is the
average perceived performance after the two news articles.80 Results are shown in table
3.3. In line with table 3.2, we document a negative impact on specific performance
perception among the negative treatment group as well as a positive impact among
the positive treatment group. These results are robust to the inclusion of baseline
government performance and additional controls related to political preferences.
Next, we evaluate the impact of the treatment on perceived overall central government
performance (table 3.4). We observe a strong and significant effect of the negative
treatment, corresponding to one-fourth of the standard deviation of the general govern-
79In fact, the positive impact among the control group is larger for NovaSBE sub-sample, where
baseline and treatment surveys took place in subsequent weeks.
80Results are robust to considering only the last answer or when we create a panel of the two answers
for each individual.
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Table 3.2: Univariate Analysis of Government and PS Performance Perception
After Treatment
This table presents a univariate analysis of the treatment effect. Here, we show how perception about performance
changes after each news article. Government and PS performance are assessed through the question ”Considering
the information above, did your opinion change regarding the performance of the following entities [Government
and PS]?”. We then re-scaled the 5-node scale varying from ”Yes, worsened a lot” to ”Yes, improved a lot” to the
interval [-1; 1]. General government performance (column 5) is a 4-level scale varying from ”Very unsatisfactory”
to ”Very satisfactory” and re-scaled to fit the interval [-1;1]. Column 6 presents the change with respect to the
baseline general government performance. Significance levels:* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Article 1 Article 2 Both articles
Government PS Government PS General Gov. ∆ General Gov.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
T. Positive 0.169 0.114 0.221 0.180 0.210 0.059***
T. Negative -.009 -.0384 -0.084 -0.084 0.076 -0.081***
Control - - - - 0.182 0.026*
ment perception. This result is robust to the inclusion of controls related to political
alignment. In fact, all those coefficients are positive and significant at least at 10%
significance level, showing that voters aligned with the parties supporting the central
government present a higher propensity to rate the government more positively. How-
ever, the coefficient on the positive treatment is no longer strong and is only statistically
different from zero in a few specifications. These results are suggestive of negativity
bias in the performance perception in our sample. Similar findings have been reported
in the literature, such as in James and John (2007). In fact, although both negative and
positive information affects respondents policy-specific perception, only negative news
systematically affect the general performance perception of the central government.
3.4.1 Information and perception updating
In the previous section we documented that the treatment induced adjustment in self-
reported perception and that this adjustment occurred in the expected direction. There
are two potential concerns with the interpretation of these results.
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Table 3.3: Treatment Effect on Policy-Specific Government Performance
This table presents the treatment effect on perception about policy-specific government performance. The outcome
variable is the government performance perception associated with the policy areas covered in the information bundles.
T.NEG. and T.POS. are dummy variables equal to 1 whenever respondents belong to negative and positive treatment,
respectively. Centre and Left are dummy variables equal to one when respondents report to be in that part of the
political spectrum. Vote PS and Vote PS+BE+CDU are dummy variables equal to one when respondents report an
intention to vote for the respective parties in the baseline. Baseline government performance perception is a 5-level scale
re-scaled to the interval [-1;1]. Additional controls include socio-demographic and measures of engagement/interest in
politics. All regressions include class dummies. Standard errors are robust and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.
Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Policy-Specific Government Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
T. NEG. -0.113*** -0.110*** -0.116*** -0.116*** -0.117*** -0.123*** -0.123***
(-8.35) (-8.23) (-8.16) (-8.16) (-8.22) (-7.56) (-7.57)
T. POS. 0.131*** 0.132*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.126*** 0.126***
(10.09) (10.34) (8.59) (8.59) (8.62) (7.92) (7.94)
Gov. perf. (Baseline) 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.059*** 0.067*** 0.067***
(4.62) (4.52) (4.54) (3.98) (3.95) (3.97)
Center -0.005
(-0.32)
Left 0.028*
(1.82)
Vote PS 0.026
(1.48)
Vote PS+BE+CDU 0.027*
(1.74)
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1736 1710 1503 1503 1503 1141 1141
adj. R-sq 0.156 0.164 0.155 0.154 0.156 0.177 0.178
F-test 5.322 5.261 - - - - -
p-value 0.000 0.000 - - - - -
The first relates to the fact that the treatment may be just amplifying a previous
negative opinion about government actions in each policy area. We show this is not
the case by interacting a variable indicating a baseline negative opinion on each area
with negative treatment dummy (table 3.5). Indeed, the coefficient is non-significant.81
Thus, irrespective of the controls included, we do not find any support for the hypo-
81Table 3.5 reports the results of a panel regression with two observations per individual: one
associated with the answer to the policy-specific performance question appearing immediately after
the first article and the other after the second article. We do so because each bundle covers two
different topics for which there is a potentially different corresponding baseline opinion. Our findings
do not change in a cross-sectional analysis.
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Table 3.4: Treatment Effect on General Government Performance
This table presents the treatment effect on perception about general government performance. T.NEG. and T.POS. are
dummy variables equal to 1 whenever respondents belong to negative and positive treatment, respectively. Centre and
Left are dummy variables equal to one when respondents report to be in that part of the political spectrum. Vote PS and
Vote PS+BE+CDU are dummy variables equal to one when respondents report an intention to vote for the respective
parties in the baseline. Baseline government performance perception is a 5-level scale re-scaled to the interval [-1;1].
Additional controls include socio-demographic and measures of engagement/interest in politics. All regressions include
class dummies. Standard errors are robust and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Significance levels: * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
General Government Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
T. NEG. -0.100*** -0.106*** -0.114*** -0.114*** -0.116*** -0.111*** -0.111***
(-4.13) (-6.17) (-6.27) (-6.26) (-6.35) (-5.36) (-5.33)
T. POS. 0.033 0.033** 0.028 0.027 0.029* 0.037* 0.037*
(1.47) (1.98) (1.61) (1.58) (1.69) (1.82) (1.84)
Gov. perf. (Baseline) 0.666*** 0.661*** 0.658*** 0.646*** 0.657*** 0.661***
(26.79) (25.59) (25.44) (24.36) (22.15) (22.57)
Center 0.034*
(1.65)
Left 0.064***
(3.62)
Vote PS 0.062***
(3.36)
Vote PS+BE+CDU 0.050***
(2.86)
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1731 1708 1509 1509 1509 1150 1150
adj. R-sq 0.018 0.481 0.490 0.491 0.494 0.531 0.530
F-stat. 2.218 16.144 - - - - -
p-value 0.000 0.000 - - - - -
thesis that a negative baseline opinion makes participants updating their policy-specific
performance perception differently when exposed to the treatment.
A second and more severe potential concern is that the observed impact may just reflect
the intention of participants to please the researchers by behaving in the expected
direction. While our experimental design does not allow to completely rule out this
possibility, there are a couple of tests we can do to investigate it further.
The first argument against this channel is the evidence of negativity bias. If the observed
impact purely reflects willingness to please the researchers, it is not clear why the impact
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would be asymmetric. Yet, it can be the case that participants are more likely to behave
in the expected direction when exposed to negative information, even if the information
hasn’t contributed to perception updating at all.
In order to investigate whether the information conveyed in the treatment is indeed
an input of perception update, we can test whether participants with different ex-ante
probability of having had access to that information in the past respond differently. In
other words, if the treatment is indeed effective, we expect it generates larger adjustment
when information is not only relevant but also new to the participant. We use two
proxies for this ex-ante stock of information. Firstly we use self-reported interest in
each policy area assessed in the baseline survey. Then, we use parents’ occupation as
an objective measure of access to information in different policy areas.
In table 3.5, we assess the marginal effect of treatment on individuals who declare to
have high interest in the policy area covered in each news article.82 For instance, for
someone that was randomly assigned to an information bundle containing a negative-
tone news article on the National Education System, we look whether the person has
reported to have high interest in Education policy area in the baseline survey. As we in-
teract the negative treatment with a ’High Interest’ indicator, we find that an increased
interest attenuates the overall treatment impact. A positive and significant sign of the
interaction term suggests that the treatment effect is stronger among participants with
lower levels of interest.
We also use parents’ occupation as a proxy for access to information. In the baseline
survey, a substantial percentage of the participants reveal to hold conversations about
politics at home (45%) and it is one of the most important sources of political inform-
ation, only surpassed by outdoor advertising and media (TV, radio, newspapers). As
82The question about interest in each area was just collected at NovaSBE, which justifies the drop
in the number of observations.
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Table 3.5: Treatment Effect On General Government Performance by ex-ante Opin-
ion and Interest
This table presents the treatment effect on perception about policy-specific government performance. T.NEG.
and T.POS. are dummy variables equal to 1 whenever respondents belong to negative and positive treatment,
respectively. Negative Opinion and High Interest are dummy variables equal to 1 when respondent reports a
baseline negative performance perception or a baseline high interest in the policy area of the information he or she
was exposed to. Second article is equal to 1 whenever specific performance perception refers to an article presented
as the second piece of information. Baseline government performance perception is a 5-level scale re-scaled to
the interval [-1;1]. Additional controls include socio-demographic and measures of engagement/interest in politics.
All regressions include class dummies. Standard errors are robust and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.
Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Post-Treatment Specific Government Performance
Opinion Interest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
T. NEG. -0.237*** -0.237*** -0.228*** -0.346*** -0.342*** -0.330***
(-8.68) (-8.64) (-7.87) (-10.00) (-9.68) (-8.83)
T. NEG. x Negative opinion -0.019 -0.017 -0.018
(-0.60) (-0.54) (-0.54)
Negative opinion -0.074*** -0.060** -0.076***
(-3.23) (-2.56) (-3.06)
T. NEG. x High Interest 0.131*** 0.130** 0.118**
(2.60) (2.56) (2.20)
High Interest -0.021 -0.021 -0.014
(-0.59) (-0.58) (-0.38)
Second article -0.009 -0.008 -0.007 -0.060** -0.057** -0.053**
(-0.66) (-0.63) (-0.49) (-2.32) (-2.21) (-1.99)
Gov. perf. (Baseline) 0.064*** 0.049** 0.076** 0.077**
(3.40) (2.39) (2.46) (2.15)
Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Obs. 2211 2193 1929 616 606 555
adj. R-sq 0.149 0.153 0.156 0.193 0.198 0.189
F-stat. 6.500 6.466 5.927 13.421 12.342 5.619
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
an example, participants whose parents are professors are expected to have ex-ante
increased exposure to information related to Education. We test this hypothesis in
table 3.6. In order to perform this exercise, we needed to search for parents’ occupation
directly related to some of the policy areas covered. We end up looking at teachers
and school staff (Education) and doctors and nurses (Health). We also assess whether
parent’s employment status affects the reaction to negative news.
For all the occupations analyzed, we document a positive coefficient on the interaction
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Table 3.6: Treatment Effect on General Government Performance by Awareness
Level
This table presents the treatment effect on perception about policy-specific government performance. Here, we
use parents occupation as a proxy for awareness in specific areas. The analysis in columns 1 to 4 is conditioned on
policy areas that can be linked to parent’s occupation (Education and Health). In columns 5 and 6 we include all
surveys. Baseline government performance perception is a 5-level scale re-scaled to the interval [-1;1]. Additional
controls include socio-demographic and measures of engagement/interest in politics. All regressions include class
dummies. Standard errors are robust and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Significance levels: * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Post-Treatment Specific Government Performance
Education Health Unemployed Parents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
T. NEG. -0.312*** -0.259** -0.319*** -0.314*** -0.254*** -0.247***
(-3.70) (-2.36) (-9.63) (-8.67) (-15.98) (-14.35)
T. NEG. x Occupation 0.196 0.194 0.205** 0.259** 0.060 0.075*
(1.11) (0.94) (2.05) (2.17) (1.45) (1.66)
Occupation -0.099 -0.031 -0.217*** -0.265*** -0.032 -0.049*
(-0.92) (-0.20) (-2.90) (-3.15) (-1.21) (-1.75)
Gov. perf. (Baseline) 0.194 0.047 0.075***
(1.59) (1.10) (3.52)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 135 118 411 365 1144 984
adj. R-sq 0.261 0.205 0.270 0.260 0.197 0.208
F-stat. - - - - 31.279 4.599
p-value - - - - 0.000 0.000
of negative treatment with parent’s occupation indicator. Such a positive coefficient
indicates a lower treatment effect among the group of participants that have presum-
ably more information about the respective policy area. The coefficient is statistically
different from zero at least at 10% significance level for Health and Unemployed Status.
This result is consistent with the previous findings using self-reported interest.
In this subsection we documented that the response to information is different across
different characteristics related to the ex-ante stock of information. These results sug-
gest that the reported treatment effect found above is not driven by the willingness of
participants to please the researchers by behaving in the expected direction.
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Table 3.7: Treatment Effect on General Government Performance among Unde-
cided and First Election Voters
This table presents the treatment effect on perception about policy-specific and general government performance.
The analysis is conditioned on the sub-sample of participants that are either undecided regarding whom to vote for
in the baseline survey or are allowed to vote for the first time in the 2017 local election. Baseline government per-
formance perception is a 5-level scale re-scaled to the interval [-1;1]. Additional controls include socio-demographic
and measures of engagement/interest in politics. All regressions include class dummies. Standard errors are robust
and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Undecided Voters First Election
Specific Gov. Perf. General Gov. Perf. Specific Gov. Perf. General Gov. Perf.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
T. NEG. -0.116*** -0.119*** -0.092*** -0.117*** -0.114*** -0.133*** -0.055* -0.080***
(-6.31) (-6.35) (-2.79) (-4.98) (-6.55) (-7.05) (-1.67) (-3.36)
T. POS. 0.124*** 0.108*** 0.011 0.027 0.126*** 0.112*** 0.068** 0.067***
(7.27) (6.12) (0.36) (1.15) (7.31) (6.09) (2.17) (3.02)
T. NEG. x Undecided -0.038 -0.017 -0.021 0.028
(-1.02) (-0.45) (-0.33) (0.54)
T. POS. x Undecided 0.049 0.085** 0.092 0.043
(1.28) (2.09) (1.56) (0.98)
Undecided 0.028 -0.013 0.037 -0.009
(1.15) (-0.56) (0.84) (-0.30)
T. NEG. x First Election 0.004 0.036 -0.109** -0.085**
(0.15) (1.24) (-2.25) (-2.25)
T. POS. x First Election 0.010 0.014 -0.084* -0.090**
(0.38) (0.48) (-1.89) (-2.56)
First Election 0.003 -0.006 0.064* 0.062**
(0.13) (-0.27) (1.75) (2.02)
Gov. perf. (Baseline) 0.065*** 0.652*** 0.058*** 0.636***
(3.88) (22.28) (3.86) (23.66)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 1296 1141 1297 1150 1735 1503 1730 1509
adj. R-sq 0.173 0.181 0.016 0.533 0.154 0.155 0.020 0.499
F-stat. 4.686 - 4.534 - 5.097 - 2.354 -
p-value 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 -
3.4.2 Undecided and Inexperienced Voters
Our sample is composed to a large extent by participants with low voting experience.
It is interesting to analyze the impact of the treatment according to this dimension.
Firstly, we look at participants that were undecided regarding whom to vote for in
the baseline round week (Undecided Voters). Second, we analyze the subset of first
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time voters in our sample (First Election). These respondents were identified based
on their reported birth date. In both cases, the reaction to the treatment may differ
from the overall sample. Undecided voters may be more sensitive to the information
provided, because they may be less informed or confused about the information they
have received. First time voters, in turn, have no retrospective voting habits and thus
may be more sensitive to (new) information. On the other hand, they may also be less
engaged with politics and thus be less informed, which could amplify the informational
power of the treatment.
Table 3.7 shows the heterogeneous effects of treatment on the sub-sample of undecided
voters and first time voters. Undecided voters do not seem to react in a systematically
different way to the information provided.
We observe a similar result when looking at respondents eligible to vote for the first time.
Columns 5 and 6 show that this sub-sample does not react differently to the treatment
in policy-specific areas. However, this is the group that drives the strong negativity
bias found in general government performance: negative information translates strongly
to the aggregate perception about government performance. The effect of positive
information is more diluted than for the whole sample (columns 7 and 8).
3.5 Central Government Performance and Local Elec-
tion Outcomes
The previous section provides evidence that the treatment had an effect both on the
perception about the incumbent central government and about PS. We now address the
second research question, i.e., whether the exogenously-induced update in perception
affects local election outcomes.
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3.5.1 Turnout
We start by analyzing the impact of the treatment on electoral turnout, which is shown
in table 3.8. We have no prior hypothesis about the direction of the effect concerning
turnout. On the one hand, information can keep individuals away from the polls if
it harms their trust in politics or politicians. On the other hand, it may increase the
desire to vote, whenever the vote is perceived as an important tool to change the status
quo.
Regardless of the specification, we find no impact of the treatment on the decision to
cast a vote. The stronger predictor of post-election reported turnout is the expected
turnout reported in the baseline survey. Interestingly, the perception about central
government performance does not systematically increase or decrease the decision of
voting.
3.5.2 Voting Outcome
We now focus our attention on the chosen candidate. In the following tables we aggreg-
ate the reported choices of voters and non-voters (remember we asked both in which
candidate they did vote for or would have voted for if they had cast a vote). Our results
remain unaltered if we take the two groups separately. Results are shown in table 3.9.
Due to the political configuration of the central government in charge at the time of
the election, we aggregate the reported voting choices for candidates from the parties
supporting the government (PS, BE and CDU) and consider all other candidates (from
PSD, CDS, other smaller parties or independent candidates) jointly, which we label
”Other parties”.83 Presumably, positive (negative) information would benefit (harm)
the local candidates aligned with the parties supporting the central government and
83Considering only the parties represented in the national Parliament does not change our results.
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Table 3.8: Treatment Effect on Turnout
This table presents the treatment effect on turnout. The outcome variable is a dummy variable equal to one when
respondent reports to have voted in the election. Turnout (baseline) refers to the intention to vote reported in
the baseline survey. Baseline government performance perception is a 5-level scale re-scaled to the interval [-1;1].
Additional controls include socio-demographic and measures of engagement/interest in politics. All regressions
include class dummies. Some specifications include voting area dummies (municipalities). Standard errors are
robust and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Turnout
(1) (2) (3)
T. NEG. -0.026 -0.026 -0.012
(-1.18) (-1.12) (-0.49)
T. POS. -0.026 -0.032 -0.033
(-1.17) (-1.38) (-1.32)
Turnout (Baseline) 0.688*** 0.651*** 0.626***
(34.11) (25.64) (21.60)
Gov. perf. (Baseline) 0.014 -0.003 0.013
(0.62) (-0.13) (0.50)
Controls No Yes Yes
Municipal Dummies No No Yes
Obs. 1768 1547 1545
adj. R-sq 0.381 0.407 0.423
F-stat. 46.467 - -
p-value 0.000 - -
harm (benefit) all other candidates.
Overall, there is no treatment effect on voting outcomes. We find no significant im-
pact of the treatment on the likelihood of voting for the parties supporting the central
government (PS + BE + CDU), for the opposition parties (PSD + CDS) or casting
a blank ballot. Regardless of the outcome variable, voting intentions are highly per-
sistent as the baseline voting plan explains realized voting outcomes to a large degree.
Unsurprisingly, a higher baseline government performance perception has a positive
impact on voting for the parties supporting the central government (columns 1 to 3),
and reduced the likelihood of voting for opposition parties (columns 4 to 5). The effect
on the likelihood of a blank ballot is non significant.
Our results seem to suggest that central government performance does not play a key
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Table 3.9: Treatment Effect on Voting Decisions
This table presents the treatment effect on voting decision. The outcome variable is a dummy variable equal to one when
respondent reports to have voted (or would have voted had he or she voted) in any of the parties. We aggregate votes of
government supporting parties (PS+BE+CDU), other parties (including the opposition parties PSD and CDS), and blank
ballots. Additional controls include socio-demographic and measures of engagement/interest in politics. All regressions
include class dummies. Some specifications include voting area dummies (municipalities). Standard errors are robust and
t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Voting decision
PS+BE+CDU Other parties Blank Ballot
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
T. NEG. 0.018 0.015 -0.001 0.012 0.007 0.017 -0.008 -0.005 -0.000
(0.69) (0.56) (-0.02) (0.47) (0.28) (0.59) (-0.40) (-0.27) (-0.01)
T. POS. 0.012 0.005 -0.006 0.021 0.007 0.013 -0.003 0.006 0.012
(0.43) (0.16) (-0.19) (0.81) (0.28) (0.44) (-0.13) (0.31) (0.53)
PS+BE+CDU (Baseline) 0.606*** 0.566*** 0.516***
(24.02) (19.35) (14.68)
Other Parties (Baseline) 0.634*** 0.558*** 0.500***
(24.82) (17.81) (13.74)
Blank Ballot (Baseline) 0.602*** 0.556*** 0.537***
(14.64) (12.30) (10.65)
Gov. perf. (Baseline) 0.196*** 0.139*** 0.147*** -0.159*** -0.109*** -0.120*** 0.001 -0.023 -0.019
(7.64) (5.36) (5.01) (-6.28) (-4.18) (-4.22) (0.07) (-1.14) (-0.82)
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Municipal Dummies No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Obs. 1191 1074 1074 1191 1074 1074 1191 1074 1074
adj. R-sq 0.427 0.466 0.465 0.475 0.505 0.524 0.342 0.355 0.350
F-stat. 28.996 87.277 - 40.070 104.803 - 7.038 14.723 -
p-value 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 -
role as a determinant of local election outcomes. Indeed, it may be that voters do not
benefit/penalize local candidates based on their perception about the central govern-
ment performance. This could be seen as evidence that local elections are not second
order elections and would be consistent with Marien et al. (2015), whose main conclu-
sion is that “local candidates contribute strongly to the salience of electoral decisions on
the local level”. However, the nonexistent treatment effect can also be due to treatment
dilution. Due to unobserved characteristics such as prior exposure to information or the
time devoted to read and understand the information bundle, there may be problems of
non-compliance or protocol deviations. As explained in Angrist (2006), regressing the
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outcome variable directly on treatment assignment will provide conservative estimates.
The solution is to use the treatment assignment as an instrument for the actual treat-
ment – in our case, the updated perception of government performance –, and then
estimating the impact of the instrumented variable on the outcome variable. Using
the IV methodology requires the exclusion restriction to be satisfied though, meaning
that the only way through which the treatment has an impact on voting outcomes is
actually through the updated perception. While we cannot claim it holds, we perform
this estimation as a robustness exercise.
We have shown the first stage of the two-stage least square estimation (impact of
treatment on perception) in section 3.4. The second stage corresponds to the following
equation:
V oting Outcomei = α + βPerformance Perceptioni
∧
+ γXi + ηi (3.2)
where V oting Outcomei is the outcome variable of interest. This methodology isolates
the impact of an exogenously treatment-induced change in government performance
perception on the probability of voting for a given candidate. For sake of brevity we
show only the estimates of the likelihood of voting for PS.
The second stage results are presented in table 3.10. All specifications control for
baseline government performance perception and the initial plan to vote for PS reported
in the baseline survey. In the first two columns, we use positive treatment and negative
treatment indicators as instruments. In the remaining columns, we use all individual
survey version indicators as instrumental variables.
We find positive but non-significant coefficients on the instrumented variable in the
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Table 3.10: Second Stage Regression (2SLS) of Perceived Central Government
Performance on Local Election Decisions
This table presents the (second stage) regression coefficients of the instrumented perceived central government
performance on local election voting decision. The outcome variable is a dummy variable equal to one when
respondent reports to have voted in PS. Columns 1 and 2 report the estimates when we use positive treatment,
negative treatment and control assignment as instrumental variables. Columns 3 and 4 use all survey versions as
instruments. Gov. Perf. (post-treatment) denotes the(instrumented) government performance perception from the
first stage. Baseline government performance perception is a 5-level scale re-scaled to the interval [-1;1]. Additional
controls include socio-demographic and measures of engagement/interest in politics. All regressions include class
dummies. Standard errors are robust and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Significance levels: * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Vote for PS
IV: T. Pos. & T. Neg. IV: Survey Dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gov. perf. (post-treatment) 0.223 0.203 0.293** 0.312*
(1.29) (1.02) (1.87) (1.92)
Vote PS (Baseline) 0.589*** 0.589*** 0.565*** 0.564***
(16.02) (15.22) (15.87) (14.93)
Gov. perf. (Baseline) 0.015 0.036 -0.033 -0.030
(0.13) (0.27) (-0.32) (-0.28)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Obs. 1166 1051 1166 1166
Cent. R Sq. 0.3734 0.3841 0.3659 1051
F-stat 229.22 65.54 220.13 60.58
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
first two columns. The results turn out significant when we use all survey version as
instrumental variables. However, the results are only significant at 10% significance
level. Moreover, given that the F-test of the excluded instruments is below 10 in this
case, we believe this approach strengthens our central argument of a lack of average
treatment effect in the overall sample.
3.5.3 Undecided and Inexperienced Voters
We found evidence that central government performance perception does not impact
local voting behavior in the overall sample. Nevertheless, we can investigate whether
the response is different among the group of undecided voters. The interest of analyzing
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this group lies on the fact that the information participants were exposed to may be
residual to the overall sample, but it can be relevant for undecided or swing voters.
Recall that these respondents did not react differently to the information provided nor
they use it in a different way in the perception updating process, as shown in section
3.4.2.
In table 3.11 we extend the main specification with interaction variables between treat-
ment and undecided voters indicator. When analyzing the effect of negative treatment
on this sub-sample, we observe a negative effect on the probability of voting in the
supporting parties (PD + BE + CDU). This coefficient is non-statistically significant
though. In turn, there is a statistically significant increase in the vote of opposition
parties (’Other parties’). The impact is sizable. The likelihood of an undecided voter
to vote in an opposition party increases by 16 to 22 percentage points when exposed to
negative information about the central government performance.
We also evaluate the effect on blank ballot voting. It decreases as a response to the
negative treatment for this sub-sample. When we look at the size of the coefficients,
there seems to be an overall vote transfer from PS + BE + CDU as well as from blank
ballot to the opposition parties.
We next investigate the effect of the positive treatment. Unlike the negative treatment,
the positive treatment did not have a strong effect on perception updating (section 3.4).
Therefore, it is not surprising that we do not find a strong significant impact of this
treatment on voting outcomes, neither at the full nor at the sub-sample of undecided
voters. Nevertheless, the positive treatment decreases the likelihood of blank ballot by
14 to 15 percentage points. The blank votes seem to have been distributed more in
favor of the opposition parties, although it is only statistically significant in column 5.
We performed a similar analysis for respondents that are allowed to vote for the first
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Table 3.11: Treatment Effect on Voting Decision among Undecided Voters
This table presents the treatment effect on voting decision. The analysis is conditioned on the sub-sample that reports to
be undecided regarding on whom to vote for in the baseline survey. The outcome variable is a dummy variable equal to
one when respondent reports to have voted (or would have voted had he or she voted) in any of the parties. We aggregate
votes of government supporting parties (PS+BE+CDU), other parties (including the opposition parties PSD and CDS),
and blank ballots. Additional controls include socio-demographic and measures of engagement/interest in politics. All
regressions include class dummies. Some specifications include voting area dummies (municipalities). Standard errors are
robust and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Voting decision among undecided voters
PS+BE+CDU Other parties Blank Ballot
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
T. NEG. 0.018 0.030 0.012 -0.020 -0.035 -0.028 0.012 0.012 0.019
(0.67) (1.15) (0.41) (-0.80) (-1.46) (-1.01) (0.67) (0.71) (0.93)
T. POS. -0.010 -0.005 -0.022 -0.012 -0.025 -0.016 0.022 0.030 0.038*
(-0.38) (-0.19) (-0.71) (-0.49) (-0.98) (-0.53) (1.14) (1.53) (1.68)
T. NEG. x Undecided -0.038 -0.111 -0.101 0.164** 0.228*** 0.224*** -0.123* -0.107 -0.118*
(-0.45) (-1.30) (-1.11) (2.08) (2.86) (2.72) (-1.83) (-1.59) (-1.73)
T. POS. x Undecided 0.050 0.012 0.040 0.128 0.150* 0.118 -0.164** -0.147** -0.151**
(0.61) (0.14) (0.44) (1.63) (1.83) (1.42) (-2.54) (-2.25) (-2.16)
Undecided 0.267*** 0.276*** 0.261*** 0.167*** 0.146*** 0.144** 0.255*** 0.204*** 0.187***
(4.54) (4.46) (4.02) (3.10) (2.69) (2.53) (4.98) (3.99) (3.47)
PS+BE+CDU (Baseline) 0.699*** 0.653*** 0.607***
(27.05) (21.28) (16.48)
Other Parties (Baseline) 0.722*** 0.647*** 0.594***
(28.75) (20.83) (16.05)
Blank Ballot (Baseline) 0.636*** 0.588*** 0.566***
(15.76) (13.01) (11.21)
Gov. perf. (Baseline) 0.147*** 0.110*** 0.118*** -0.143*** -0.099*** -0.108*** -0.006 -0.025 -0.020
(5.84) (4.24) (4.08) (-5.87) (-3.96) (-3.96) (-0.33) (-1.30) (-0.91)
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Municipal Dummies No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Obs. 1191 1074 1074 1191 1074 1074 1191 1074 1074
adj. R-sq 0.467 0.495 0.495 0.516 0.547 0.563 0.380 0.377 0.367
F-stat. 33.217 85.039 - 40.722 111.767 - 6.875 14.275 -
p-value 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 -
time. We find no differential response to treatment among this sub-sample. Results are
available upon request.
To sum up, we do not observe a significant treatment effect of our experiment. This
suggest that performance perception about central government is not a key driver of
voting at local elections. However, we find some support to the idea that voters with
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less rigid voting preferences, such as the ones who are undecided very close to the
election date, resort to their updated performance perception to shape their local voting
behavior. These findings are aligned with those of Epstein and Robertson (2015), who
show that search engine manipulation, simply by biasing the search result rankings
“can shift the voting preferences of undecided voters by 20%”.
3.6 Conclusion
We conducted a randomized controlled trial to evaluate, in a causal framework, the
impact of perception on central government performance and local election behavior.
Firstly, the research design allows us to measure the different impact of positive and
negative-tone information on the perception updating about the performance of central
government. Secondly, we measure to which extent the updated perception implies a
different behavior in local elections.
Our experiment was carried out in Portugal in the weeks around the 2017 local election.
This research was conducted with 1 800 students from two business schools in Lisbon.
The treatment consisted of exposing participants to factual information about central
government performance in several policy areas. In total, we created 13 different in-
formation bundles that cover diverse policy areas such as public finance or road safety.
Besides the large sample, our work distinguishes from previous studies by using com-
parable positive and negative bundles of information, no use of fictional information
and diversification of information topics.
We document that participants react to information and use it to update their percep-
tion about central government performance. The adjustment in perception suggests an
asymmetrical effect of positive and negative information: negative treatment induces
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a downward revision on the general perception about central government performance,
while the positive treatment has a smaller and frequently non-significant effect. This
phenomenon (negativity bias) has been previously documented in the literature. The
comprehensive information we gathered about our respondents allows us to further un-
derstand the updating process. As we show, the ex-ante stock of information plays a
role: the negativity bias is lower among participants with higher levels of (political)
awareness and higher for less experienced voters. These results reinforce the belief that
information provision, particularly with a negative tone, affects the perception about
political performance. This finding can be of particular importance in the context of
fake news and negative advertising.
Next, we investigate whether and how the exogenously-induced change in perception
about government performance impacts on local election behavior. The existing liter-
ature on second order elections shows that electoral behavior is sometimes driven by
factors that are related to other political administration layers. With the exception of
Marien et al. (2015), this literature has mostly focused on how voting in European elec-
tions is affected by the developments of national politics of member states. Moreover,
voters may see the party system as a selection mechanism for local candidates. Thus,
the performance of the central government may signal local candidates’ quality.
We focus on turnout and voting decisions as local election outcomes. Our findings show
that there is no average treatment effect of central government performance perception
on neither of those. These results can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand,
they may suggest that local election behavior is not fundamentally influenced by central
political developments. On the other hand, it may arise due to a treatment dilution
problem. We circumvent this problem by using an instrumental variable approach.
Still, the evidence of the impact is weak.
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Importantly, we find some support to the idea that voters with less rigid voting pref-
erences, such as the ones who are undecided very close to the election date, resort
to their updated performance perception to shape their local voting behavior. These
findings are aligned with those of Epstein and Robertson (2015), who show that search
engine manipulation, simply by biasing the search result rankings “can shift the voting
preferences of undecided voters by 20%”.
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Table C1: Survey Contents
This table describes the contents of each survey round. Panel A shows the information collected in each
survey. Panel B describes the information bundles in the 13 survey versions.
Panel A: Information collected in each survey round
Baseline Treatment Follow-up
• Sociodemographics,
political orientation,
interest in politics, past
voting experience;
• Expected voting beha-
vior*;
• Policy-specific and gen-
eral perception of cur-
rent government per-
formance.
• Expected voting beha-
vior*;
• Positive, neutral and
negative information
bundles;
• Updated voting behavior ;
• Updated perception of
current government per-
formance.
• Realized voting beha-
vior*.
*Voting Behavior includes: turnout, voting direction (candidate) and reasons, for both voters and non-voters.
Panel B: Information bundles
Survey No. 1st Article 2nd Article
N
eg
/
P
o
s
1/7 Public Finance Pensions
2/8 Public Finance Youth Employment
3/9 Public Finance Road Safety
4/10 National Health Service Youth Employment
5/11 National Health Service Education
6/12 National Health Service Road Safety
C 13 Portuguese Dog Breed
184
Appendix of Chapter 3
Table C2: Percentage of respondents by survey type and
treatment groups
This table shows the percentage of responses by each survey type and treatment
groups.
Treat.
Group
Survey No.
% Survey
Type
% Treat.
Group
T. Neg
1 5.83
32.94
2 5.50
3 5.00
4 5.67
5 5.11
6 5.83
T. Pos
7 5.67
33.28
8 5.83
9 5.89
10 4.83
11 5.22
12 5.38
Control 13 33.78
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Table C3: Descriptive Statistics
This table presents summary statistics.
Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Panel A: Socio-Demographic Characteristics
ISCAL 1 800 0,73 0,44 0 1
Undergraduate 1 797 0,97 0,16 0 1
Female 1 797 0,59 0,49 0 1
Age 1 784 21,32 5,97 16 54
Under legal age to vote until last elections (2016) 1 785 0,47 0,5 0 1
Household size 1 728 3,59 1,15 1 11
HH income per capita (equiv.) 1 710 1352,72 1631,49 111,8 17677,7
Catholic 1 778 0,55 0,5 0 1
At least one parent is unemployed 1 800 0,16 0,37 0 1
At least one parent is civil servant 1 761 0,27 0,44 0 1
Panel B: Turnout determinants and knowledge
Displaced student 1 793 0,29 0,45 0 1
Person in power makes difference 1 786 0,54 0,50 0 1
One vote makes difference 1 789 0,60 0,49 0 1
Understanding politics is complicated 1 780 0,17 0,38 0 1
Panel C: Interest and experience in politics
Self-reported interest in politics (1: No interest, 4: very interested) 1 789 2,6 0,78 1 4
Belongs to a political party as militant 1 775 0,06 0,24 0 1
Actively supported a candidate in this local election 1 794 0,06 0,23 0 1
General interest in this election (1: No interest, 4: very interested) 1 794 2,51 0,88 1 4
Panel D: Political preferences and opinion (general)
Knows which part of the political spectrum identifies with 1 772 0,72 0,45 0 1
Position in the spectrum results from own ideas 1 717 0,61 0,49 0 1
Position in the spectrum results from family and friend contexts 1 717 0,4 0,49 0 1
Position in the spectrum results from opinion about politicians 1 717 0,22 0,41 0 1
Within the same party politicians share ideology no matter central or local
roles
1 758 0,49 0,5 0 1
Panel E: Opinion towards current central government
General gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive) 1 769 0,15 0,4 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): agriculture, forest and sea 1 731 -0,28 0,61 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): home affairs 1 714 -0,04 0,58 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): culture 1 726 0,26 0,59 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): defense 1 711 -0,09 0,58 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): education 1 722 0,09 0,69 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): economy 1 727 0,32 0,68 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): public finance 1 719 0,23 0,67 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): health 1 721 -0,17 0,62 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): labor and social security 1 722 0,09 0,63 -1 1
Considers using the vote to send a message to gov. 1 761 0,33 0,47 0 1
Considers sending a positive message to gov. 549 0,42 0,49 0 1
Panel F: Voting behavior in Local Elections 2017
Knows about election 1 788 0,95 0,21 0 1
Intends to vote 1 793 0,77 0,42 0 1
No age to vote 1 793 0,05 0,22 0 1
Does not know on whom to vote for 1 332 0,23 0,42 0 1
Intends to vote for PS 1 332 0,23 0,42 0 1
Why plan not to vote (2017): I do not identify with electoral programs 312 0,21 0,41 0 1
Why plan not to vote (2017): I do not care 312 0,25 0,43 0 1
Why plan not to vote (2017): I was far from my voting area 312 0,36 0,48 0 1
Voted (follow-up) 1 798 0,64 0,48 0 1
Did not vote (follow-up) 1 798 0,3 0,46 0 1
No age to vote (follow-up) 1 798 0,05 0,22 0 1
Voted/would vote in PS (gov. party) 1 453 0,33 0,47 0 1
Did you consider voting in a different candidate? 1 143 0,27 0,44 0 1
In your decision, which was the most important: candidate 1 097 0,51 0,5 0 1
In your decision, which was the most important: party 1 097 0,4 0,49 0 1
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Table C4: Relation between General Gov. Performance and Performance in
Different Policy Areas (Baseline)
This table presents the relation between (self-reported) general government performance and government
performance in specific policy areas. The outcome variable is the general government performance perception,
a 5-level scale re-scaled to the interval [-1;1]. Dependent variables are performance perception in specific
policy areas, a 3-level scale re-scaled to the interval [-1;1]. Both independent and dependent variables are
measured in the baseline survey. In each column, we report the results on a different sub-sample. Columns
3 and 4 correspond to the sub-sample of voters that have voted PS or Opposition parties in the previous
central government elections (2015). Standard errors are clustered at class level, t-statistics are reported in
parenthesis. Significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
General government performance (baseline)
All ISCAL PS (2015)
Opposition
(2015)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Agriculture, forest and sea 0.039*** 0.039** 0.047 0.045
(2.90) (2.57) (1.16) (1.15)
Home affairs 0.069*** 0.066*** -0.021 0.054
(4.69) (3.99) (-0.44) (1.33)
Culture 0.021 0.024 0.061 0.044
(1.46) (1.51) (1.23) (1.14)
Defense 0.044*** 0.047*** 0.043 0.028
(3.02) (2.85) (0.82) (0.64)
Education 0.046*** 0.036** -0.072 0.051
(3.60) (2.52) (-1.63) (1.41)
Economy 0.157*** 0.144*** 0.175*** 0.256***
(9.08) (7.38) (3.01) (5.23)
Public finance 0.115*** 0.108*** 0.071 0.127***
(6.68) (5.47) (1.26) (2.63)
Health 0.028** 0.013 -0.014 0.060
(1.97) (0.83) (-0.32) (1.52)
Labor and social security 0.074*** 0.076*** 0.096** 0.050
(5.12) (4.83) (2.01) (1.24)
Obs. 1621 1213 128 203
Adj. R Sq. 0.360 0.342 0.192 0.500
F-stat. 102.328 70.986 4.361 23.480
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Figure C1: Example of negative treatment information bundle (survey 6)
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Figure C2: Example of positive treatment information bundle (survey 12)
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Figure C3: General Government Performance Question
This figure shows the question on general government perception (translated to English). This
question kept the same format in baseline and treatment surveys.
Figure C4: Policy-Specific Governmemt Performance Question
This figure shows the question on area-specific government perception (translated to English).
This question was included in the treatment survey after each of the news articles. In this case,
we exhibit the one following a news article on Road Safety.
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